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I 
OVERVIEW 
The jury is an important and vital part of Australia's criminal 
justice system if the views of participants at this seminar are 
summarised. Notwithstanding that, it is crucial that known 
shortcomings, which leave the jury vulnerable to attack, are 
addressed and that action is taken to ensure that the task of 
jurors is made as straightforward and non-threatening as 
possible. 
Support for the jury received a real boost from the first speaker 
at the seminar, the Hon. Mr Justice Lionel Murphy, who stated 
quite unequivocally 'I have been a life long believer in the 
value of trial by jury ... [it] should be maintained and 
extended as far as possible'. 
Mr Justice Murphy's paper was directed towards section 80 of the 
Australian Constitution which allows for trial by jury for any 
Australian charged with an indictable offence against 
Commonwealth law. Recent High Court judgments in the cases of 
Kingswell and Brown have indicated that the High Court does not 
currently have a settled view on the import of section 80, and Mr 
Justice Murphy suggested that some further judicial comment might 
well be expected. 
Commenting upon that paper, Professor Tony Blackshield happily 
embraced the idea that more might be heard on this issue and 
suggested that all High Court judges would now approach the 
question sharing a fundamental view of the importance of the 
jury. 
Mr Justice Murphy's paper also referred to the notion of the 
'overzealous prosecutor' and this caused considerable discussion. 
Three types of prosecutors were identified: police officers, 
tenured and salaried crown prosecutors, and lawyers in 
private practice who undertook prosecution work from time to 
time. His Honour saw little difference with respect to the 
last two, but stated strongly that a police prosecutor 
was simply not compatible with the administration of justice. 
People subject to 'orders and discipline' were inappropriate 
prosecutors and police should be free to do police work. 
Notwithstanding that, His Honour believed that peer review of 
prosecutorial behaviour might be appropriate although legislation 
(and sanctions) might well be need to be instituted to require 
prosecutors to conform to certain standards of behaviour. Chief 
Judge Heenan expressed his view that legislation could not cope 
adequately with controlling prosecutorial behaviour and he 
favoured peer group review. But whether any exercise to control 
prosecutorial overzealousness would considerably assist the jury 
in its deliberations was not directly canvassed. 
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His Honour did agree with Mr David Biles that eligibility for 
jury service should be widened insofar as currently citizens with 
better education or in high status employment were invariably 
excluded from jury duty. That in turn meant that juries could be 
seen as representative of only part of the community and were 
thus open to attack. Mr Justice Murphy was most firm that such 
attacks needed to be repelled and the jury constituted 'a most 
important feature of the justice system' for the retention of 
which all Australians should fight. 
Mr John Willis in his paper identified another way in which the 
jury was under attack, but this time from the law-makers 
themselves. He outlined the way in which re-defining certain 
offences as summary removed the hearing of those offences into 
Magistrate's Courts and away from jury trial. Mr Tom Kelly 
indicated that the New South Wales Legal Aid Commission had a 
working practice of encouraging defendants to accept summary 
jurisdiction, not least to avoid the risk of a longer sentence if 
they were found guilty by a jury. Despite that it was generally 
agreed that accused persons should have the right to elect for 
trial by jury. In New Zealand, Judge Jaine informed the seminar, 
the accused has that right only where the maximum penalty for the 
offence exceeds three months imprisonment. 
Mr Willis also drew attention to the difficulties faced by jurors 
resulting from their unfamiliarity with legal procedure and the 
'artificial mental gymnastics' they may need to engage in if they 
do wish to understand it. He suggested that judges should pay 
greater heed to the difficulties faced by juries. 
Not all participants agreed with this view. Mr Paul Fairall 
argued that any member of the public could, for instance, make a 
distinction between 'reasonable doubt' and the 'balance of 
probabilities'. But there was general agreement that the task of 
the jury was considerably more difficult in long trials and even 
allowing something as simple as note taking by jurors could 
considerably assist them. 
However, in practice, judges controlled the activities of the 
jury, and jurors as a matter of course had no right to take 
notes, ask for transcripts or documents like the police record of 
interview, or address questions to witnesses. The variety of 
attitudes held by judges was evident from the fact that some 
judges encouraged jurors to take notes while others forbade it. 
One newly appointed judge was described by a participant as 
having asked the jury after each witness concluded testifying 
whether they had understood that evidence. However, after a few 
trials the judge had ceased that particular practice, a move the 
participant suggested was not consistent with ensuring the jury 
performed their task faithfully. 
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In his paper Mr David Neal argued that it was important for the 
jury to be seen in its historical and political context. He used 
specific historical examples to illustrate this point, and 
indicated how the so-called perverse verdict where a jury refuses 
to convict should be seen as a legitimate role of the jury rather 
than a criticism of it. 
Mr Mark Findlay, while embracing an historical and political 
perspective believed that much community support for the jury is 
based on untested ideological beliefs. The practices followed in 
selecting, challenging and vetting potential jurors all 
contribute to illusory community involvement, yet community 
involvement is the ideological touchstone of many supporters of 
the jury. Mr Neal agreed there were difficulties with reflecting 
the community on juries but nevertheless he said, 'some decisions 
in democracies are to important to trust to anyone but citizens 
... two of these decisions come through the ballot box and the 
jury box'. 
This view was effectively rejected by Ms Mariette Read who had 
practical experience of both the Australian and Dutch legal 
systems, the latter not using juries but instead panels of judges 
who have up to eight years education or training. On the basis of 
that experience Ms Read argued for 'justice without juries' in a 
provocative paper, given the general feeling amongst participants 
in favour of the jury. 
While Ms Read's paper was given a good hearing, it did not 
convince the bulk of participants of the folly of continuing the 
use of the jury. There were three main objections to Ms Read's 
presentation. The first was the unreliable nature of hard facts 
advanced in support of her case. These included the unsuitable 
phrasing of the Age Poll which showed that 40 per cent of 
respondents had little confidence in the jury (but only after a 
preamble pointing out how particular verdicts in recent times had 
been questioned), the second objection related to the skewed 
nature of letters written to the Victoria Police Commissioner 
a visible critic of the jury. The third was the inappropriateness 
of comparing statistics relating to all magistrate's court 
hearings with only 'not guilty' pleas in the higher courts. 
Participants seemed to feel that celebrated cases where re-trials 
or other action had followed a jury verdict, were not so much 
failures of the jury, but failures of the judge or counsel to 
adequately inform the jury. That has two corollaries. First, Ms 
Read's implicit assumption that somehow judges will always 'get 
it right' may be inappropriate. And second, juries are capable of 
handling complicated evidence if it is properly presented to 
them. 
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This last proposition was, however, not supported by research 
reported by Mr Ivan Vodanovich. He found that the majority of 
members of the public responding to his survey believed special 
juries should be appointed for trials involving 'difficult 
scientific, medical or commercial evidence'. Despite that 
however, the 747 respondents were generally supportive of the 
jury and its continued use with those who had actually served on 
a jury being more supportive. Mr Paul Byrne pointed out that the 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission's study had also found 
greater support for the jury from those who had served on one, 97 
per cent support compared with 70 per cent for a community 
survey. 
Many members of the community, however, form opinions very much 
on the basis of what they glean from the media, and Mr Tom 
Molomby presented a paper dealing with the possible impact on a 
jury of media coverage. Basically Mr Molomby addressed the 
issue of a free press versus a fair trial, indicating that in 
his opinion, much of the media were unconcerned about the 
consequences of their actions on the prospect of a fair trial. 
He suggested that the Victorian legislation effectively 
'gagging' jurors was an over-reaction to the problem of 
post-trial speculation, but agreed that self-regulation of the 
media was somewhat illusory. 
During discussion, Mr Frank Gurry, Q.C. pointed out that 
lawyers were often annoyed that it was only in spectacular cases 
that the media sought out jurors and Mr Tom Kelly raised 
the further problem of the media itself being manipulated by, 
for instance, the police. Mr Molomby responded by indicating 
that the media comprised individuals with their own targets 
who received or solicited information from a variety of 
sources. Mr Keith Mason, Q.C. raised the issue of who 
should be proceeded against when interference in the legal 
process followed reporting of, say, a prominent public figure's 
comments. Mr Molomby believed that action should be taken 
against both editor and the corporation, on the grounds that 
if it were the corporation only, they may well be happy to 'pay' 
for the story. 
The actual court proceedings before a jury were the subject of 
papers by Mr Bill Hosking, Q.C. and Professor Peter Sheehan. Mr 
Hosking's paper based on his experience as a practising 
barrister, encompassed the theatrical nature of trial by jury 
and indicated methods used by counsel to persuade the jury. In 
response to a question regarding the importance of a barrister 
being able to behave theatrically, Mr Hosking said that he 
believed that choice of lawyer was not critical and that the 
existing legal system and the notion of a charge having to be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt were the crucial elements of a 
trial. 
Professor Sheehan's paper reviewed existing psychological 
research that was relevant to the jury's role. In particular he 
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spoke of memory, witness testimony and confidence all of 
which affect jurors' processing of the information presented to 
them in court. 
However, having pointed out how jurors' biases and prejudices 
also affect their judgment Professor Sheehan did say that 
despite these problems the jury was still 'the best game in 
town'. This paper prompted many questions from participants who 
were genuinely concerned about the soundness of the behaviour of 
juries given the catalogue of difficulties raised by Professor 
Sheehan. In response to these, Professor Sheehan indicated that 
there was not necessarily safety In numbers and the larger the 
number of people on a decision making group the greater was the 
social pressure within it; jurors were affected by the authority 
figures in court; police tend to overwork a witness's testimony, 
the original questioner of a witness who is later to give 
evidence should be a neutral person with no preconceived ideas; 
there is more chance of distortion by jurors in long cases as 
time delay does affect perception and lead to erratic memory; 
there are real problems selecting an appropriate jury without 
knowledge of jurors; and counsel deliberately using a therapeutic 
technique in questioning witnesses is certainly professionally 
inappropriate if not unethical. 
Representatives from three local law reform bodies which had 
recently released reports involving the jury were next to make 
presentations to the seminar. They comprised Dr Jocelynne Scutt 
(from the Law Reform Commission of Victoria), Mr Paul Byrne (from 
the New South Wales Law Reform Commission) and Professor Michael 
Chesterman (from the Australian Law Reform Commission). Their 
papers reflected the activities of their various commissions and 
identified the major points that resulted from those activities. 
Mr Mark Findlay then commented on the work of law reformers 
generally, arguing that the apparent basic enthusiasm by the 
public for the jury, does not inhibit the institution of real 
reforms. 
The difficulty faced by juries in coming to grips with legal 
questions were discussed by two speakers. Mr Ivan Potas outlined 
research he had conducted on the capacity of mock jurors to 
handle legal matters as presented to them in the format of a 
judge's summing up. Professor Wayne Westling introduced the 
seminar to pattern jury instructions as they are used in the 
United States in order to deal in a uniform way with similar 
cases. Each speaker urged that jurors should be given more 
assistance to perform their duty. 
'Inside the Jury' was the title of the paper read by Ms Meredith 
Wilkie of the New South Wales Law Reform Commisson. That paper 
examined exemption and selection patterns for juries in N.S.W., 
established that young males were under represented on juries, 
and following data gathering from 1834 jurors after their 
service, identified the assistance they had received and how they 
felt about their task. 
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While that paper reported a macro study, Mr Dennis Challinger's 
paper looked at these last areas in a micro context. Each of the 
papers reflected some jurors' frustrations with the legal 
process, and identified areas where more could be done to make 
jury service less trying and more acceptable. 
One issue in particular that was raised and discussed In the 
seminar was the possible provision of the transcript to the jury. 
Apart from problems of availability and cost, judicial 
reservations were expressed about the utility of this suggestion. 
Judge Jaine suggested it was safer to rely on the collective 
memory of the twelve jurors, believing that if the transcript 
were available the jury might latch (unfairly) onto particular 
questions. Judge Heenan pointed out that in any event the trial 
judge would read back appropriate sections of the transcript if 
the jury requested it. 
A particularly absorbing session at the seminar was that 
involving forensic scientists Dr Hilton Kobus, Dr Ben Selinger 
and Dr Eric Magnusson. Collectively their papers indicated the 
range of forensic science possibilities available to courts 
today, the necessity for forensic standards and the importance of 
the scientist to be seen as providing information for the Court 
rather than exclusively for either the prosecution or defence. 
This last could be achieved by the development of standard 
prescribed methodologies with step-by-step documentation that 
could be provided to the court and the jury, along with a pre-
trial disclosure or examination of any forensic evidence that was 
intended to be used in court. 
These propositions led to some vigorous discussions during which 
Dr Selinger made clear that the propositions needed more 
development and that he was keen to continue to work to that end 
in conjunction with lawyers or social scientists who were also 
interested in that endeavour. Setting standards and defining 
guidelines would plainly be difficult yet that work should be 
undertaken to ensure that unreliable, unsound or speculative 
forensic material does not reach the court or the jury's 
attention. Ultimately, however, setting the standard becomes a 
social rather than a strict scientific decision and that is why 
joint research is necessary to clarify just how standards should 
be defined. 
Professor Richard Harding's paper extended the above forensic 
arguments to commercial and other complicated cases, asserting 
that juries can certainly handle complex material as long as it 
is competently presented to them. That would in turn, he 
suggested, require pre-trial disclosures, prosecutorial 
guidelines, training of lawyers and development of forensic 
ethics and standards. Commenting on this paper Mr Ian Temby 
agreed that all efforts should be made to ensure juries 
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understood the proceedings and the evidence. 
The final session of the seminar allowed for further discussion 
of some issues that had surfaced during presentation of the 
papers. Among them was the issue of the representativeness of 
juries which was illustrated by a Queensland event related by Mr 
Kevin Martin. He indicated how in 1981 the Queensland Attorney-
General had floated the idea of limiting exemptions from jury 
service for certain occupational groups including medical 
practitioners. A concerted campaign by the Australian Medical 
Association followed the Attorney's announcement, with up to a 
third of the state's medical practitioners objecting to the 
proposal. In addition, other professional groups became aware 
of the existence of automatic exemptions from jury service 
and started further lobbying for their profession. The 
divergence of these professional views from that of the general 
community seems quite marked. 
But representation itself was a conceptual issue that had not 
been canvassed, and Mr David Neal pointed out that it 
could mean representative of community values or representative 
of community groups. Either way it was suggested that without 
challenges, accused persons might feel that a jury had been 
imposed upon them, and their ability to participate in their own 
trial in this way was an important and sometimes settling down 
role. Plainly the issue of allowing what number of challenges was 
an area where concensus was unlikely amongst the seminar 
participants. And so it was with other points which have not been 
included in this overview. Concensus was achieved, however, with 
respect to the general notion that the jury's continued part in 
Australia's criminal justice system was most important. 
I 
WELCOMING ADDRESS 
THE JURY SYSTEM 
Professor Richard Harding 
Director 
Australian Institute of Criminology 
Your Honours, Ladies and Gentlemen: 
Welcome to this conference on the jury system. We, at the 
Institute, believe that it is one of the most important we have 
arranged in recent years. The jury is at the fulcrum of the 
relationship between the citizen and the State as E.P. Thompson 
put it in Writing By Candlelight, (The Merlin Press, London): 
In my books, the ... common law rests upon a 
bargain between the Law and the people. The jury box is 
where the people come into the court: the judge watches 
them and the jury watches bck. A jury is the place where 
the bargain is struck. 
Recent events in Australia have raised questions about that 
bargain and how it is to be struck. The program of the Conference 
ranges across the whole spectrum of issues that have been thrown 
up - what the public thinks about the jury system; whether it 
should be retained at all; whether complex cases, particularly 
those involving abstruse scientific evidence, require a different 
form of trial; whether legal language and procedures should be 
simplified and, if so, how; whether the Australian media, 
apparently insatiable in their quest for half-truths, should be 
penalised for revealing jurors' memories of their deliberations; 
whether the jury should be more representative; generally, what 
paths reform should take. 
These issues are now being vigorously debated: in the courts, in 
the more reputable parts of the media, in legal and 
criminological journals, in Law Reform Commission discussion 
papers and reports. 
All this activity is welcome, but is perhaps a sign of previous 
neglect. I am reminded of the comment of the jazz musician, Hubie 
Blake who, interviewed on his ninetieth birthday, said that if 
he'd realised he was going to live that long he'd have taken 
better care of himself. As a society, we have not really taken 
good care of one of our oldest members, the jury system, so that 
we now have so much more to do to keep it alive and healthy. This 
conference should enable the necessary diagnoses to be made. 
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Ironically - and I want to put this unequivocally on the record -
the decision to hold this conference pre-dated all the frantic 
activity and attention to which I have referred. Its origins 
were a letter written to me early in 1985 by a Chief Justice 
indicating his concern at the particular problem of jury 
competence in cases involving forensic evidence. I wrote back 
saying that the Institute would be happy to arrange a conference 
fitting this issue within the broader one of the jury system as a 
whole. I suggested that it might be promoted jointly with the 
Institute of Judicial Administration. That possibility was in 
fact explored, but not implemented. In a way that is a pity, for 
the judiciary is centrally concerned with this issue. I would 
like more judges to have been exposed to the deliberations of a 
conference such as this. Having said that, I particularly welcome 
those who have chosen to come. 
Anyhow, the decision to hold this conference was finalised in 
June 1985, before the brouhaha about juries really started. We 
have not, Ladies and Gentlemen, been merely opportunistic, but 
the conference is, of course, no less opportune. 
A threshold issue about jury trial is the extent of its 
availability. It would be fatuous to say that the jury system is 
at the fulcrum of the relationship between the citizen and the 
state if the latter can readily circumvent it or even abolish it 
altogether. As you know, in the United States there are 
constitutional guarantees applicable not only to the federal 
government but also the individual states. In Australia, section 
80 of the Constitution is the primary source of law and it 
states: 
The trial on indictment of any offence against the law of 
the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and every such trial 
shall be held in the State where the offence was 
committed, and if the offence was not committed within any 
State the trial shall be held at such place or places as 
the Parliament prescribes. 
Though, it is, in terms, limited to federal law, nevertheless it 
is not unrealistic to expect that the tone of Australian law and 
practice, even at the State level, will be affected by this 
provision. So what should be its scope? Logically, some attempt 
to delineate it should be the starting point for a conference on 
the jury system. 
Mr Justice Lionel Murphy, of the High Court of Australia, has 
always been concerned about this question. For example, as long 
ago as 1967, as an Opposition Senator he successfully moved 
amendments to the Narcotic Drugs Bill which secured trial by jury 
for a whole range of offences and had a spillover effect in other 
areas of Commonwealth law. In the fifteen years or so I have 
known him, I myself have had several discussions about the scope 
of section 80 with him, and I do not doubt that many others 
have heard his views and developed their own in response to his 
prodding and probing. 
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During the period in which the Institute was planning this 
conference, it came to my notice that two cases raising profound 
section 80 issues would be decided by the High Court. Because of 
the timing, His Honour would not be able to participate in the 
decisions. Accordingly, some months ago I invited him to speak at 
this conference thereby setting our deliberations off on this 
right foot and also putting his views on the public record, 
albeit extra-judicially. I am glad to say that he agreed 
in principle to do so. Now he is here to honour that 
undertaking. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is ray privilege now to invite Mr Justice 
Murphy - a man whom history will surely assess to have been a 
great Australian and a great judge - to speak to us on 'Trial 
by Jury: The Scope of Section 80 of the Constitution'. 

TRIAL BY JURY: THE SCOPE OF SECTION 80 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Mr Justice L. K. Murphy 
High Court of Australia 
Canberra 
I have been a life long believer in the value of trial by jury. 
Recent events have confirmed my belief. Trial by jury should be 
maintained and extended as far as possible. 
Trial by jury is our legal heritage. At state level, we derived 
it directly from Britain. At federal level we adopted it from the 
United States. In modern times the people's will is exerted upon 
the legislative and executive branches of government through the 
ballot box. The jury is the means by which the people participate 
directly in the administration of justice. 
In 17th century England, after the experience of the Star Chamber 
and other methods of inquisition and trial, the ancient jury 
system was recognised as a safeguard against arbitrary power. 
Blackstone in his Commentaries warned against open attacks upon 
the jury system, and also against sapping and undermining it, by 
new and arbitrary methods of trial by commissioners and similar 
bodies. He said: 
... and however convenient these may appear at first, (as 
doubtless all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the 
most convenient,) yet let it be again remembered, that 
delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, 
are the price that all free nations must pay for their 
liberty in more substantial matters; that these 
inroads upon this sacred bulwark of the nation are 
fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our 
constitution; and that though begun in trifles, the 
precedent may gradually increase and spread, to the 
utter disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous 
concern.(1) 
As de Tocqueville said 'The institution of the jury places the 
real direction of society in the hands of the governed, and not 
in the hands of the government ... all the sovereigns who have 
chosen to govern by their own authority, and to direct society 
instead of obeying its direction have destroyed or enfeebled the 
institution of the jury ...'.(2) 
In the American colonies trial by jury was guaranteed in the 
Constitutions of the original thirteen states. The Constitution 
of the United States, in article III, itself provides 'the trial 
of all crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by 
jury ...'. 
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In Duncan v. Louisiana(3) the United States Supreme Court said 
the guarantees of trial by jury 'reflect a profound judgement 
about the way in which the law should be enforced and 
justice administered. A right to a jury trial is granted to 
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the 
Government'. They said it gave an accused 
an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt over-zealous 
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric 
judge ... The jury trial provisions ... reflect a 
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power 
- a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and 
liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of 
judges. 
Section 80 of the Australian Constitution states: 
The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of 
the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and every such trial 
shall be held in the State where the offence was 
committed, and if the offence was not committed within any 
State the trial shall be held at such place or places as 
the Parliament prescribes. 
IS S.80 A MERE PROCEDURAL PROVISION? 
The question is whether trial by jury even for serious crimes can 
be avoided simply by not using the procedure of indictment. In 
1928, in Archdall's case, Mr Justice Higgin's answer was yes. 
He bluntly stated that 'if there be an indictment, there 
must be a jury but there is nothing to compel procedure by 
indictment.(4) In the same case, Chief Justice Knox and three 
other justices said 'The suggestion that the Parliament, by 
reason of s.80 of the Constitution, could not validly make the 
offence punishable summarily has no foundation and its 
rejection needs no exposition'.(5) 
In Lowenstein's case Chief Justice Latham said 'The Commonwealth 
Parliament can, at its discretion, provide that offences shall be 
triable summarily or on indictment. It is only when the trial 
takes place on indictment that s.80 applies'.(6) 
The effect of these decisions was summed up by Chief Justice 
Barwick in Spratt's case, 'Whereas s.80 might have been thought 
to be a great constitutional guarantee, it has been discovered to 
be a mere procedural provision(7)'. 
In Zarb v. Kennedy Chief Justice Barwick went further and stated 
that 'the question of the scope of s.80 has ... not only been 
long settled but ought not now to be re-opened(8)'. In Li Chia 
Hsing's case, he once again referred to the court's 'settled 
interpretation' of the meaning and scope of s.80, (9) but Justice 
Gibbs, Stephen and Jacobs all expressly refrained from examining 
further the scope of s.80 since the offence there was clearly one 
which could be prosecuted summarily. (10) 
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My view was that the meaning and scope of s.80 was far from 
settled but it certainly guaranteed trial by jury, at least in 
serious criminal cases. (11) 
Two recent cases in the High Court suggest that this aspect of 
s.80 is not settled. In Klngswell v. The Queen, (12) the four 
justices in the majority took the view that the so-called 
'settled' interpretation. Should be accepted although recognised 
that the result of such a narrow interpretation has been 
criticised. In two dissenting judgments, Justices Brennan and 
Deane both interpreted s.80 as being far more than a procedural 
provision. Justice Brennan stated: 
I construe s.80 as prohibiting the Parliament from 
withdrawing issues of fact on which liability to a 
criminal penalty or to a particular maximum penalty 
depends from the jury's determination when any offence 
against a law of the Commonwealth is tried on indictment.' 
(13) This approach would give s.80 'teeth' while still 
accepting the so-called 'settled' interpretation. 
Justice Deane, however, rejected the 'settled' interpretation in 
stating that 'the section is not a "mere procedural provision". 
It embodies a constitutional guarantee of trial by jury in any 
case where a person is charged by the Commonwealth or an agency 
of the Commonwealth with a serious offence against a law of the 
Commonwealth'.(14) 
Justice Dawson, in the later case of Brown (15), recognised the 
forceful criticism of the settled interpretation and said 'it is 
overstating the position to say that s.80 has been reduced to a 
procedural provision'. He observed that section 80 has not yet 
been really tested: the Commonwealth has not since Federation 
passed any laws designed to avoid trial by jury for serious 
criminal offences. 
I can recall at least one occasion during my time in the 
Parliament when such proposed laws were passed by the House of 
Representatives and were only stopped by Senate amendments. In 
1967, the Narcotic Drugs Bill and the Customs Bill both contained 
provisions under which an accused could be deprived of trial by 
jury for serious drug offences. It was only after vigorous debate 
in the Senate that both Bills were amended so that the consent of 
the accused was necessary before the proceedings could be 
determined summarily.(16) 
Examples such as this together with legislative schemes such as 
that contained in the present Customs Act where only part of the 
offence is tried by the jury and the rest is left to the judge 
ostensibly as part of a sentencing discretion, illustrate the 
ramifications of treating s.80 as merely a procedural provision. 
The increasing tendency of legislatures to bypass trial by jury 
due to its supposed expense and inconvenience may make judges and 
lawyers question whether s.80 is, indeed, nothing more than a 
mere procedural provision. 
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Most members of the Australian Parliament are unaware that they 
have a special personal interest in these questions. The trial 
of serious offences without a jury is especially dangerous for 
them. Section 44 of the Constitution provides 'that any person 
who has been convicted and is under sentence or subject to be 
sentenced for any offence punishable under the law of the 
Commonwealth or of a State by imprisonment for one year or longer 
shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a Senator or 
a member of the House of Representatives'. 
CAN TRIAL BY JURY BE WAIVED? 
The words of s.80 'shall be by jury' taken literally, are 
mandatory. In Brown's case (17), the issue squarely arose as to 
whether the accused could waive a right to a jury and opt for a 
trial by judge alone. 
In that case, s.7 of the South Australian Juries Act allowed the 
accused to elect to be tried by a judge alone. Section 68(1) of 
the Commonwealth's Judiciary Act applied the laws of South 
Australia to persons charged with a commonwealth offence. Section 
68(2), however, stated that this vesting of federal jurisdiction 
on the State Court was 'subject to ... s.80 of the Constitution'. 
The issue was, thus, whether s.80 of the Constitution precluded 
Brown from electing to be tried by a judge alone. 
Section 80 of the Australian Constitution was obviously modelled 
on Article III, section 2(3) of the United States Constitution 
which has been interpreted by its Supreme Court to confer a 
personal right upon an accused which can be waived at his or her 
election. 
There are powerful arguments for and against the right to waive, 
as shown by the 3-2 decision in the High Court in Brown's case 
itself.(18) Waiver conflicts with the literal meaning of s.80 and 
may be said to be an unacceptable inroad into the institution of 
trial by jury. On the other hand, to deny an accused such a 
choice may be, to use the words of Justice Frankfurter in Adam's 
case, 'to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the 
Constitution'.(19) 
Brown's case may not be the last word on this issue. 
DOES S.80 APPLY TO THE TERRITORIES? 
In 1915, Bernasconi's case (20) decided that the guarantee 
contained in s.80 had no application to the territories. 
Bernasconi's case was decided when Papua and New Guinea were 
territories of Australia. There were overwhelming practical 
reasons why the jury system could not be applied in the existing 
circumstances to the people of Papua New Guinea. Mr Justice 
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Isaacs said 'Parliament's sense of justice and fair dealing is 
sufficient to protect them, without fencing them round with what 
would be in the vast majority of instances an entirely 
inappropriate requirement of the British jury system'.(21) 
In a later case Spratt v. Hermes, Chief Justice Barwick said of 
Bernasconi, 'whatever doubts there may be as to that decision 
what it actually decided ... ought not now to be disturbed'.(22) 
One of the reasons for not reopening this question was said to be 
that the significance of what Bernasconi decided was small in the 
light of the very narrow interpretation given to s.80 in 
Archdall's case and Lowenstein's case. In other words, since the 
guarantee in s.80 is illusory, what does it matter whether it 
applies to the territories or not? 
In the light of Kingswell's case and Brown's case it is now much 
less clear that s.80 is merely a procedural provision and this 
will obviously affect any future consideration of this issue. 
Spratt v. Hermes was decided in 1965 and Papua and New Guinea 
were still territories of Australia. Now that Papua New Guinea is 
independent the practical political consideration which prevented 
the application of s.80 to the territories has gone. 
Perhaps the only reason this issue has not arisen since 
Bernasconi's case is that for the most part the Commonwealth has 
provided for trial on indictment of serious offences in the 
territories and presumably in the Northern Territory the same has 
been done by the territorial legislature. In constitutional law, 
many such questions lie fallow for years, awaiting decision or 
redecision. In recent years, the scope of the Commonwealth's 
powers in relation to corporations, external affairs and 
industrial law are examples. 
The idea that the guarantee of trial by jury is restricted to the 
States is inconsistent with the general framework of the 
Constitution. Section 80 is in Chapter III, The Judicature, not 
in Chapter IV, The States. Section 80 itself refers to offences 
not committed within any State. The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth would be absurd if it guaranteed a jury trial for 
federal offences for Australians generally, but not for those in 
the territories. It would be especially absurd if it did not 
apply to the Australian Capital Territory which was intended by 
the Constitution to contain the seat of government, the 
Parliament and the High Court. 
OTHER UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS 
Two further questions are whether s.80 requires that the jury be 
composed of twelve persons and whether the jury's verdict must be 
unanimous. Both these issues may well arise because state laws 
which are made applicable to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction 
by s.68 of the Commonwealth Judiciary Act provide in some states 
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for majority verdicts or for verdicts by juries composed of less 
than twelve persons. 
For example, s.44 of the Victorian Juries Act provides for the 
continuation of a trial notwithstanding the jury is reduced in 
number due to death or illness of a juror. This power lies 
within the court's discretion. In New South Wales, s.22 of their 
Juries Act similarly provides for such continuation but only if 
consent in writing is obtained from both the accused and the 
Crown. Here again the question of a right to waive may arise. 
This raises similar issues to those in Brown's. 
Quick and Garran, using American authority, state that the words 
'by jury' in s.80 'guarantees not merely the form of trial by 
jury, but all the substantial elements of trial by jury, as they 
exist at common law*. (23) Changes to state laws, such as those 
mentioned, expose this issue of what are the indispensable 
elements of modern concept of trial by jury. 
The High Court in recent years has not been called upon to decide 
what are the essential elements of modern trial by jury, although 
these questions have arisen in the United States. 
THREATS TO TRIAL BY JURY 
The main threat is erosion of trial by jury by legislatures, 
especially state legislatures. The trend is to less and less use 
of juries. 
There are other threats to the institution. The main external 
threat is the increasing tendency to trial by media in newsworthy 
cases. Some sections of the media are tending more and more to 
attempt to orchestrate trials by publication of prejudicial 
material before and during certain trials. 
There are also internal threats, one of which was referred to by 
the United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisianna. The 
excessive zeal of prosecutors can be a real threat to a fair jury 
trial. In Australia cases have come, even to the High Court, in 
which excessive zeal has been apparent. It is very dangerous to 
the administration of justice when the career prospects or the 
prestige of a prosecutor become involved in the prosecution. The 
classical approach is that 'Counsel for the prosecution ... are 
to regard themselves as Ministers of justice, and not to struggle 
for a conviction ... nor to be betrayed by feelings of 
professional rivalry - [not] to regard the question at issue as 
one of professional superiority, and a contest for skill and pre-
eminence' (see Bathgate).(24) Prosecutors should not be 
scalp-hunters. 
In the opinion of many experienced in the criminal law it is no 
longer safe to rely upon the prosecution observing the 
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traditional fairness. The remedy may be that the law should 
require that the traditional standards be observed. The duties of 
prosecutors should be spelled out in legislation and sanctions 
should be provided for transgression. Also, there should at 
least be voluntary peer review to inhibit violation of the 
standards. 
Another threat to effective trial by jury is the failure in 
Australia to recognise that the accused in a trial of any serious 
criminal offence should be entitled to the advice and assistance 
of counsel and that if he or she cannot afford it the community 
should pay for it as part of the price for justice. Mclnnis's 
case (25) showed that poor persons can be forced to trial 
upon the most serious charges without representation. This 
offends Article 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights by which Australia is now bound. 
There are other problems. One of these is the absence of a right 
to a speedy trial. Another tendency is to lengthen trials. This 
could be curbed by more pre-trial decisions aimed at avoiding 
collateral issues and prolonged legal argument during the trial. 
Trial by jury is a valuable part of the criminal justice system. 
Its retention is necessary if there is to be continuing respect 
for the law. 
In Australia, as elsewhere, we live in an age when freedom is 
being rapidly diminished. Our freedoms are too precious to be 
left to the discretion of legislators and judges. The safeguard 
of the people's freedom is the people themselves. The means by 
which they can preserve freedom from unjust laws and from 
injustice within the law is by their participation through the 
jury in the administration of justice. In the future the extent 
to which the jury system is used will be a clear measure of 
freedom in our society. 
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SECTION 80 
A COMMENTARY ON MR JUSTICE MURPHY * S PAPER 
Professor Tony Blackshield 
Legal Studies Department 
La Trobe University, Victoria 
I am tempted to begin by pressing His Honour Mr Justice 
Murphy for elucidation of his somewhat cryptic comment on 
Brown's case, that in relation to the question whether the 
right to trial by jury can be waived, the 3:2 decision in 
that case may not be the last word on the issue. But I know 
that to press him for a more determinate view on that 
question would be to press in vain. Let me turn to some other 
aspects of Brown's case. 
Brown, decided in March this year, and Kingswell, in November 
last year, are a clear indication of two things about section 80 
of the Constitution. The first is that all the constitutional 
and technical questions relating to the guarantee of trial 
by jury are now open questions. There is no longer, if there ever 
was, a 'settled' High Court view. The second thing is that, 
however views may continue to differ on particular technical 
questions, all members of the High Court would approach those 
questions now in a spirit of sharing the fundamental commitment 
to the importance of the jury system, of which His Honour has 
spoken today. 
The essential division in Brown's case is between two points of 
view. One asserts that the right to trial by jury enshrined 
in section 80 of the Constitution is a fundamental individual 
right, the corollary being that an individual has the right to 
waive that right. The other view asserts that the guarantee of 
trial by jury is not merely an individual right but a 
fundamental structural guarantee going to the root of our system 
of justice. Both those views depend on taking trial by jury 
seriously, neither of them is compatible with reducing section 80 
of the Constitution to a mere tautology. 
I share with Mr Justice Murphy and with His Honour Mr Justice 
Deane, in his remarkable judgment in Kingswell's case the belief 
that the so-called 'settled view' of section 80 i^ a tautology, 
an 'inane proposition' as Mr Justice Deane refers to it in 
Kingswell. I share the view that that proposition is indeed 
inane, and that it should now be rejected. What I want to draw 
attention to is an observation in Mr Justice Murphy's paper that 
that inane view is in fact the 'settled' view. Mr Justice Murphy 
referred to Archdall (in 1928) and to Lowenstein (in 1938), and 
told us that 'the effect of these decisions' was summed up by 
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Chief Justice Barwick in Spratt's case, when Barwick advanced 
'the inane proposition'. The fact is that 'the inane 
proposition', the tautologous view - section 80 only means that 
there shall be trial by jury in cases where there is trial by 
jury - has never in fact been decided by the High Court. The myth 
that a long line of settled decisions of the High Court has 
entrenched that view has always been a fundamental mistake, an 
extraordinary example of uncritical legal acquiescence in an 
unsubstantiated proposition. In 1844 Lord Denman said in the 
House of Lords that if you took ali our legal propositions and 
wrote them down under three columns - law made by statute, law 
made by judicial decisions and law taken for granted - you 
would find that you had more in the third column, 'law taken 
for granted', than in the other two put together. 
The so-called 'settled view' of section 80 is the most 
extraordinary example of law taken for granted, for which there 
is no support in any High Court decision, at least not before 
1968. 
Some of the details of that demonstration have been made by Mr 
Justice Deane in Kingsweli. Let me pick out a couple of points. 
Mr Justice Murphy refers in his speech today to Archdall, in 
1928, in which it's true that Mr Justice Higgins did in a single 
sentence lay down the so-called tautologous view. Later 
justices, in particular Sir John Latham in Lowenstein, have said 
that all six Justices expressed that view. But one of them at 
least, Mr Justice Starke, expressed no view on the question at 
all, and the four remaining justices in a joint judgment said 
only this: 'The suggestion that the Parliament, by reason of 
section 80 of the Constitution, could not validly make the 
offence punishable summarily has no foundation and its rejection 
needs no exposition'. 
The real question about Archdall is whether that sentence, as His 
Honour read it to us, is support In precedent for any view of 
section 80 at all. If when we look for precedent we look for the 
reasons for the previous High Court decision, then obviously this 
sentence is no good because it expressly refuses to give us any 
reasons at all. If we look at the actual decision - if one asked 
what, if anything, did this passage in the majority judgment in 
Archdall actually decide - one way of testing that would be to 
ask whether the actual decision would be inconsistent with the 
view which Justices Dixon and Evatt later took in Lowenstein's 
case, which Mr Justice Murphy has taken in Beckwith and 
Li Chia Hsing, and which Mr Justice Deane at least has taken in 
Kingsweli. That view, the unsettled view, is that section 80 
does ensure a guarantee of trial by jury, at least in serious 
cases. 
The actual offence in Archdall's case was an Industrial 
boycott offence. It was an offence which carried a term of one 
year's imprisonment; it had not been tried on indictment. The 
attempt to rely on section 80 was framed in the argument in a 
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single sentence and the single sentence was this: 'To ascertain 
what are indictable offences within the meaning of section 80 of 
the Constitution, regard must be had to the law as it stood when 
the Constitution Act was enacted, and such offences as were 
then regarded as indictable cannot be declared by Parliament to 
be other than indictable*. 
That is the argument that the majority in Archdall's case 
were rejecting; that is, the argument which they thought 
so obviously unsustainable as to need no reasoned exposition. 
But I have to say after puzzling over the argument that I 
would have taken the same view of it myself. It is not saying, 
this argument in Archdall, that the class of indictable 
offences is frozen as at 1901, in the sense that no new 
offences could ever be made indictable thereafter, but it is 
saying that what was in the class of indictable offences in 1901 
cannot hereafter be shifted out of that class, and that is all 
it is saying. 
I can see no way in which that argument would have helped the 
defendant in Archdall, where the issue related to a statutory 
offence created in 1926. Indeed, I can see no way in which that 
argument would lead to any workable theory of section 80 at all. 
To dismiss that argument as the joint judgment in Archdall did, 
was in my view entirely right; to try to read into that dismissal 
any implications about any wider view of section 80 is a vain 
exercise. 
One can go on demolishing each of the decisions which are 
supposed to provide some support for the so-called 'settled view' 
but the result is the same in each case. Lowenstein, in 1938, 
which is commonly supposed to be a four/two decision - Dixon and 
Evatt standing up for the real view of section 80 and the other 
four judges rejecting it - turns out in fact to be a two/two/two 
decision: Justices Latham and McTiernan advancing 'the settled 
view'; Dixon and Evatt in a classic judgment rejecting that 
view; and the other two members of the court saying nothing on 
the issue at all. There is no way that that can be read 
as deciding any issue about section 80 of the Constitution. 
Lowenstein's case had a footnote in 1954, which some judges, 
including the present Chief Justice, have tried to use as 
reinforcing, entrenching, the supposed decision in Lowenstein. 
What happened was that Sir Owen Dixon, who had dissented in 
Lowenstein, became Chief Justice in 1952, and various members of 
the Bar thought that this might be an opportunity to re-open the 
Lowenstein issue. The exact decision in Lowenstein, by the way, 
had been that section 217 of the Bankruptcy Act as it then was 
did not involve an illegitimate mixture of judicial and non-
judicial power, and therefore did not violate the doctrine of 
separation of powers (if indeed that doctrine was part of our 
Constitution, a constitutional issue which Lowenstein also left 
undecided). The only thing decided in Lowenstein was the 
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operation of section 217 of the Bankruptcy Act; the four 
majority judges took one view of that question, and on that 
question Dixon and Evatt did dissent. 
Well, in 1954 an attempt was made to re-open Lowenstein's 
case. Lowenstein was reaffirmed in the Supreme Court of 
Queensland; the High Court dismissed an appeal. Immediately 
afterwards, in the case of Sachter v. Attorney General in 1954, 
an attempt was made in the High Court to re-open Lowenstein's 
case, and Chief Justice Dixon, as he then was, refused to allow 
the matter to be re-opened. 'Lowenstein's case' he said in 
effect, 'is now a precedent of this Court and we will not 
allow the question to be re-argued at this sittings'. Why he 
added the qualification 'at this sittings' is one of the minor 
mysteries. 
Now this refusal in 1954 to re-open Lowenstein is one of the 
factors that is seriously advanced as having entrenched the 
tautologous view of section 80. But in fact eighteen months 
later, in the Boilermaker's case when Sir Owen Dixon finally 
succeeded in persuading a 4:3 majority of the Court to adopt his 
view of the constitutional separation of powers question, he 
said: 'If we had supposed, when we were asked to reconsider 
Lowenstein's case, that a consitutional issue was involved, of 
course we would have allowed the case to be re-opened'. The 
rejection, the refusal to re-open Lowenstein dealt only with the 
construction of section 217 of the Bankruptcy Act. 
The irony is, of course, that even in 1956 when Sir Owen Dixon 
explained the refusal to re-open in 1954 - even in 1956, he 
was not of course thinking about the constitutional question of 
trial by jury, he was thinking about the constitutional question 
of separation of powers. But what is true for one constitutional 
Issue is obviously true for another. If the court would have been 
prepared to re-open Lowenstein on the inconclusive things it 
said about separation of powers, it must equally have been 
prepared to re-open what Lowenstein said on the inconclusive 
question of trial by jury. 
One could go on and on amassing these arguments. The point is 
not to illustrate the point in any further detail, but rather to 
underline that the whole history of section 80 is an 
extraordinary piece of pathology in Australian constitutional 
law. For generations, the Bar and the Bench have persisted in 
maintaining the myth that the issue has been decided, when 
anyone who ever sat down and critically read the decisions would 
at once perceive that no such issue had ever been decided at all. 
The cases currently in the court - Brown, Kingsweli and the 
other issues that His Honour referred to in his paper which may 
now be coming up for decision - show at least that that long 
fallacy is over. 
For my part, I have already spoken longer than I intended, and I 
shall now sit down. But before doing so I should say this: that 
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although I think I have properly emphasised the importance of 
Mr Justice Deane's decision in Kingswell as now the leading 
judgment in my view on this whole question, one ought also to 
acknowledge something that His Honour was too modest to do: 
the important historical role played in the re-opening of the 
issue, first by His Honour's judgment in Beckwith v. The Queen in 
1976, the first clear judicial attempt to take section 80 
seriously since Dixon and Evatt's 1938 judgment on the question, 
and secondly, and more especially His Honour's judgment in Li 
Chia Hsing v. Rankin. That case, in 1978, was in some ways 
an irritating case, as the captain of the foreign fishing vessel 
who had been convicted on a summary offence carrying a 
maximum of 6 months in prison was clearly not entitled to rely 
on any guarantee under section 80 of the Constitution; and the 
whole court, including His Honour Mr Justice Murphy, so 
held. Nevertheless, the case provided Sir Garfield Barwick 
with an opportunity to lay down what is probably the most 
reasoned argument that we have had for the so called 'settled 
view'. But it also provided His Honour Mr Justice Murphy with 
the opportunity to lay out at much more length his reasons for 
the view he had taken in Beckwith. 
What is fascinating about that case, as His Honour mentioned 
in his paper, is the extent to which three judges of the 
Court abstained from expressing any view on the constitutional 
question at all, and that abstention is a fascinating 
feature of the latest High Court cases. In particular the 
present Chief Justice, Sir Harry Gibbs, began in Li Chia Hsing 
a pattern which he has followed ever since, referring to 
the 'settled view' and still calling it the 'settled view', but 
referring to it in the mildest, almost hesitant terms as 
something that 'appears' to be settled, as something that 
cannot be challenged under 'the existing state of the 
authorities'; always reaffirming the view but always with some 
qualifying words which indicate that at the proper time, he 
too would now be prepared to take the issue seriously. 
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PAYING LIPSFRVICF, TO JfTRIFS 
J. Willis 
Senior Lecturer 
Department of Legal Studies 
La Trobe University 
The institution of the jury trial in criminal cases is presently under 
considerable pressure from a variety of sources. Rome groups, most 
notably the police, are concerned at what they 3ee as the unacceptably 
high acquittal rate in jury trials. There is also a significant body 
of opinion that juries are simply not able to comprehend adequately the 
evidence in trials involving complicated commercial transactions or 
highly technical scientific evidence. These concerns have been fuelled 
of late by substantial community doubt about the correctness of the jury 
verdicts in a number of very public trials. 
These criticisms, however, have not as yet at any rate brought about 
very much change in the conduct of jury trials. A belief among 
politicians that the jury system still commands general community 
confidence and support has doubtless been a significant factor in the 
maintenance of traditional practice in this area. It is also true that 
lawyers and judges in general are still strong supporters of the jury 
system."* 
However despite the general unpreparedness of governments to respond to 
overt suggestions for changes to the jury system, in practice there has 
been a considerable erosion of the jury's role in the criminal justice 
process in Australian jurisdictions. Governments have been the major 
cause of this erosion, but the courts have also played a significant 
part. In large measure, the precipitating factors have been expense and 
delay - jury trials cost more and take longer than summary trials and 
guilty pleas. Many of the changes which have diminished the jury's role 
have occurred with little or no fuss and with virtually no public 
discussion. In other situations, a major determinant of policy seems to 
have been a belief that juries could not be relied upon to convict the 
guilty. Often, too, decisions have been made which on the most 
charitable explanation would appear to demonstrate a complete failure by 
both government and courts to take into consideration the needs and 
interests of jurors. 
My aim in this paper is to draw attention to and discuss some of these 
matters. At the outset, I want to stress that I am not necessarily 
condemning or criticising these developments. Some of them undoubtedly 
make good sense; but in general I think it is true that these changes 
have been subjected to far too little scrutiny. Many of these 
developments have already quite substantially changed the criminal 
justice system and have the potential to effect even greater change. 
They really do demand analysis and justification. 
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Removing cases from the jury 
There are two major means of removing cases from the jury -
(1) making offences triable summarily; and 
(2) reducing the number of contested cases. 
(1) Making offences triable summarily. 
The general tendency of Australian jurisdictions has been to make new 
statutory offences triable summarily and to Increase the number of 
indictable offences which can be heard summarily. Maximum penalties 
under much summary legislation are now very substantial. The Trade 
Practices Act (Cth) provides for maximum fines of $50,000 for 
corporations and $10,000 for individuals for breaches of the consumer 
protection provisions of the legislation. Some summary legislation 
also provides for penalties for "continuing offences". Thus the 
Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) having created various offences 
has provided a maximum penalty of $10,000 for these offences and a 
penalty of not more than $4000 for every day the offence continues after 
conviction or after notic^ by the Environment Protection Authority of 
contravention of the Act. In other situations repeated or multiple 
offences are very likely, as for example under the provisions of the 
Trade Practices Act (Cth) and the Social Security Act (Cth) dealing 
with making false statements. 
As Fox and Freiberg have stated, "The risk of fines reaching 
astronomical levels for continuing or repeated offences is increasingly 
having to be confronted" . In Victoria, quite recently a person was 
fined in a Magistrates' Court $500,000 for some twenty breaches of the 
Labour and Industry Act. 
At the same time, the number of indictable offences which can be heard 
summarily has increased substantially in recent times. In Victoria, 
under the Magistrates' Courts (Jurisdiction) Act 1973, charges of 
larceny (an indictable offence) where the goods alleged to have been 
stolen were a car or under $1000 in value could he heard summarily. The 
defendant still had a right to trial by jury. The maximum penalty that 
could be Imposed summarily was 1 year's imprisonment. In 1975, the 
summary jurisdiction for theft (which had replaced larceny) and for 
burglary was increased to $2000, and in 1980, th^summary jurisdiction 
for these offences increased fivefold to $10,000. At the same time, 
the maximum penalty that could be,imposed summarily was increased from 1 
year to 2 years' imprisonment. The Attorney-General, the Hon. H. 
Storey, introducing the 1980 amendments justified these increases 
essentially on administrative grounds that they would avoid two hearings 
(committal and trial), and thus enable cases to be disposed of more 
expeditiously in the interests of both accused and the community. He 
emphasised that the accused still retained his right to trial by jury. 
There was little debate in the parliament, all parties agreeing to the 
amendments. 
In New South Wales, larcenies and frauds are broadly speaking divided 
into three groups: those which can be heard summarily without the 
defendant'8 consent; those which can be tried summarily but only with 
the defendant's consent and subject to the magistrate's approval; and 
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those which must he heard on indictment. The three groups are divided 
according to the value of the property involved. The property value 
below which the matter could he heard summarily without the accused's 
consent was 10 pounds in 1900, 50 pounds in 1955, $500 in 1974 and 
became $2000 in 1983. The property value above which the matter must be 
heard on indictment was 20 pounds in 1900, 100 pounds in 1924 and in 
19R3 was increased to $10,000. ® Similar tripartite arrangements exist 
in A.C.T., N.T. and Tasmania although the property value limits are much 
lower. 
These developments raise large questions of principle and policy; 
particularly the theft-larceny offences where there is no right to trial 
by jury. Should a person's right to trial by jury depend on the value 
of the property involved? Issues that would seem relevant are the 
seriousness of the offence in the eyes of the community (however that 
may be measured) and the seriousness of the consequences of a conviction 
to the defendant. The seriousness of the offence or the consequence of 
conviction will often not vary directly with the value of the property -
the theft by a bank officer or a solicitor of $100 from a pensioner 
would be considered by many far more serious than shoplifting $1000 from 
Myers. If, however, the use of property value is seen as necessary, 
should the determination of the value of the property and the number of 
counts be a matter for the prosecuting authority? Perhaps more 
fundamentally, the underlying assumption seems to be that summary trials 
are in essential ways inferior to jury trials: the magistrates are less 
expert, counsel less skilled, experienced and, often, less prepared; the 
facts and the law are less thoroughly examined, ^art of this assumption 
that summary trials are inferior to jury trials relates to fairness. 
There is a reasonably widespread belief that police evidence is more 
easily believed in magistrates' courts and that magistrates often have a 
less stringent view of the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard than 
juries. In England, a survey in the early 1970's of defendants in the 
London area who chose trial by jury revealed a similar concern about the 
quality of summary justice: 
"The reasons mentioned most frequently [sc. for choosing jury 
triall were all related to what were seen as the advantages of 
trial on indictment or the disadvantages of summary trial. In 
the vast majority of cases the reasons given were that the 
case was gone into more thoroughly in the Crown Court; that 
there was a jury to try it; that there was a better chance of 
being acquitted there; that judges were better qualified than 
magistrates; and that magistrates' courts were too ready to 
accept the prosecution case". 
Such perceptions of summary justice, regardless of their validity, are 
of great concern; and they clearly raise large questions about the wide 
extension of the summary jurisdiction. 
Quite apart from questions of fairness and competence, there is the 
allied issue that if an offence is summary or can be heard summarily 
then it is not such an important offence. As the James Committee said: 
"Many offences in the intermediate category Ti.e. indictable 
offence which can be heard summarily1 ... are extremely 
serious and for them to be regarded as primarily summary might 
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wrongly imply that they were to he thought of more lightly 
than in the past. A procedure which suggested that summary 
trial was the normal mode of trial for an offence such as 
burglary in a dwelling, for example, would not be 
acceptable". 
But, in fact, the great majority of burglaries, in Victoria at least, 
are dealt with summarily either in Magistrates' Courts or in the 
Children's Court, and generally it would seem that "often a burglary 
case is just another summary matter like driving carelessly or assault, 
of no great import, being processed routinely through a court of summary 
jurisdiction" . It may be doubted whether the community generally, the 
victims of burglary and insurance companies would be happy with such an 
implied assessment of the seriousness of burglary. 
From the defendant's viewpoint it may be argued that the existence of a 
comparatively extensive summary jurisdiction is acceptable provided that 
the defendant has a right to trial by jury in the more serious cases. 
Thia is in varying degrees the situation in Australia. However, the 
right to trial by jury is often rather hollow. The attractions of 
summary jurisdiction are substantial - maximum penalties are far lower; 
cases generally speaking will be heard more quickly, will be cheaper and 
less traumatic. These considerations merit discussion. 
The discrepancy between maximum penalty on indictment and on summary 
hearing raises serious issues of principle. Mr Justice Murphy in 
Beckwlth has suggested that in drug offences under the Customs Act the 
massive differences between maximum penalties applicable on indictment 
and those applicable on summary hearing (life or 25 years' imprisonment 
on indictment, 2 years' imprisonment on summary conviction) constitute a 
breach of s.RO of the Constitution (right to trial by jury) by putting 
improper and excessive pressure on accused persons not to exercise their 
right to trial by jury. That issue apart, the difference in maximum 
penalties may in theory reflect the different degrees of seriousness of 
cases heard in each jurisdiction. But, one suspects, there are other 
considerations. Lower courts should not be entrusted (or trusted) with 
cases where larger penalties are appropriate. Is there a trade-off of 
lower maximum penalties for lower quality justice? 
Delays in processing cases in the higher courts no doubt lead some 
defendants to opt for the quicker summary hearing. To the extent that 
this occurs, inefficiency in processing cases in the higher courts 
operates as a disincentive against exercising the right to trial by jury 
- it is hardly a fair or a proper criterion in choosing trial by jury or 
summary hearing. 
There is no doubt that summary hearings are cheaper than cases dealt 
with in the higher courts. And cheaper for everyone - governments and 
legal aid bodies included. Legal aid bodies appear at least in some 
States to take the view that if a case can be heard summarily then it 
should be heard summarily unless there are special circumstances - and 
special circumstances would generally 9,not include the greater 
probability of acquittal at a jury trial. The difficulties faced by 
legal aid bodies are, of course, evident. They are largely dependent on 
government funding, which will generally be insufficient for present 
demand. In such circumstances, the approach adopted by legal aid bodies 
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is understandable, but it undoubtedly militates against defendants 
exercising their right to trial by jury. 
Some empirical data 
Tables 1 and 2 3et out the number of committals and the actual number of 
trials in the higher courts in various State and Territory jurisdictions 
from 1978-1982. There are some surprising statistics. The annual 
number of committal proceedings in both South Australia and Queensland 
was not significantly dissimilar from those in Victoria, despite the 
great difference in populations. In the light of these figures, it is 
of interest to note that in 1980, Victoria massively increased the 
summary jurisdiction for property offences (from a limit per count of 
$2000 to $10,000). On the committal figures, the need for such an 
increase is not obvious. The annual number of trials is, of course, 
substantially lower than the number of committals - a majority of 
persons committed plead guilty, some receive a nolle" and some cases 
are not heard within a year. At the least, a comparison of the number 
of trials heard in various jurisdictions raises questions about the need 
for Victoria to increase its summary jurisdiction. Of course, these 
figures by themselves (even if accurate) cannot, without further 
analysis, provide an adequate basis for any 3olid conclusions, but they 
could suggest at the least that the case (even on administrative 
grounds) for increased summary jurisdiction in Victoria needs more 
justification that it has hitherto received. 
TABLF, 1 
Number of Committal Proceedings 
DATF QUEENSLAND NSW VIC TAS S.A. W. A. N.T 
1078 1405(1977-78) n.a. 1498 288 1408 n.a. 183 
1979 1436(1978-79) 4255 1669 357 1477 n.a. 186 
1980 1658(1979-80) 4591 1694 348 1680 n.a. 149 
1981 1917(1980-81) 5028 1608 308 1529 n.a. 201 
1982 1956(1981-82) 5693 1722 32.6 1335 n.a. 193 
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TABLE 2 
Actual Number of Trials in Supreme, District or County Courts 
DATE QUEENSLAND NSW VIC TAS S.A. W.A. N.T. 
1979 507 684 446 84 306 n.a. n.a. 
1980 456 697 473 79 367 n.a. n.a. 
1981 447 858 428 86 358 n.a. n.a. 
1982 no reliable 636 400 66 378 n.a. n.a. 
figures available 
Note: 
1. All Queensland figures to be treated with caution because of 
reporting difficulties. 
2. Queensland figures are for financial years. 
*Source: Queensland Law Reform Commission, Working Paper on Legislation 
to Review the Role of Juries in Criminal Trials (O.L.R.C. WP 28 1984) 
adapted from Table A p. 114, Table B p.118. 
(2) Reducing the number of contested cases 
Guilty pleas save time and money and reduce the pressure on over-worked 
and often understaffed higher courts. The attractiveness of increasing 
the number of guilty pleas is apparent. It has for long been an 
established principle of sentencing that remorse or repentance is a 
mitigating factor and that a guilty plea may be evidence of such remorse 
or repentance. The further question is whether the mere fact that a 
person has pleaded guilty and thus saved the court time and expense 
should (quite apart from the issue of remorse or repentance) be a factor 
which goes towards mitigation of sentence. 
In England, it is now well-established that the mere fact of a guilty 
plea is a factor which will generally lead to a reduction in sentence. 
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The situation in Australian jurisdictions i3 less clear. In Gray, a 
majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Victoria held that a guilty 
plea, not actuated by remorse, could at the judge's discretion be a 
mitigating factor for sentence by serving the "public interest" of 
sparing witnesses the ordeal of giving evidence and sparing the State 
the cost of a trial. Later decisions of the Victorian Court of Criminal 
Appeal, especially in Page have left the status of Gray somewhat 
doubtful. In New South Wales, it would appear Jjiat a guilty plea, not 
actuated by remorse, can be a mitigating factor. In South Australia, 
the issue has received a frank and quite comprehensive analysis in 
Shannon. In that case, a court of five Supreme Court justices were 
assembled to consider the weight (if any) to be given by the sentencing 
tribunal to the fact that an accused had pleaded guilty. In a careful 
judgment, King C.J., with whom Mohr J. agreed, stated: 
"The conditions under which justice is administered change and 
the emphasis to be placed upon the various purposes to be 
achieved in shaping sentences changes accordingly. There are 
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features of the current conditions which emphasise the need 
for practical encouragement for guilty persons to admit their 
guilt. Legal aid for as many as possible of those charged 
with serious offences should he a high social priority, and, 
indeed, it is not too much to say that its availability to 
persons having a genuine defence to criminal charges is 
indispensable to the proper administration of justice. The 
consequences of the general availability of legal aid must, 
however, be recognised and coped with. It must be recognised 
that guilty persons can put forward false stories and be 
defended without cost to themselves. The result is the 
depletion of funds available for legal aid and congestion and 
delay in the criminal courts. It is not, generally speaking, 
for the solicitor assigned or the legal aid authority to judge 
the truth of the assisted person's story, and it is only in 
the exceptional case that it can he proper to refuse or 
discontinue assistance because of the strength of the 
prosecution's case. If a plea of guilty, as distinct from 
remorse evidenced by such a plea, cannot be regarded as a 
factor in mitigation of penalty, there is no incentive, other 
than the demands of honesty, for an offender to admit his 
guilty, and experience indicates that the demands of honesty 
have but little influence on many of those who appear in the 
docks of criminal courts. In most cases, if the offender has 
nothing to gain by admitting his guilt, he will see no reason 
for doing so. I am impressed by the strong practical reasons 
for recognizing a willingness to co-operate in the 
administration of justice by pleading guilty as conduct 
possessing a degree of merit, quite apart from remorse, which 
can be taken into account in assessing the sentence". 
At the close of his judgment, King C.J. laid down five propositions 
assented to by a majority of the Court: 
"(1) A plea of guilty may be taken into account in mitigation of 
sentence where -
(a) it results from genuine remorse, repentance or contrition, or 
(b) it results from a willingness to co-operate in the 
administration of justice by saving the expense and 
inconvenience of a trial, or the necessity of witnesses 
giving evidence, or results from some other consideration 
which is in the public interest; notwithstanding that the 
motive, or one of the motives, for such co-operation may be a 
desire to earn leniency, 
and where to allow a mitigatory effect would be conducive to the public 
purposes which the sentencing judge is seeking to achieve. 
(2) A plea of guilty is not of itself a matter of mitigation where it 
does not result from any of the above motives, but only from a 
recognition of the inevitable, or is entered as the means of inducing 
the prosecution not to proceed with a more serious charge. 
(3) Tn cases falling within (1), the judge is not bound to make a 
reduction, but should consider the plea with all the other relevant 
factors in arriving at a proper sentence. 
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(4) In assessing the weight to be attached to a plea of guilty as a 
factor making for leniency, it is proper for the judge to bear in mind 
that it is important to the administration of justice that guilty 
persons should not cause expense to the public and delay to other cases 
by putting forward false stories and on the basis of such false stories 
contesting the charges against them. 
(5) The above propositions are not to be taken as weakening in any way 
the principle that there must be no increase in the sentence which is 
appropriate to the crime because the offender has contested the 
charge. 
Cox J. in disagreeing with the majority, stated: 
"Nothing I have said, of course, is intended to detract from 
the power, and duty, of the court to take into account 
everything favourable to the defendant, including his 
contrition or regret. A genuine desire to spare, say, a 
victim in a rape case the ordeal of giving evidence is 
something from which repentance may readily be inferred. 
However, I would not include among the relevant 
considerations the mere fact that the defendant has taken a 
course that happens to have saved the time of the court and 
the prosecutor, and has refrained from unnecessarily 
burdening the public purse in the form of the legal aid 
scheme. The proper detachment of the courts towards such 
governmental or organisational considerations is better 
served, in my opinion, by ignoring them altogether." 
Shannon is a clear authoritative statement that a guilty plea even when 
not actuated by remorse may lead to mitigation of sentence, if, as it 
virtually always does, it leads to a saving of costs or assists the 
public interest in some other way. In the Australian Capital Territory, 
the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Schumacher adopted 
and applied Shannon, although still insisting on the primacy of the 
sentencing judge's discretion. 
There are obvious problems of principle with the idea of a 'sentencing 
discount' merely for pleading guilty. It does seem in conflict with the 
principle that a defendant's plea be voluntary; it can very easily (and 
apparently generally does) give the appearance of penalising persons for 
pleading not guilty; it Increases the risk that innocent persons will 
plead guilty; and It introduces what amounts to a principle of disparity 
into sentencing. King C.J. in Shannon attempted to deal with these 
objections save that of introducing a principle of sentencing 
disparity. His attempts are ultimately not very convincing, essentially 
because, as he stated, his judgment is based on "strong practical 
reasons". 
The aim of the sentencing discount is clearly to generate 'guilty pleas' 
and particularly in cases where they would not without the 'sentencing 
discount' be expected to occur. Thus both Shannon and Gray would not 
allow a sentencing discount for pleading guilty where the case against 
the accused was effectively unanswerable. The discount is to be 
reserved for cases where, to use the words of King C.J. in Shannon, the 
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37 offender has "a real and practical choice" between contesting his 
guilt and pleading. The implication of this is clear: the discount is 
to be reserved for those who have an arguable defence. This position 
is, with respect, of very dubious merit. It was rejected by the 
Victorian Shorter Trials Committee. 
"Tt seems to the Committee that the situation where there is 
an overwhelmingly strong Crown case and the accused 
appreciates that this is so is precisely the situation where 
a discount for a guilty plea should apply. The practice 
which needs most discouragement is that of accused persons 
who know they are guilty, and have no real defence, using 
their legal aid entitlement to defend charges on the off-
chance that something will turn up. 
The Committee also mentions the other aspect of the second 
of the propositions laid down by Chief Justice King in 
Shannon. Where plea negotiations result in an accused 
pleading guilty to a lesser offence than that originally 
charged, the Committee is of the opinion that the offence to 
which he has pleaded guilty should be treated as the proper 
measure of his criminal conduct. The judge should not 
assume that the original charge was the appropriate measure 
of criminality nor speculate as to the grounds on which the 
plea was negotiated. The plea of guilty should operate in 
mitigation of sentence although it results from plea 
negotiation." 
The fact is that senior judges in appellate courts have decided that the 
problems of backlog and delay can be dealt with only by placing real and 
substantial obstacles in the way of persons seeking to exercise their 
right to trial by jury. That there are problems of backlog and delay is 
undoubted; that the proper or the only solution was via pressures to 
plead guilty Is surely arguable. The position of Cox J. in Shannon has 
much to recommend it; at the very least judicial innovation which 
interferes with basic rights should he tried only as a last resort when 
all other means of dealing with the problem have been tried and 
failed. Tt must he doubted whether this is what has occurred. It is, 
too, somewhat paradoxical that judges, so often seen as among the 
strongest supporters of the right to trial by jury, should have been 
prepared so explicitly to seek to limit that right. 
S.80 of the Constitution 
In this context, mention should be made of s.80 of the Constitution. 
S.80 states in part: 
'The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of 
the Commonwealth shall be by jury ..." 
On a first reading, one might have assumed that s.80 was intended to 
provide a constitutional guarantee of trial by jury in serious cases. 
Rut the High Court has not so interpreted s.80. In a aeries of 
decisions the High court has, for reasons best known to itself, refused 
to give s.80 any real effect. Fven more strangely, the interpretation 
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chosen by the High Court is not based on any clear, cogent legal 
principle or policy, a point made with some vigour by Deane J. in his 
fine dissenting judgment in Kingsweli. The interpretation given to 
s.80 has effectively given the federal government a complete discretion 
as to whether or not it will made any offence triable summarily or not. 
HaIf-removing Cases from Juries 
Much of the law of evidence is said to be based on mistrust of the 
jury's capacity to grasp and distinguish. There are, however, even 
more basic examples of keeping the jury only half-way involved. In 
Victoria, the Crimes Act creates offences of rape, and indecent assault, 
these offences carrying maximum jail sentences respectively of 10 years 
and 5 years. There are also offences of rape with aggravating 
circumstances and indecent assault with aggravating circumstances, these 
offences carrying maximum jail sentences respectively of 20 years and 10 
years. A person is defined as committing an offence with aggravating 
circumstances if he inflicts serious personal violence upon the victim, 
has an offensive weapon with him, does an act likely seriously and 
substantially to degrade or humiliate the victim, or is aided and 
abetted in the commission of the offence by another person who is 
present at the time. The legislation then provides that where a person 
is convicted after a trial of rape or indecent assault, and the judge is 
satisfied that he has previously been convicted of rape or indecent 
assault, he may direct that the defendant be found guilty of rape or 
indecent assault (as the case may be) with aggravating circumstances. 
The effect is to double the maximum penalty - in the case of rape from 
10 to 20 years; in the case of indecent assault from 5 to 10 years. 
It may be that judges will rarely exercise this discretion; it may be a 
most potent charge bargaining tool in the hands of the Crown when 
dealing with persons with relevant prior convictions, since the power to 
make the offence one with aggravating circumstances applies only after 
trial. Rut it is certainly a substantial derogation from the normal 
role of the jury, whose verdict generally determines the maximum 
penalty. Just what purpose ia served by this provision is somewhat 
uncertain. 
The drug offences under the Commonwealth Customs Act are not dissimilar 
in their aim of removing from the jury vital decisions about the 
applicable maximum penalties. S.233B Customs Act creates, inter alia, 
an offence of being without reasonable excuse (proof whereof shall lie 
upon the defendant) in possession of prohibited drugs. The maximum 
penalties for this offence are set out in s.235 and depend on the 
finding by the trial judge of further factual matters - including the 
quantity of drug involved and intentions of the offender. Findings on 
these factual matters can lead to maximum penalties of from 2 years to 
life imprisonment. The simple fact of possession without reasonable 
excuse of prohibited drugs creates presumably a liability for a maximum 
penalty of only 2 years; it is the findings by the judge after the jury 
verdict that can immensely increase the defendant's liability. 
Forgetting about the Jury 
There are instances where procedures and laws are established whose 
ramifications on juries seem not to have been considered. Thus in New 
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South Wales under the crime compensation scheme which is court based, a 
victim who has suffered "injury" can seek an order from the trial judge 
for compensation at the end of the trial, even if the defendant has been 
acquitted. Tn such cases, the judge must be satisfied on the balance 
of probabilities that a crime has been committed before he can award 
compensation. In cases where a judge does make a compensation order 
after an acquittal, while there is in theory no conflict between the 
jury verdict and the making of the compensation order, it is clear that 
in practice, the judge's order could very easily he seen as an implied 
disagreement with the jury's verdict. There seems little justification 
in creating structures which can fuel dissatisfaction with jury 
verdicts, particularly when there are alternative and probably superior 
means of providing criminal compensation. 
In Victoria, theft is defined as "dishonestly appropriating property 
belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the 
other of it". The legislature being anxious to ensure that persons 
who "joy ride" in cars are convicted of theft created, not a special 
offence of stealing cars, but merely an evidentiary provision. This 
provision, s.73(14), states: 
"(l4)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (12) 
in any proceedings -
(a) for stealing a motor car or an aircraft proof that 
the person charged took or in any manner used the motor 
car or aircraft without the consent of the owner or 
person in lawful possession thereof shall be conclusive 
evidence that the person charged intended to 
permanently deprive the owner of it;" 
The problem is that very often the fact that a person took or in any 
manner used a car without the consent of the owner does not mean that he 
intended to permanently deprive the owner of it. And since in order to 
convict of theft, say, of a car, the jury must be satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that the defendant had the intention to permanently 
deprive, s.73(14) seems to be telling them that black is white. It will 
be noted that s.73(14) does not on its terms create a legal presumption 
rebuttable or irrebuttable; it in effect tells a jury who are supposed 
to be the deciders of factual issues how it is to interpret certain 
evidence. T.t is a singularly crude device. 
Providing Ammunition for Critics of the Jury 
Critics of the jury have with more than a little justification argued 
that in the present circumstances juries are inappropriate bodies to 
decide many criminal cases. These critics argue that the jury cannot 
cope with the subtle distinctions in the rules of evidence especially in 
joint trials; do not perceive the significance of much that occurs 
because of unfamiliarity with legal procedure; and cannot understand the 
law it is supposed to be applying. 
It can be said that in no small measure judges have left the jury open 
to these criticisms. The rules of evidence often expect somewhat 
artificial mental gymnastics of jurors - e.g. in joint trials with the 
use to be made of accomplice evidence. There is evidence that jurors 
often have added difficulties simply because they do not understand 
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basic procedures; likewise there has very often been little effort 
made to assist jurors with note books and biros, or with copies of key 
documents. This surely is a matter where judges could have taken 
initiatives. 
Various aspects of the substantive law are simply quite unsuitable for 
jury trials. Justice Roden of the NSW Supreme Court has stated: 
"My own belief is that many of our principles of law and 
especially those relating to self-defence, provocation and 
diminished responsibility, which have been carefully and 
skilfully designed by lawyers and which could provide a very 
suitable basis upon which lawyers might seek to arrive at 
verdicts if it were their responsibility to do so, are 
totally unsuitable for juries". 
Tn similar manner, the use of alternative verdicts in some jurisdictions 
needs reform. In Victoria, the Crimes Act provides some seven 
alternative verdicts for a person charged with rape. These include 
assault with intent to commit rape, attempted rape, assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm; indecent assault. The task imposed on the trial 
judge can be well-nigh impossible especially if there are more than one 
accused. In addition to directing the jury on the law and relevant 
evidence for the offence of rape and distinguishing clearly between each 
defendant, he is required to direct them on the law and relevant 
evidence for whichever of the alternative offences there is evidence on 
which a jury could convict. And it must be doubted whether a jury could 
on any terms be expected to have the slightest idea of the legal 
distinctions between each of these offences. 
In all these areas, where judges have a very large say about how things 
should be, judges have very often failed to pay sufficient attention to 
the needs of juries. The reasons are not hard to find - juries are 
transient, silent, with no jurors' union to make demands. There is a 
greater awareness now of the needs of jurors and even, on occasion a 
preparedness to hear their point of view - it is a welcome development 
and one that needs to be taken a good deal further. 
Conclusion 
The present concern about the performance of juries in the criminal 
justice system is most timely. At the very least it should lead to 
greater awareness of the needs of jurors and of the difficulty of their 
task. It may also lead to a solid, serious debate, about the proper 
role of juries in the modern trial. Such a development could only be of 
value. 
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JUSTICE WITHOUT JURIES 
Ms Mariette Read 
Formerly Research Officer 
Law Reform Commission of Victoria 
PUBLIC DEBATE 
Criticism of the jury system has come as a surprise to many 
lawyers. Indeed, the community at large does not seem to 
seriously question the criminal justice system: like taxes, 
juries seem to be taken for granted. In recent years, public 
awareness of the jury system has increased considerably, because 
of revelations by jurors in celebrated cases, such as the 
Chamberlain, Gallagher, and Murphy trials. 
Victorian newspapers in particular have carried numerous articles 
dealing with the pros and cons of the Anglo-Australian criminal 
trials, including the 50 per cent acquittal rate (seen by some 
as an indication of malfunctioning of the system and by others as 
a sign that the jury has taken Its task seriously by acquitting 
when not convinced beyond reasonable doubt), and issues such as 
whether there should be a referee in the jury room to explain 
points of procedure and to keep jurors at their task of deciding 
the evidence; whether juries sometimes bring in a verdict merely 
because they wanted to go home; and whether the jurors are or 
should be the accused's peers. 
The jury system and its adversary nature are also being 
questioned and probed by the young people, our future leaders, as 
part of their legal studies at Year 12 level. 
In the early 1980s the then liberal government in Victoria toyed 
with the idea of making trial by jury optional as a means of 
speeding up the whole criminal procedure. In New South Wales, 
South Australia, Canada and New Zealand optional trial by jury 
had already been introduced but the issue was shelved in Victoria 
when the liberal party lost the election. The present labor 
Attorney-General seems firmly committed to the retention of the 
jury for all indictable offences dealt with in the higher 
court s. 
For many years, the Chief Commissioner of Police in Victoria, 
Mr S.I. Miller, has argued that the jury system needs 
thorough Investigation (see, for instance, the Age, 2 June 
1984). He has asserted that if jury deliberations were to be 
revealed, the weakness of the system would be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt. He bases this contention on views expressed 
to him by a large number of people who have actually served on 
juries. 
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Also, he says, the comparison of the conviction rate of about 90 
per cent in the Magistrates' Courts with a conviction rate of 
about 50 per cent in the higher courts makes one wonder 
whether one of the two systems may not be wrong* 
The legal profession is very protective towards the jury. In the 
press, some have blamed the jury attacks on increased police 
militantism. Newspaper articles criticising the jury system are 
said to be counter-productive, and questioning of jury competence 
was 'astounding' (Age, 9 August 1984). But even lawyers seem 
to be starting to feel a lurking doubt about the jury's ability 
to handle complex scientific or commercial matters following such 
lengthy trials as those of Van Beelen and Smart, and notable 
trials such as that of Chamberlain. 
The Age poll, conducted last year in the wake of the jury 
revelations in the Chamberlain, Gallagher, and Murphy 
trials, indicated that two out of every five citizens in 
Australia now have doubts about the jury system (Age, 9 
October 1986). The jury is alive, but just. The question is, 
should we let it die its natural death, give it artificial 
legal life support, or perform drastic surgery. 
What is the diagnosis and what is the prognosis of the jury 
system? 
DIAGNOSIS 
In Favour of the Jury 
The theory in favour of the jury system suggests that it is a 
democratic institution, that it is a good fact finder, and that 
it dispenses justice rather than law. 
Democratic Institution 
As a democratic institution, it is said that the jury keeps in 
check the power of the law makers (parliament) the law upholders 
(judiciary) and the law enforcers (police). Does the jury live up 
to this standard and how necessary is it that these checks are 
performed by a jury? 
History shows that political trials have only led to an acquittal 
in a handful of cases. Trials inspired by political motives, that 
is by laying charges without adequate evidence, or otherwise 
unjustifiably, happen rarely if at all. The independence of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions and the Prosecutors for the 
Queen, as well as the independence of the judiciary ensure that 
political interference is kept out of the conduct of a trial. 
Recently, Mr Justice Murphy claimed his trial as political. 
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Even if we assume for the sake of the argument that this were so, 
the mere fact that he was convicted by the first jury shows that 
the jury did not follow its reputed distaste for politically 
inspired prosecutions, but merely found the facts and applied the 
law as directed by the trial judge. The acquittal on the second 
trial followed a different course of trial and different 
directions as to the law. 
Similarly, the perceived check on the judiciary, although not 
begrudged by judges, seems to be fallacious. Firstly, judges have 
much more influence on the jury's verdict than is generally 
realised and secondly, they agree with the jury's verdict in at 
least 75 per cent of the cases so they might as well have 
given the verdict themselves (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; 
Baldwin and McConville 1979). In the 25 per cent of 
disagreement with the jury, it is legitimate to ask whether 
society has benefited from those verdicts. Undeserved 
convictions or acquittals take their human toll. 
To avoid an alleged lawyers' bias, which can be recognised and 
overcome by the judge in a written and reasoned judgment, a 
jury's bias has been allowed to exist which is uncontrollable and 
secret (see American research reported in Australian, 1 July 
1985). 
It is said that the jury ensures that an accused does not stand 
convicted merely because the police are convinced of that 
person's guilt. The very fact that the conviction rate In the 
Magistrates' Courts is so high, may well suggest that the police 
investigation has not been sufficiently questioned. The other 
side of the coin, to the European observer, is that undue 
criticism of the police force has led to a rigidity in the 
investigation of major crime, since a conviction at odds of 50-50 
is quite a triumph. Investigations should include matters 
pointing to innocenceas well as guilt. A preliminary 
investigation led by an independent prosecutor (or by a judge, as 
in Europe) seems to be a more effective way of avoiding 
unnecessary prosecutions. Relying on a particular jury to 
distrust police evidence in the appropriate case is putting the 
cart before the horse. 
The Fact Finder 
It is not the objective facts that are in dispute in most trials 
but the subjective Intention of the perpetrator of the crime, 
which in ordinary language is not a true fact but an inference to 
be drawn from the facts. Even where the facts are denied by the 
accused, such as in cases of mistaken identity or where 
circumstantial evidence is challenged by the accused, the 
tribunal Is usually asked to choose between conflicting expert 
evidence rather than conflicting witnesses' evidence. 
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Today, there are additional and more accurate means of 
establishing facts than reliance on a jury's intuition. No longer 
does the jury possess an Inside knowledge about the circumstances 
of the crime (except, perhaps in country communities). The jury 
is now more distanced from the case than the judge. The jury 
which developed as an able bodied assistant to the judge, is now 
as helpless as a newborn babe. 
If the issue is the handling of firearms or the sale of second 
hand video recorders in a pub or the morals of sub-cultures or 
ethnic groups, it would make more sense if evidence on the 
particular issue was given during the trial. For instance, in 
R v. Dincer (1983 VR 460) where a conservative muslim stabbed 
his teenage daughter to death upon finding her in bed with 
her boyfriend, the issue left to the jury was whether an ordinary 
man with the accused's characteristics, that is a 
traditionalist Turk, would have reacted similarly to 
the provocation. Unrealistically, the law does not permit 
evidence to be called to assist the jury in determining what 
an ordinary conservative Turkish muslim might have done in those 
circumstances. 
The mens rea of the accused is a much refined concept. 
Psychiatrists are precluded from commenting on the probable 
intent of the accused at the time of the crime, because how could 
they assess the accused's state of mind in the past without 
knowing all the evidence. The jury is required to distill the 
past intent out of the proven objective facts, but knows little 
or nothing about the accused's personality. 
To enable a jury to find facts, much time and effort goes into 
making the process understandable to them. It may well be that by 
and large the judge and counsel succeed in making the issues 
sufficiently clear, but their painstaking efforts have not 
prevented the criminal law from becoming extremely intricate and 
refined. Some common words, like rape, theft and malice, have 
acquired a technical legal meaning which differs somewhat from 
every day language. The terms 'reasonable man' or 'beyond 
reasonable doubt' are not the recognisable concepts that lawyers 
had hoped. Distinguished legal minds in the appeal courts are 
forever refining the concepts of, for instance, the mental 
element in crime, which requires precise and specific directions 
by the trial judge to the jury. It is unlikely that a jury will 
obtain sufficient dexterity during the course of a trial to apply 
these theoretical concepts with any manner of precision. The 
beneficial effect of this microsurgery of the law is lost where 
the holder of the scalpel has no more training than the barber of 
yore. 
Furthermore, in cases of multiple accused or multiple charges, 
complex scientific evidence or complicated commercial dealings, 
the evidence cannot be simplified. The clock cannot be set back. 
Today's trials may be more cumbersome compared to a romanticised 
past, tomorrow's trials will be even more technical. 
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By asking a tribunal to apply refined legal concepts and 
comprehend complex and scientific evidence, without giving it the 
training and experience to do so, only invites its indiscriminate 
application and many grounds for appeal. 
Justice 
Jurors swear an oath to give a true verdict according to the 
evidence. And in general, jurors seem to bear that in mind. A 
juror in the first Murphy trial referred to the jury's dislike 
for a particular law but felt constrained to apply it. 
One can imagine cases where sympathy is almost entirely with the 
accused, such as in euthanasia cases, or where the victim kills a 
wife and child basher. In English speaking countries one is led 
to believe that a jury will acquit in the appropriate case, where 
a judge, who is bound by the law cannot. This however, is a 
fallacy. Firstly, not all juries feel free to depart from their 
oath to give a true verdict according to the evidence, in the 
absence of instructions from the judge to the contrary, so that 
in some deserving case one jury may acquit but in another equally 
deserving case another jury may convict. And in which case has 
justice been done? 
Secondly, even in the Anglo-Australian trial, where the judge is 
bound by precedent (which, by the way, need not be necessary to 
have an orderly justice system), judges have shown the skill and 
ingenuity to distinguish a meritorious case. Alternatively, a 
judge, like a magistrate, could exercise a discretion not to 
record a conviction. Considering the refinements of the law of 
murder, lawyers have not shown much confidence in juries getting 
it 'right', without, metaphorically speaking, putting the jury 
in a straitjacket of concepts such as provocation, self-
defence, reckless murder, felony murder, or intent to do 
grievous bodily harm. The appeal courts increasingly add further 
complications to the criminal law. Some judges now regard a 
criminal trial as more complex than those in jurisdictions 
traditionally regarded as hard, such as equity or practice 
court. This development is in part due to the narrow appeal 
grounds which do not allow for a rehearing on the facts. This 
has sharpened the ingenuity of counsel and judges in finding 
errors of law on the most minute distinctions, where perhaps 
all that was required was to reconsider the factual 
evidence. Where a trial judge cannot be found to have made an 
error of law sufficient to overturn the verdict, such as in the 
Chamberlain case, the accused would have to rely on sufficient 
public agitation to result in the setting up of an 
inquisitorial form of inquiry. Those found guilty of lesser 
indictable offences, such as burglary or assault cannot hope 
for further deployment of public funds. 
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One of the merits of the jury system is said to be that it will 
counter harsh laws by consistent acquittals. Laws have been 
changed as a result of a large number of acquittals in cases such 
as sedition, child murder and manslaughter by a drunk motorist. 
However, such changes have come very late to the British criminal 
law. Without the reliance on this justice by the jury, such 
changes would have come much earlier. Indeed, the presence of the 
various law reform bodies in this country now have the task to 
advise the Attorney-General on more timely updating of the law. 
Furthermore, consistent acquittals by juries should not always be 
followed by a change in the law, say, for the sake of the 
argument If juries consistently refuse to convict 'poofter 
bashers' or rapists of prostitutes. In those cases Parliament 
should be more enlightened than the public prejudice that might 
be expressed in jury verdicts. 
All in all, Parliament is chosen by the community to pass the 
laws the community demands and should not slavishly follow 
acquittals made by a statistically non-representative sample of 
the community just to ensure the courts register more 
convictions. 
Against the Jury 
The arguments against the jury system are, broadly speaking, that 
it relies on comprehension of the issues which cannot be 
guaranteed or ascertained, that a jury trial is too narrowly 
based and wasteful In time, effort and money and that a jury 
verdict is unpredictable and falsely unanimous. 
Intelligence cannot be measured by the level of education alone. 
Nor is intelligence the only requirement for comprehension of the 
issues. Concentration, interest in the issues, experience and 
familiarity with the topic all come into play. 
It takes time to develop understanding of courtroom procedure; 
the who'8 who, what roles people play, the difference between 
examination in chief and cross examination, and the impact of an 
unsworn statement. All common enough for the courtroom expert, 
but a foreign wilderness to each and every juror alike. 
Lawyers will say that by the end of the trial the jury will have 
a sufficient grasp of the evidence because counsel will explain 
it all very clearly, and so will the judge. But surely, it is not 
the point whether the evidence becomes clear on explanation at 
the end, but that it is understandable from the beginning so that 
no points are being missed because the jury does not know what 
counsel is leading up to. 
To a certain extent these problems could be alleviated by 
providing the jury with advance information on courtroom 
procedure, maps and plans, and even the transcript. 
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However, even they will not make up for the lack of experience in 
judicial decision making, which is not a natural but an acquired 
skill, as is recognised in Western European countries where 
judges receive training in judicial skills before appointment to 
the bench. 
Lack of comprehension is a real and recognised problem, but 
cannot be identified in individual cases, because a jury does not 
give reasons. The jury is the only tribunal that is not required 
to give reasons for its judgment. The modern rationale is that 
jurors might have varied reasons (originally, in the days of the 
bow and arrow, the requirement was not so much unanimity, but 
that at least twelve people out of a large number, could be found 
to swear to a particular set of facts). It is realised that it is 
impracticable to require the jury to give reasons. Indeed, that 
just shows up the very weakness of the jury system. It leaves the 
accused and the community to wonder about the verdict. 
Is it really true that a jury acquittal leaves the accused's 
reputation in tact? Controvery around the Murphy verdict 
remains. Equally, a guilty verdict does not appease public 
opinion either, as the Chamberlain verdict shows. If reasons 
had been given for these verdicts, both the accused and the 
public would have had something concete to point to, 
something they could agree or disagree on which could provide 
definite arguments to refute allegations that tarnish the 
verdict. Without reasons, one is left with speculation and an 
unwillingness to correct a verdict that was factually wrong, 
because it cannot be shown to be based on a misdiagnosis except 
in the extreme cases. A verdict without reasons covers up 
mistakes that may have been made by these twelve human 
beings, just as liable to make an error as, for instance, is 
a board of management. 
The British adversary trial hearing is lengthier than its 
European counterparts. This is in part due to the use of juries. 
Civil cases, without juries now take up to one third less time 
than a civil jury trial. Another reason is the completely oral 
nature of the hearing. In Europe documentary evidence has 
a much greater role to play. In Holland, with its bench of 
three professional judges, only the crucial witnesses are heard 
orally at the trial. Many witness's statements to the police or 
to the investigating judge are handed over to the court unless 
the defence objects. Usually, there is very little mileage in 
attacking a peripheral or supporting witness, so in this way 
much time is saved during the trial itself. Recently a trial was 
held in Holland involving alleged fraudulent dealings by the 
owner-director of a large private bank. The bank was sold to a 
French concern which uncovered the fraudulent banking practices 
when it was faced with losses of about $150 million. The trial 
lasted four days and judgment was handed down a fortnight later. 
The court acquitted the accused, and reasons were given, 
exonerating the bank director from criminal liability for these 
fraudulent practices in his bank, because of his particular 
position on the board of management at the time. 
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These reasons were published in newspapers, allowing the public 
valuable Insight into the reasoning behind the acquittal. 
Actual Jurors' Experiences 
Occasionally a juror lets the proverbial cat out of the bag. 
Judges have frowned upon this. Disclosure of irregularities or 
misconceptions during jury deliberations have never yet led to a 
successful appeal. The courts have been anxious to preserve the 
finality of the verdict (apart from the statutory grounds of 
appeal) and the finality of the juror's role upon verdict. 
In Victoria, post trial revelations of jurors have recently been 
made subject to contempt of court proceedings, although the way 
has been left open for bona fide academic research. 
From what has been published so far, it seems that the verdict of 
the jurors on their crucial role Is by no means unanimous. Two 
detailed accounts of jurors' experiences are of particular 
interest. One involved a manslaughter case in New South Wales, 
the other a rape trial in South Australia. In both cases the 
accused had made an unsworn statement; in both, the jury 
returned a not guilty verdict. In the N.S.W. case, the jurors 
(ten of whom were white collar workers or had tertiary 
qualifications) took notes and during the deliberation stayed 
close to the evidence. In the South Australian case, where no 
notes were taken, there was much speculation on matters 
outside the evidence and signficiant prevalence of prejudices. 
The juror in N.S.W. comments: 
Jury service was more onerous than I expected. I was 
impressed with the conscientiousness of the jurors, who 
took their job responsibly, paid close attention to the 
evidence, and discussed this intelligently and in depth. A 
couple of women and one of the men emerged as dominant 
forces and some clearly understood the process of 
influence within a group. Yet we worked as a group in 
quite a democratic way (Petre, 1984) 
But the South Australian juror was disillusioned with the way 
her jury evaluated the evidence and speculated on extraneous 
matters and whether the system was hiding vital information from 
them, and stated that 'every aspect of a case where a jury is 
conscious of its ignorance feeds doubt and suspicion' (Callinan 
1984). 
A juror in the trial of Ryan, the last person to be hanged in 
Victoria in 1967, said, the jury would not have convictd him of 
murder if they had known he would hang. This juror remembers: 'We 
followed the evidence closely and made up our minds on the facts, 
without much emotion' (Sun, 14 August 1984). 
Also in the first Murphy trial, the jury foreman Indicated that 
the deliberation process had worked very well. 'It required us to 
listen to the thoughts of others and weigh the evidence before us 
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and in spite of an emotional or sentimental reluctance to do it, 
to gradually say "Well, I really don't have any choice"' 
(Age, 19 July 1985). 
The juror in the Gallagher trial who told her story in the 
National Times in August last year, found the eighth day 
deliberation highly emotional. She was the only one who 
throughout insisted on a not guilty verdict. On the fifth day, it 
appeared that none of the other jurors had understood the 
evidence on the first count and through her persistence a not 
guilty verdict was finally agreed upon. On the eight day a 
verdict of not guilty was reached on eighteen counts and finally 
a compromise verdict of not guilty on half the counts and guilty 
on the remainder was reached (National Times, 9-15 August 1985). 
From a radio interview with two jurors by Tom Molomby in 'The Law 
Report' in 1982, it appears that the lack of know-how of the role 
of the jury and of criminal procedure in general, as well as of 
the issues in the instant case, seriously affects the juror's 
concentration and comprehension at the beginning of the trial. 
Note taking was regarded as essential but extremely difficult, 
because it was not always immediately clear which are salient 
points in a witness's evidence until the evidence is contradicted 
later. Although jurors are aware that they can put questions to 
the judge, they do not feel encouraged to do so. And, of course, 
as one juror said, 'If you have missed the point, how can you ask 
the question?'. 
A frequently mentioned problem area for jurors is the 'beyond 
reasonable doubt' concept. Many a jury has asked a judge to 
explain this in more detail, only to hear that it means what it 
says. It seems that 'reasonableness' in legal jargon means little 
to a juror who encounters the term for the first time. Beyond 
reasonable doubt can mean to one that any ingenious or fanciful 
explanation constitutes reasonable doubt, and to another a 
balance of probabilities. 
Professor Devons's experience as a juror and observer of 
several trials In Britain in the 1960s is that 'you could 
never tell what bit of evidence would influence the jury, 
and that frequently they were influenced in arriving at their 
verdict not merely by whether they thought the accused was 
guilty but also whether he should be punished' (Devons, 1965, 
56) 
The responsibility of deciding someone's fate is sometimes 
regarded as extremely heavy, some jurors flatly refusing to 
convict anyone, others feeling emotionally very disturbed at 
having to decide someone's guilt. 'It should not be let to the 
likes of us to make a decision of this kind', one juror comments 
in Barber and Gordon, 1976. 
On the whole, it seems that most jurors feel out of their depth 
in the courtroom, find their task onerous, but try very hard 
to arrive at a just decision. However, there is no guarantee 
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that every jury is able to cope, there is no control over 
their decision making and only limited scope for correction of a 
wrong verdict. 
Synopsis 
Arguments to retain the jury system, like the arguments in favour 
of home births, are emotional, even romantic, rather than 
rational or logical. (Roskill, 1985). The system is dependent on 
the expertise of counsel: if counsel fails to elicit an 
available piece of evidence or fails to call a potential 
witness, an unappellable miscarriage of justice may occur. No 
expertise has developed In weighing the evidence, assessing 
the relative importance of documentary evidence or putting 
circumstantial evidence into perspective. A good judgment is not 
based on a mere enumeration of all major and minor 
arguments made during the trial, and letting the side with the 
largest number of arguments win, but on the careful dissection 
and weighing of the testimony. 
Similarly, to assess the jury system, one should not be satisfied 
with a list of arguments and counter arguments, but one should 
weigh the validity of each in the light of known facts. 
The first argument is that the jury performs a social or 
democratic function of lay Input tempering judicial power. The 
more important question is not whether it does or it does not, 
but whether there should be lay input, whether judicial power 
should be checked and if so, in what way. In a mixed tribunal 
(judges and lay persons sitting together) the lay Influence 
appears to be marginal (Casper and Zeisel, 1972). In the separate 
tribunals of judge and jury, in most cases the jury follows the 
judge's directions (if that were not so, the system would have 
faltered long ago) so the judge could equally well have given the 
judgment. The value of lay input is more apparent than real. 
Without the presence of lay members, would the courts go haywire? 
The Magistrates' Courts used to sit with justices of the peace, 
one would think a most valuable contribution by lay members of 
society. However, recently, Victoria opted for legally qualified 
magistrates rather than retaining lay members and the 
Magistrates' Courts have not fallen into disrepute. 
The higher courts have more power over people's lives. This power 
can be abused as is shown throughout history and in totalitarian 
countries, but is better safeguarded by an independent judiciary 
than by a token democratic institution that can be abolished with 
the stroke of a pen, as the diminishing role of the jury trial in 
this century shows. The replacement of the total judiciary is not 
nearly so easy. A safeguard for decent decisions would be the 
requirement of reasons for verdict, preferably for acquittal and 
convictions alike, so that no allegations of arbitrary verdicts 
can be raised. The reasoned verdict is open to scrutiny and 
convictions can be appealed against in the fullest sense on law 
and facts thus avoiding miscarriages of justice (Samuels, 1984, 
337). 
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In Holland, where such reasoned verdicts are given and where an 
appeal by way of rehearing is open as a right, celebrated 
miscarriages of justice, such as Beck, Evans, Christie, Splatt 
and many others could just not have occurred. 
The next argument is that separation of the function of judge and 
the jury facilitates and purifies the fact finding process. This 
is countered by allegations of incompetence, waste and 
unpredictability. Although a thorough investigation of actual 
jury deliberations would provide a conclusive picture of the role 
of the jury, some insight can be gained from what actual jurors 
have said, from research into group deliberations, from jury 
experiments, and from comparisons with jurisdictions 
without juries. 
The Law Reform Commission of Victoria's background paper The Role 
of the Jury in Criminal Trials (1986) refers to research material 
in those areas. This research is not altogether encouraging as to 
the actual functioning of the jury process. The jury remains the 
wild card in the courtroom play. How important is It that there 
is this separate fact finder? Because of the separation in 
function, the fact finder need not be influenced by inadmissible 
prejudicial material, but if prejudicial material is relevant, 
and merely excluded because of fear that the jury might attach 
undue weight to it, the jury does not get the whole story. A 
doctor cannot make a proper diagnosis without a full history, 
neither can a jury be expected to judge the accused's actions out 
of context. The doctrine of admissibility is leading verdicts 
astray, because naturally the jury will speculate on missing 
links. 
Where the jury has no reason to suspect omission of facts, and 
gives it verdict on an honest appraisal of what was left of the 
evidence, a jury may well feel despondent at its role. For 
instance, in two separate incidents, a man has been charged and 
acquitted of rape on the Issue of consent by the girls he picked 
up from the bus stop. If he is charged with rape after a third 
such incident, it would strain credulity if we were to think he 
Is merely unlucky in the type of girl he picks up. 
Where the issue of consent in rape cases lies in the subjective 
belief of the accused, the jury should have before it all 
relevant material. Any subjective issue requires a great deal of 
information as to the accused's background before an accurate 
appraisal can be given. Inadmissibility of evidence and 
determination of subjective intent do not coincide. 
A good example of a case where the evidence was fairly simple is 
provided by a recent unreported case in the Victorian Supreme 
Court. The accused had been embroiled in a gun fight. The accused 
received two wounds, one in the groin and one in the knee. His 
assailant was hit once in the stomach and twice in the head, one 
of which was fatal. 
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The case raised the issues of murder, self—defence, provocation 
and manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act. The jury found 
the accused not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. The 
conviction was quashed on appeal and a new trial was 
ordered because the trial judge was held to have erred in 
certain directions to the jury embodied in documents with a 
theoretical expose of the relevant concepts In this case. 
The step of providing written instructions to a jury is not 
to be taken lightly, because as the Appeal Court judge said 
'the extraneous Issues by theoretical exposition may result in 
Juries not being in a position in which they understand the 
decision they must take and the verdicts which emerge from 
those decisions'. Such documents are to be expressed only 
in terms relating to the evidence. Again, this shows a real but 
not acknowledged distrust of the jury's reasoning power. Although 
the actual application of these difficult concepts by this 
jury is anyone's guess, the evidence gave only part of the 
story. There were two other men at the scene of the 
crime, whose evidence was not given because of their 
objections on the ground of self-incrimination. The truth was 
there all along, but the jury was not to hear it. They were 
left to wonder and speculate and to apply fanciful doctrines 
that even judges stumble on. 
The picture is even grimmer where the evidence is complex. In 
several cases, appeal courts have acknowledged the difficulties 
the jury must have faced with the mass and complexity of the 
evidence. The answer from most law-reformers has been suggestions 
to facilitate the task of the jury providing more information 
beforehand by the use of visual aids and more documentary 
evidence or perhaps even access to the indexed transcript. The 
English Fraud Trials Committee Report 1986 (the Roskill Report) 
considered all those amendments, but recommended, nevertheless, 
a tribunal without jury to hear complex fraud cases. The 
Roskill committee found that the limits of comprehension of the 
jury, the unfamiliarity with the procedure and the evidence 
and the difficulties of sustaining concentration for the 
length of the trial create the serious risk either that the jury 
will acquit a defendant because they have not understood the 
evidence or will convict because they mistakenly think they 
have understood it when they have In fact done little more 
than applied the maxim 'there's no smoke without fire'. 
The presence of a jury also affects the type and number of 
charges. Sometimes less serious charges than the facts warrant 
are chosen because of fears by the prosecution that the jury will 
have trouble following the evidence on the more complicated 
charge. Sometimes, as with murder, lesser alternative charges are 
not laid because the jury might take the lesser option without 
giving the murder charge due consideration. Furthermore, the 
trial may be about one event or a chain of events: a fraud and an 
armed robbery by the same accused always require two separate 
trials, even where it would be in the accused's interest to face 
the ordeal of a trial only once. 
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Not only the way the case is started is influenced by the 
presence of the jury, but also the way the evidence is elicited. 
The oral nature of the trial is a necessity with the jury. 
However, psychological research bears out that there are serious 
flaws in the oral adversary trial - written accounts of a 
witness's testimony may be more reliable guides in establishing 
the truth than the observation of the witness's demeanour 
in the box; cross-examination elicits less accurate accounts 
than free narration followed by further direct questioning. To 
be a witness subjected to cross-examination can be a gruelling 
and humiliating experience, but the impressive witness is not 
necessarily the better (Re, 1983). 
PROGNOSIS: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE JURY 
The limitations on the jury in its fact finding function are now 
clear. Current criticism of the jury system indicates a shift in 
public opinion: just as in the Middle Ages discontentment grew 
with the system of ordeals leading to the introduction of more 
rational methods of proof, so in this century society is gearing 
up to the reception of a more sophisticated analysis of the 
evidence. This is a natural evolution, not to be artificially 
supressed. Equally, in Europe, criminal procedure feels the 
pressures of technology. Europe went through its most dramatic 
times of adjustment in the days of Napoleon, when the best 
features of the English adversarial trial were adopted; 
changes since have been gradual. 
The Anglo Saxon world could now similarly benefit from the 200 
years of European experience with a modified adversarial 
trial. In most Western Europen countries mixed tribunals are 
still being used in criminal trials, but the tendency is for lay 
input to be slowly vanishing. 
The Dutch are generally happy with their choice of a completely 
professional bench, but lately the question has arisen whether in 
fraud cases commercial expertise should be added to the bench. 
The same question will arise in other trials with complicated 
technical and scientific aspects. The likely prospect is that all 
countries in western civilisation will eventually adopt a bench 
comprised of judges and ad hoc experts. 
The fear is that such a tribunal will be inhumane in its approach 
to life's miseries. Experience with the professional bench shows 
that soft touches do not depend on the presence of the lay 
members. Rather it is the face to face confrontation of tribunal 
and accused, the responsibility of the tribunal towards this 
person of flesh and blood, whose fate is in their hands, that 
seems to call up an instinctive protectiveness for the one in 
trouble. Judges experience that feeling just as much as members 
of a jury. 
58 
The question of euthanasia springs to mind. Active euthanasia is 
a crime in Holland, but doctors have for years assisted the 
terminally ill to die when they so wish. One may agree or disagee 
with this practice, but the point is that in absence of 
legislative reform, the doctors have deliberately turned to the 
judges for guidelines, knowing that they would get a balanced and 
humane response. 
Justice does not require a jury. Without truth, justice cannot in 
fact be done, although It may be seen to be done. The narrow 
legal proof in the adversarial trial sometimes distorts the wider 
truth. The law should allow the jury to hear all relevant 
evidence or else confess its distrust of the jury's ability to 
find the truth. Fairness to the accused can be achieved by giving 
them early right to counsel's advice, pre-trial information about 
all evidence to be led In court, the right before the trial to 
have forensic evidence checked by independent experts, reasoned 
judgment and a right to appeal by way of rehearing. 
The rights of the victim should also be considered. For instance, 
the victim should be notified of the outcome of the investigation 
and whether the accused pleads guilty. 
Let us aim for true justice without juries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much of the debate about trial by jury focuses on .jury 
as a legal institution. Titles such as the Role of the 
Jury in a Criminal Trial direct attention to practical 
issues about the selection of juries, their 
qualifications, their ability to understand complex 
evidence, their cost-effectiveness, etc. ( 1' This paper 
emphasises the political not the legal significance of 
juries; rather than examine the role of the jury in a 
criminal trial, the paper considers the role of the jury 
in the Australian political system. The two concerns 
are not mutually exclusive; indeed I would claim that 
the political significance of juries implicitly colours 
many of the practical questions concerning trial by 
jury. But the fact that the political values underlying 
jury trial remain implicit, and are sometimes 
contradictory or ambiguous, allows debate to proceed at 
cross purposes. Lack of conceptual clarity about the 
values at stake has, for example, resulted in radically 
different views about the competence of juries in 
complex and technical cases. Similarly, whether juries 
dispense "justice" depends heavily on the meaning 
attached to that term. The legitimacy of the so-called 
"perverse" verdict and the associated question of the 
judge/jury relationship provide another example of 
issues which can best be resolved by explicit discussion 
of the values to which the polity is committed. 
I have chosen to approach the question of the political 
underpinnings of the jury system by way of four 
historical examples. These draw out the values that 
various people have claimed for the jury. I have chosen 
examples from within the Anglo-Austra1ian 
political/legal tradition, but. from different eras and 
geographic locations. They present the views of radical 
political groups in seventeenth century England, the 
thoughts of a nineteenth century French political 
thinker, Alexis de Tocquevilie, on the new American 
democracy, the forcefully made claims for jury trial by 
Emancipists in early New South Wales, and the arguments 
of an English historian, E.P.Thompson, on the need for 
the jury in the modern British state. 
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The historical accounts emphasise the theme of popular 
sovereignty and associated convictions about the 
structure of political power. In the second half of the 
paper I consider the contemporary relevance of these 
values to the continued use of the jury system. 
Underlying this is the view that though longevity is not 
a sufficient justification for continued reliance on the 
jury, the reasons for the jury's continued significance 
can be found in its history. 
FOUR HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS 
In 1670 Edward Bushel and three fellow jurors became 
involved in one of the most famous cases ever on trial 
by jury. < 2 ) They had sat in a case in which the Quakers 
William Penn and William Mead were charged with unlawful 
assembly and disturbance of the peace arising out of 
their public preaching. The jurors found the facts 
alleged that the the defendants were preaching to a 
crowd, but refused to conclude that these facts amounted 
to a crime. The trial judge, Lord Chief Justice Kelyng, 
fined the jurors and imprisoned Bushel who had refused 
to pay. Bushel used the writ of habeas corpus to bring 
the case before the Court of Common Pleas. The court 
held that jurors may not be punished for their 
verdicts.< 3 > 
The case was the culmination of a debate about the jury 
which had begun some thirty years earlier in the trials 
of the Leveller leader, John Lilburne. The Levellers 
founded their political theory on what they claimed were 
the communal Anglo-Saxon institutions which pre-dated 
"the Norman yoke". Judges, lawyers, law French and 
legal complexity all stood in the way of the laws of 
God, the fundamental law of England, to be found in the 
conscience of all righteous people. This meant that the 
jury, not the judge nor the parliament, was the ultimate 
adjudicator of the law. To emphasise the point one of 
their sympathisers, Henry Marten, advised jurors to 
"keep their hats on in the presence of the judge, in 
order to show that they were the chief judges in the 
court."<4 > 
Lilburne carried this theory of popular sovereignty and 
the jury into his trials in 1649 and 1653. In the 
first, for treason, he stood before a bench of nine 
ermine-robed judges and told the jury that they were 
judges of law as well as of fact, and that the judges 
were mere "cyphers" to impose sentence. In the second 
trial, this time for breaching an Act of Parliament that 
had banished him from England, he invited the jury to 
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treat the Act as a breach of the fundamental law of 
England. He was acquitted by the jury on both 
occasions. ( b > 
Alexis de Tocquevilie would not have endorsed the 
Leveller theory of popular sovereignty. Indeed like 
many of his early nineteenth century contemporaries he 
had misgivings about popular democracy, based in part on 
his view of the French revolution. His account of the 
new American democracy, published in 1835, detailed 
three factors which tempered his fears about the 
"tyranny of the majority". < 6 ) In the f irst, place, the 
federal system prevented the concentration of power in 
the hands of central government. The importance of 
judges and lawyers in American life provided the second 
safeguard. This was not because, like Coke, they would 
uphold the law in the face of the monarch or executive 
government. Quite the contrary, de Tocquevilie thought 
that judges and lawyers supplied an intellectual 
aristocracy, a substitute for the natural aristocracy 
which America lacked, which imposed a check on popular 
passions. Judges and lawyers were far more likely to 
side with government than with the people. 
The jury formed the third protection against the tyranny 
of the majority. De Tocquevilie thought that above all 
the jury was a political institution through which the 
people had a say in the execution of the laws made in 
the popularly elected legislature. "The jury," he 
wrote, "puts the people themselves, or at least one 
class of citizens on the judge's bench. Therefore, the 
jury as an institution really puts control of society 
into the hands of the people or of that class.... The 
jury system in America seems to me as direct and extreme 
a consequence of the dogma of the sovereignty of the 
people as universal suffrage. They are both equally 
powerful means of making the majority prevail." ( 7> The 
jury box schooled citizens in responsibility and 
justice, according to de Tocquevilie, and this together 
with the moderating influence of the "aristocratic" 
judge established respect for the law, the judge, and 
the rule of the people. It formed a guard against the 
danger of the excesses of popular passions. 
Jury trial has always had opponents in England, 
especially in governments. Juries frustrated Cromwell's 
pursuit of the Levellers in the seventeenth century and 
government prosecutions of the radical publisher, John 
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Wilkes, in the eighteenth.<8> Nor did England's rulers 
trust some of their colonies with trial by jury. 
Refusal of jury trial for certain offences contributed 
to the revolt of the American colonists. ( 9> 
Opposition to jury trial has a long pedigree in 
Australia too. For over forty years from colonisation, 
England refused to allow trial by jury in New South 
Wales. Convicts dominated the population of New South 
Wales for the first years of white settlement. Even in 
the early decades governors and governed complained 
about the absence of trial by jury, the abuses practised 
by the officers of the New South Wales Corps who sat as 
a panel in criminal cases, and the military flavour of 
the court. However, the real agitation for trial by 
jury began as the growing number of emancipated convicts 
began to organise themselves politically. 
The first ever petition from emancipists to the English 
government came in 1819 and placed trial by jury at the 
top of the list. At first sight this seems a rather 
strange priority, especially for the respectable 
leadership of the emancipists who did not expect to find 
themselves in front of a jury again. The motivation was 
political. For people who had forfeited their civil 
rights on conviction, eligibility to serve on juries was 
a restoration of the badge of citizenship. It was a 
mark that their "birth rights as Englishmen", 
"guaranteed by the Magna Carta", to use their terms, had 
been restored to them. They identified trial by jury 
with the English constitution and the protection of 
English liberty from arbitrary government. They also 
saw trial by jury as inextricably linked with elective 
institutions and the opportunity for them to participate 
in the government of the colony. 
The exclusive faction (i.e. wealthy free settlers) in 
the colony opposed jury trial vehemently. They too saw 
the issue in political terms, posing the threat of an 
emancipist ascendancy and the possibility that they 
would be judged and ruled over by their inferiors, 
former felons. At the behest of the exclusives the 
English government dragged its feet on the issue until 
the late 1820s when Governor Darling unwittingly forced 
its hand. Aggrieved by criticism of his governorship, 
he brought criminal libel proceedings against a 
newspaper editor. The prospect that the governor would 
name the members of the military panel who would sit on 
his own case proved too much for the English government. 
It ordered civilian juries in such cases and gradually 
extended full jury trial in the next few years. 
Elective institutions followed shortly after and, 
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despite excLusivist protestations, emancipists were 
eligible both to serve on juries and to vote on the same 
property qualifications as those without criminal 
convictions. ( 1 0 ) 
The last historical account of the political 
significance of the jury comes from the very recent 
past, the 1970s. In a series of essays Edward Thompson 
has described the rise of the "secret state" in England 
and the decline of institutional checks against its 
incursions. ( 1 1 ' Thompson points to the growth in the 
power of the executive, especially the security forces 
and the police. Simultaneously, a dulling of England's 
traditional "libertarian" sense has allowed an erosion 
of procedures for making executive government 
accountable to the people - a "managed parliament" under 
the sway of bureaucracy, restrict ions on in format ion 
such as the Official Secrets Act, and the too ready 
sacrifice of traditional political values to 
"efficiency" and "rationality". Attacks on the 
independence of juries occupy a central place in 
Thompson's case. He details a debate in England over 
jury vetting - or jury stacking to use plain terms -
during which the Home Secretary, the Attorney-General 
and the Director of Public Prosecutions defended the 
until-then secret practice of consulting police records 
and striking off the names of potential jurors who fell 
foul of the guidelines, especially in politically 
sensitive cases. Not only did English judges fail to 
condemn these practices, but they used contempt of court 
powers to suppress discussion of the issue. The Lord 
Chancellor washed his hands of the matter. Thompson 
objects that jury vetting is a corruption of the 
English Constitution. His commitment to the jury rests 
on : 
...a total view of the relation between the 
legislature, judiciary and the people; upon 
a notion of justice in which the law must be 
made to seem rational and even humane to lay 
jurors (hence inhibiting a thousand 
oppressive practices before they are even 
commenced, through the knowledge that no 
jury would convict); and upon a particular 
national history of contests between "the 
people" and the Crown or state, in which the 
jury has won or reserved for itelf, in its 
verdict, a final power.(p232) 
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CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JURY 
The jury has been a feature of the Anglo-Australian 
political system for some eight centuries. The long 
experience of the jury, the continued reassertion of its 
worth, and its general acceptance merit our continued 
respect. But this must be a critical respect. The 
venerable age of the jury cannot privilege it from 
scrutiny. Like other political institutions, its 
continued relevance must be open to question. Some have 
argued that the jury is not appropriate in modern 
society.< 1 2 5 I want to consider whether the political 
reason advanced for the jury in the historical accounts, 
especially the values about popular sovereignty and the 
structure of government continue to be relevant. 
Popular Sovereignty 
Popular sovereignty is a theme common to all four of the 
historical accounts. In circumstances where other means 
of expressing the popular will are limited and judges 
are government appointeees without life tenure (e.g. 
seventeenth century England and early New South Wales), 
it may be that the jury had a more important role to 
play in representing the will of the people. That does 
not mean, however, that there is no important role for 
juries in popular democracies; de Tocquevilie and 
Thompson would reject such such a proposition. The 
question is whether there is anything about modern 
society that renders the jury obsolete. 
Weber argued that the feature of modern societies which 
distinguishes them from past societies is their high 
degree of rationality in all aspects of life. Rules and 
rational calculation characterise public and much of 
private life. < 1 3 ) It is accompanied by great faith in 
expertise and reliance on experts to make all sorts of 
decisions and to perform tasks which would previously 
not have been performed by experts.< 1 4> A corollary of 
these developments is a mistrust of decision making 
where reasons are not available or not easily given, and 
a lack of faith in decision by non-experts. Taken to 
extreme this view would result in the disenfranchisement 
of large sections of the population on the basis that 
they did not possess the requisite expertise to vote on 
the complex issues of modern government. 
Very few would take such a radical position on the right 
to vote even in this highly rational age. And more 
generally despite the grip of the expert on public 
consciousness, questions of values still tend to fall 
outside the jurisdiction of expertise. Moreover, 
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challenges to the fusion of technical and value elements 
in scientific decision-making come from a number of 
fronts. Policy on space and nuclear research is not. 
seen to be the sole preserve of experts. Similarly, in 
medicine, debates about in^  vitro fertilization, the care 
of grossly deformed or extremely premature children, 
euthanasia, control of procedures such as child birth, 
e t c . , < 1 5 ) evidence a more discriminating approach to the 
claims of experts and an unwillingness to commit 
decisions about values to them that would have cheered 
John LiIburne.< 1 6> Issues like these bear directly on 
the continued relevance of the jury. If the sorts of 
decisions made by juries fall within the domain of 
values rather than expertise, then the arguments for 
juries continue to sound in politics, as our historical 
vignettes suggest. 
It follows that the answer to the question about, the 
continued importance of the jury depends on an analysis 
of the sorts of decision entrusted to juries. Consider 
the fact-finding role of the jury, first. In a 
straightforward case, the choice between a jury and some 
other body is immaterial. But "finding" the facts is a 
complex business. ( 1 7' The task of selecting the 
relevant facts, especially where the evidence of 
witnesses conflict, is not obviously one for experts, 
nor is it obvious what field of expertise could claim 
jurisdiction even if it were thought to be a task for 
experts. Sometimes judges and lawyers claim expertise 
in these matters. Apart from the se I f-serv i rig and 
unproved nature of such claims, there is no reason to 
think that they are not. afflicted by the same 
difficulties in this sort of task as other mortals. 
Moreover, psychological evidence suggests that the 
effect of repeated exposure of jurors to the courtroom 
situation biases decisions in favour of conviction. ( 1 8' 
It is reasonable to surmise that the same process 
affects judges, lawyers, and would affect full-time 
assessors were they to be substituted for juries. 
The criminal law also requires judgments to be made 
about highly speculative facts, most importantly, the 
intention of the defendant. In the "simpler" category 
the decision will be whether the defendant in a murder 
case, for example, intended to kill, or knew that the 
victim in a rape case did not consent. In the more 
difficult category, for example the property offences, 
the law requires an explicit moral evaluation of the 
defendant's conduct: was the defendant's conduct, 
dishonest by community standards? Decisions about 
negligence also fall into this category. For the 
reasons advanced in the preceding paragraph, it is not 
clear that expertise has anything special to contribute 
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to decisions in either category. Provided that the 
information in the trial is presented in a clear way, 
and there is great scope for improvement h e r e , < 1 9 ) 
juries are at least as well fitted technically to make 
these difficult decisions as any feasible alternative. 
In terms of legitimacy, the jury's popular basis gives 
it a much better claim to make the hard decisions in 
situations where expertise has no particular claim. 
This point is even clearer in the second category where 
the function of infusing community values into the 
criminal law is pre-eminently a role for the jury as 
more representative of the community than experts. 
Finally, let us consider what are called "perverse 
verdicts". Sometimes, the jury will play a role in 
saying that in a part icular case a rule, though 
logically applicable, should not be applied for reasons 
of justice. This by the way is not necessarily to 
reject the general propriety of the rule. Parliaments 
make general rules and it is unrealistic to think that 
there will not be particular cases in which application 
of the rule would clash with community standards of 
justice. In terms of popular sovereignty, the function 
of the jury in administering substantive rather than 
formal justice in such cases should be seen as a 
legitimate part of the jury's role, not as "perverse". 
In other cases juries will consistently refuse to apply 
a particular rule. Motor manslaughter and rules about 
provocation in domestic violence situations, are two 
examples. Once again the legitimacy of this will depend 
on views about popular sovereignty and how this may be 
expressed. The view that parliaments are the sole 
expounders of the popular voice is not a view that would 
have found favour with John Lilburne or Alexis de 
Tocquevilie. It is naive politics to think that the 
popular franchise of modern parliaments accurately 
expresses community standards on all issues at all 
times. In these cases the jury can be seen as a 
legitimate and valuable corrective and supplement to the 
necessarily general pronouncements of parliaments. 
The Structure of Government 
The second major lesson to be drawn from the historical 
examples is about the structure of government. 
In part the rule of law can be seen as a device which 
imposes a check on the abuse of governmental power by 
fragmenting that power. It structures government power 
in such a way that the executive has to be able to 
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justify its actions in Legal terms to the courts. In 
the period before the Act of Settlement, in England, when 
the independence of the judges was distinctly doubtful, 
for people like John Lilburne, the role of the 
independent jury was crucial to the effective operation 
of the rule of law. To the emancipists in early New 
South Wales, the power of the governor who was the 
prosecutor, held the power to appoint, the officers who 
would try cases, and was the military superior to 
colonial judges who held office only during the English 
government's pleasure, also offended this structural 
understanding about the rule of law. The contemporary 
question is whether we still need the sort of structural 
protection supplied by juries at a time when judicial 
independence is a more realistic notion. Ultimately 
this is Thompson's central concern in his essays on "the 
secret state". His answer is unequivocally, yes. 
One of the most significant, phenomena of this century 
has been the rise of the state and the growth of its 
power to reach into the lives of individual citizens. 
The size of the modern state, modern police and other 
investigatory forces, and the state's capacity for 
surveillance is something that would have profoundly 
shocked our libertarian forebears. Government today is 
much more intrusive, not less. Even absolute monarchies 
lacked the machinery available to modern government 
which provides it with the ability to penetrate the 
personal sphere. 
It would be altogether unrealistic: to think that juries 
can protect us from all of this. But in the area where 
government has most extreme power, criminal law, the 
need to guard against the state's "al1-intrusive claims" 
is greater than ever. One way to combat this is to 
structure power in such a way as to minimise the 
possibilities for abuse. In terms of the criminal law 
this means retention of the jury. 
There are several reasons for this. One of them is 
identified by de Tocquevilie. Judges form a kind of 
.intellectual aristocracy whose interests and habits of 
mind will be sympathetic to the maintenance of the 
status quo and the support of government.. They cannot 
therefore be relied on as a protection against the 
incursions of the state. De Tocquevi I1e's point 
resonates strongly in the present. The acquittals by 
juries of the civil servant, Clyde Fonting, of 
offences against the Official Secrets Act in the face of 
a direction to convi<Tt Ey the trial Judge, and Cyprus-
based service personnel charged with espionage and 
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verballed by security forces, add recent English 
examples to those offered by Thompson of the differences 
in outlook between judges and juries in these sorts of 
cases. Juries have the virtue that they have no ongoing 
relationship with the organs of government. They serve 
anonymously, on a transient basis and are less likely to 
be swayed by "reasons of state", self-interest, 
identification with other officials of the state, or 
identification with the institutional demands of the 
courts than permanent members of the legal system. 
A second major structural characteristic of juries is 
the effect they have on a whole range of factors 
affecting prosecutions from the outset. While it should 
be emphasized that jury trials make up a lamentably 
small percentage of criminal trials (less than 0.9% of 
major cases in N S W ) , ( 2 0 ) to assess the significance of 
jury trial in terms only of the number of cases that go 
to trial would be a mistake. Decisions whether to 
prosecute, for what, the sort of evidence that will be 
needed, etc. , are profoundly affected by the fact that 
if the case comes to trial, a jury will have to be 
satisfied. 
Finally, and this is related to the preceding point, the 
fact that the prosecution has to satisfy a lay jury has 
a profound effect on the public accountability of the 
criminal process. Unless the prosecution can specify in 
plain terms just what the defendant has done and how it 
breaches the rules to the jury, and through that 
structure to the public, then the prosecution will fail. 
The criminal law engages deeply held feelings about 
right and wrong and it places a great deal of power in 
the hands of the executive. In a democracy the criminal 
justice system should be publicly accountable and not 
allowed to fall prey to experts, legal or otherwise. 
Its procedures should be conducted in terms intelligible 
to the most highly educated and literate community ever 
to have been the audience for criminal proceedings. The 
presence of the jury works very much in favour of this 
sort of public accountability. 
CONCLUSIONS 
One of the responses to the controversy over the first 
Murphy verdict was an attack on people who dared to 
criticise one of our most revered institutions, the 
j u r y . < 2 1 ) This was a particularly unfortunate response 
at a time of great public interest in the issue of trial 
by jury. Proponents of jury trial ought to have grasped 
the opportunity to debate the general issues about trial 
by jury. They ought to have pointed out how rare a 
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phenomenon jury trial is and the ways in which 
legislatures and courts have cut back on the jury 
system. < 2 2 > They also ought to have taken the 
opportunity to discuss the historical record of the jury 
and the reasons that emerge from that history for the 
retention and expansion of the jury system / 2 3 ' 
Similarly, Law Reform Commission reports ought to deal 
fully with the general rationale and political 
significance of the jury. They ought to insert this 
history and the arguments that arise from it into the 
political arena. They ought not to assume some; sort of 
unquestioning acceptance of this tradition among the 
general population or among that very large part of the 
Australian population which is of non-English origin and 
cannot be expected to adhere unquestioning.! y to Engl ish 
traditions. ( 2 4 > 
Trial by jury is one of Australia's defining political 
traditions. Its history symbolises a commitment to 
individual liberty, a faith in popular democratic 
institutions, a distrust of government and experience 
of how juries may make the difference. In a century iri 
which governments and the experts available to them have 
extended the power of the state into the lives of 
citizens, the need for safeguards against misuse of 
government power has become greater. Nowhere more than 
in the criminal law. At the same time, little by 
little, the role of the jury has been stealthily eroded 
while in the popular imagination jury trials are the 
norm. Cost, efficiency, competence, etc. are given as 
reasons for nine hundred and ninety-nine cuts to the 
jury system. To continue this process of slow death 
while proclaiming the sacrosanct i ty of the jury 
constitutes either an unacceptable deception or self-
delusion. On the more charitable interpretation, the 
clash of values involved in debates over the jury has 
produced a sort of schizophrenia. The jury symbolizes 
democratic values to which we remain strongly committed, 
at least at an abstract level. On the other hand, 
rational technocratic values undermine our faith in non-
experts on juries, their secret deliberations and the 
absence of reasons for their decision. We worry that 
they produce unjust results. To the extent that the two 
sets of values simply fait to analyse the sorts of 
decisions made by juries, they talk at cross-purposes. 
To the extent that they come to grips with one another, 
they strongly conflict. A choice must be made. 
My choice must be apparent by now. Some decisions in 
democracies are too important to trust to anyone but 
citizens and institutions representative of them. Two 
of these decisions come through the ballot box and the 
jury box. Both the symbols and their reality ought to 
72 
be reasserted against the anti-democratic tendencies 
ranged against them. In the case of the jury it should 
be defended and extended to realign its actual operation 
with the symbolic importance attached to it. 
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PUBLIC ATTITUDES ABOUT THE JURY 
Mr I. M. Vodanovich 
Director of Probation and Parole 
Western Australia 
THE JURY DEBATE 
When Sir Robert Mark, the then London Metropolitan Commissioner 
of Police gave the annual Dimbleby Lecture on B.B.C. television 
in 1973 he stated that public confidence in jury trials was 
based essentially on faith (Mark, 1977). He observed that no 
one had ever thought it necessary to make a full, practical and 
important investigation of the jury process and added that 
the general belief that the system was the best in the world 
was based on practically no evidence whatsoever. 
Determined attacks of this kind on the jury system tend to come 
from many quarters at times, but inevitably such attacks bring 
forth as many or more supporters of the jury function. The merits 
or demerits of jury trial have long been debated. The principal 
arguments in favour of the system have been the value of 
participation of ordinary citizens in the administration of 
justice; the advantage of twelve heads over one; the near 
certainty that if all, or at least a majority, of a jury are 
convinced, then the case has been fully established; the 
protection of the liberties of the subject afforded by entrusting 
decisions to a group chosen at random; the impossibility of 
bribing or Intimidating a group which does not exist until the 
trial commences; and the ability of a jury to temper legalism 
with common sense (Walker, 1980). 
The principal arguments against are the inexperience, sometimes 
ignorance and even stupidity of jurors; the uncertainty whether 
they properly appreciate the issues or the evidence put before 
them, or properly understand or apply the judge's directions; the 
greater expense and delay involved in jury trial; and the 
inadequacy of appeal. The jury does not give reasons and it is 
sometimes thought that if they had to, the system would collapse 
when the inadequacy of the reasons became known. (Walker, 1980) 
The two opposing ends of the jury spectrum have been illustrated 
very aptly in two separate Hamlyn Lectures on the jury system in 
England in the 1950s. Lord Devlin, (1956) expressed the view that 
the jury is more than an instrument of justice and more than a 
wheel of the constitution, 'It is the lamp that shows that 
freedom lives' (1956, 164). 
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Glanville Williams, 1955 on the other hand, makes a powerful 
indictment of the jury system: 'If one proceeds by the light of 
reason' he maintains there seems to be a formidable weight of 
argument against the jury system. (1955, 271) 
To bring the debate closer to home, two recent Australian 
viewpoints are now submitted for consideration. Professor Colin 
Howard, (Age, 3 July 1985) states that his own belief is that 
the vast majority of juries arrive at perfectly sensible 
decisions, but he adds, there is no magic about this as judges 
alone would almost certainly produce the same result. Professor 
Howard questions whether anything is really achieved by 
preserving the system which did valuable service in times past 
but nowadays only complicates an already highly technical system 
at considerable cost and to no apparent purpose. He states that: 
The issue has been made even more acute recently by the 
mounting evidence that people no longer have faith in the 
jury which has sustained the system for so long.' 
Brown and Neal (1986) on the other hand maintain that the 
function of infusing community values into the operation of the 
criminal law is one of the most compelling arguments in favour of 
the jury system. They stress: 
The political significance of the jury trial remains as 
great as ever. It is more important than ever to argue not 
merely for retention, but for a radical expansion of 
popular, democratic participation in the administration of 
criminal justice. (1986, 13) 
RESEARCH IN UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 
One very significant result that arose out of the debate was that 
the various comments stimulated research both in the United 
States (Graham, 1983) and in England (McCabe, 1974) about the 
outcome of trial by jury. During the 1960s and 1970s important 
jury research findings were published in both countries. The most 
comprehensive United States study was the University of Chicago 
Project (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966) which was generously funded by 
the Ford Foundation from the mid 1950s to 1966. This project 
looked at 3,500 criminal trials presided over by 355 judges and 
compared the juries' decisions with those that would have been 
made by the judges had the final decision been theirs. 
It revealed that judge and jury reached the same verdict in 74.5 
per cent of the cases (ie. they both acquitted in 13.4 per 
cent and convicted in 62.0 per cent of the trials). They were 
also able to show that in only one third of the disagreements 
(8.0 per cent) could the juries' verdicts be said to be 
completely without foundation. Interestingly an English survey 
of acquittals also revealed that only 8.8 per cent of not 
guilty verdicts are wayward (McCabe and Purves, 1972). 
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Probably the most comprehensive jury survey undertaken in England 
was the study of every case passing through the Birmingham Crown 
Court between February 197 5 and September 1976. Five hundred 
contested trials were expected but only 370 ended in a full jury 
deliberation and verdict. For these 370 cases, information was 
obtained from judges, police, prosecuting and defending 
solicitors and sometimes the defendant. The researchers Baldwin 
and McConville (1979a) also studied another 347 trials in the 
London metropolitan area, but only the police view was available 
there. Overall it was found the jury acquittal role was 30.8 per 
cent in Birmingham and 47.8 per cent in London. In Birmingham 
39.3 per cent of these acquittals were seen as doubtful or 
highly questionable. In London the police expressed serious 
doubts about acquittals in 25.5 per cent of cases and some doubt 
was expressed about whether an acquittal was justified in 8.5 per 
cent of cases. The researchers were most concerned to find 
evidence of some doubtful convictions (Baldwin and McConville 
1979b). 
These surveys reveal that more is known now about jury trials 
than was the case ten to fifteen years ago. While there has been 
constant research into the work of the jury system in both the 
United States and England, it would appear there has been no real 
substantial research into public attitudes about juries in these 
two countries. Indeed Freeman (1981) believes that research 
undertaken so far on juries is peripheral to the important 
debates about the place of the jury within the criminal process. 
He infers that, in the main, the concern of completed research 
has been to show the close correspondence of jury verdicts to 
professional expectations. Certainly this approach per se does 
not allow a scope for objective research into community attitudes 
to jury trials. 
RESEARCH IN CANADA 
As far as I am aware the only research on the public's view of 
criminal jury trials, at least in the 1970s, was undertaken in 
Canada (Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1980). This research 
arose because at that particular time, there were no more than a 
handful of studies on any aspect of the Canadian jury, let alone 
a comprehensive set of studies addressing a range of features of 
the jury. 
While it was appreciated that a body of research on the American 
jury had been accumulating, its relevance to the Canadian 
situation had yet to be determined. Therefore, the Canadian Law 
Reform Commission decided to conduct or commission a number of 
research studies on the Canadian jury. Altogether three surveys 
were conducted and they included an opinion poll of the Canadian 
public consisting of questions relating to the jury; a survey of 
actual jurors before and after jury service; and a survey of 
Canadian trial judges' views on the jury. 
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The general purpose of the first survey which took place in April 
1977 was to obtain some basic information about the public's 
views of a number of different aspects of the jury. Because of 
the cost of such surveys the Law Reform Commission decided to 
limit its involvement to six 'fixed alternative' questions. The 
Gallup Poll sample was designed to be representative of 
adult Canadians 18 years and older and on this basic data was 
obtained from approximately 1,000 respondents. A summary of 
the major findings of the survey by Doob (Law Reform Commission 
of Canada, 1979) follows. 
Canadians on the whole are very favourable to the jury system. 
General support for the jury system can be inferred from a number 
of different results. First of all, of those people who think 
that verdicts of judges and juries are likely to be different 
with respect to how fair and just they are, about four times as 
many people favour the jury as favour the judge. Juries moreover 
it turns out, are preferred most in Atlantic Canada, where it 
appears more people have served on juries and where people are 
most likely to know someone else who has served on^a jury. The 
research revealed that serving on a jury anywhere appears to make 
people more likely to believe that a jury verdict is most likely 
to be fair and just. Although only a small proportion of 
Canadians had actually served on a jury in a criminal case, about 
a third knew someone who had served. They seemed to be generally 
aware of at least one aspect of the criminal jury - jury 
unanimity - and generally were in favour of that aspect of it, 
particularly for the most serious offences. Support for the 
unanimity requirement dropped off in regard to less serious 
offences, although about a third of Canadians wanted it for all 
offences. 
Almost all Canadians thought that accused people should be given 
the option of trial by jury for at least some offences. About a 
third of the people wanted the option of trial by jury for all 
criminal offences. Residents of large cities were more likely to 
feel that an accused should always have the option of trial by 
jury than were residents of smaller cities or towns. Generally 
speaking it was considered Canadians felt that it was most 
important for accused people to be given the option of trial by 
jury in the most serious offences. 
Finally, Canadians seemed to want the jury to be flexible in 
application of the law. Most people felt that jurors should be 
encouraged to come to a just and fair verdict even if it meant 
that they are not strictly applying the law. Those who had served 
on juries were even more likely to accept this view of the jury's 
role than were those who had not served. 
To examine whether the different groups in each of the three 
surveys felt that 'jury equity' was a proper function for the 
jury the following question was asked in each survey. 
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Are you in favour of giving jurors in all criminal cases the 
following instruction? 
It is difficult to write laws that are just for all 
conceivable circumstances. Therefore you are entitled to 
follow your own conscience instead of strictly applying 
the law. 
In the public opinion poll the results indicated 76.4 per cent of 
Canadians solidly supported the jury equity function and felt 
this instruction should definitely or probably be given (Hans, 
1981). The overwhelming positive response with which the public 
viewed the instruction stands in marked contrast to the judges' 
reaction to it. Only 4.5 per cent of the Canadian judges agreed 
that the jury equity instruction should be given to jurors in 
criminal cases. The researchers expressed the view that the 
judges' lack of support for the jury equity instruction was 
surprising not only because it was different from the public's 
level of support but also because a full 78.2 per cent of the 
judges themselves listed the fact that 'the jury is a good way of 
infusing community values into a trial' as a positive feature of 
trial by jury (Hans, 1981, 149). 
RESEARCH IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
In 1983 I conducted a survey on community attitudes to the jury 
system in Western Australia as part requirement for Ph.D. 
studies. The aim of that research was concerned with ascertaining 
the acceptability and legitimacy of the jury in the eyes of the 
public. It was also to provide a baseline of credibility for 
further research which was to be undertaken on the jury system 
itself at a later stage. In this paper I provide a brief 
description of the survey method and a review of some of the more 
significant results. 
Research Method 
A sample of Western Australians entitled to vote formed the basis 
of the survey and it was obtained by randomly generating 1,800 
electoral roll members from all the federal electoral divisions 
in Western Australia. 
The aim was to achieve 600 completed responses to a 
questionnaire from the 1800 persons contacted, an earlier 
research project on community attitudes to the criminal justice 
system in Western Australia having achieved a 28 per cent 
response rate (Broadhurst, 1981). 
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The Questionnaire 
It was decided to preface the questions asked with twelve 
controversial statements selected from various journals, 
newspaper articles and letters to editors. Each statement 
reflected some area of concern about the jury system. The 
questionnaire was pretested on thirty persons and 
several modifications were made after this exercise was 
completed. A questionnaire was then mailed out to the 1800 
randomly selected voters with a covering letter requesting 
co-operation and enclosing a postage paid reply envelope. 
Survey Particulars 
Total sample receiving questionnaire 1,800 
No contact 215 
Questionnaires completed and returned 747 
Completed response rate 41.5% 
Sex of respondents 365 females (48.9%) 
382 males (51.1%) 
Age of respondents 25 years and under 80 (10.7%) 
26-50 years 398 (53.3%) 
50+ 251 (33.6%) 
Not stated 18 ( 2.4%) 
Marital status Married 566 (75.8%) 
Single 90 (12.0%) 
Other 91 (12.2%) 
Education Primary 50 ( 6.7%) 
Secondary 396 (53.0%) 
Technical 164 (22.0%) 
University 107 (14.3%) 
Not stated 30 ( 4.0%) 
Residence Urban 550 (73.6%) 
Rural 197 (26.4%) 
Participants with previous experience 
on juries 54 ( 7.2%) 
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Research results 
The following selected responses indicate the extent of the 
public's commitment to the jury system. 
Q.14 Do you believe trial by jury should be a constitutional 
right of every Australian? 
Yes 85.8 per cent 
Q.18 If you were charged with a serious criminal offence would 
you prefer to have a trial heard by a judge alone? 
No 85.0 per cent 
Q.19 Or would you prefer that the case be decided before a 
judge and jury? 
Yes 85.7 per cent 
Q.26 It is said a jury of average Australians cannot fully 
understand the lifestyle and cultural circumstances of 
Aboriginal or migrant offenders. Would you agree? 
Yes 73.2 per cent 
Q.27 Are you in favour of special juries for migrant offenders 
who have difficulties understanding our criminal justice 
system? 
Yes 47.5 per cent 
Q.28 Many authorities are strongly of the view that there 
should be special juries where the situations involve 
difficult scientific, medical or commercial evidence. Do 
you agree with this view? 
Yes 61.0 per cent 
Q.36 Do you feel that highly educated persons such as 
professors, school teachers, doctors, clergymen, should 
continue to be exempt from jury service? 
No 88.9 per cent 
Q.38 Do you consider 'loss of business' should be an acceptable 
excuse to avoid jury service, for a private employer, 
partner in a firm etc? 
No 46.7 per cent 
Q.40 Participants were requested to select a maximum length of 
time they would be prepared to serve as jurors. 
1-2 days 15.8 per cent 1-2 weeks 15.1 per cent 
2-3 days 14.7 per cent 2-3 weeks 3.3 per cent 
3-4 days 5.1 per cent 3-4 weeks 2.1 per cent 
4-5 days 29.5 per cent 1 month 
or more 10.6 per cent 
No response 3.7 per cent 
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Trial by jury was abolished in Singapore in 1969. Do you 
think Australia should follow this example? 
No 87.7 per cent 
Reasons are not given by a jury. Do you find this practice 
an acceptable one? 
Yes 53.7 per cent 
Do you think the jury is merely a rubber stamp for the 
judge's opinions? 
No 80.9 per cent 
Do you feel the jury is justified in going against the 
judge's summing up at the end of the trial, out of 
considerations of fairness to the defendant? 
Yes 77.6 per cent 
(Referring to the belief that the jury system is the best 
in the world is based on practically no evidence 
whatsoever.) Do you think this belief should be examined 
and research undertaken to find out how juries work as 
long as such research does not interfere with the process 
of justice? 
Yes 82.6 per cent 
Even if you have never been called up for jury service do 
you nevertheless consider such a duty could be a 
worthwhile and rewarding experience? 
Yes 73.2 per cent 
Approximately 550 of the respondents made further comments. Two 
positive examples of these follow: 
I was happy to participate in this questionnaire. I 
believe public opinion should be sought in many other 
fields, possibly in this way although I realise cost is an 
important consideration ... As for this particular survey 
I thought it very adequately asked for the public's 
attitudes to all aspects of the jury system wording the 
questionnaire so that people (like myself) who know 
nothing of the workings of the law, were able to respond 
confidently on an issue that directly or indirectly 
affects us all. 
I think the jury system is useful because it provides the 
views of ordinary people. Judges and other people involved 
with law enforcement usually represent the establishment 
and could lose touch with the views of the rest of the 
community. 
Q.43 
Q.44 
Q.45 
Q.46 
Q.48 
Q.61 
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There were of course some negative comments such as: 
Jurors reflect not only society's values, but also its 
prejudices, e.g. the notorious delinquent in a large 
country town on trial for a serious offence. I doubt that 
one can expect an average person to think, listen and 
reason at an optimum level when placed in an unfamiliar 
setting with unfamiliar colleagues watching an unfamiliar 
ritual in unfamiliar language'. 
I am opposed to the jury system in its present form and 
would like to see the trial left to a judge and increased 
to three judges for criminal charges, e.g. murder, 
kidnapping, high-jacking public transport etc. 
Alternatively to placate those of the community opposed to 
radical change and hasten finality of trials, I would like 
to see a secret ballot enforced after no longer than two 
days of sitting of the jury and for the trial judge to 
record his vote, which should represent a big percentage 
of the overall. This latter to be decided by experts in 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
Freeman (1981), observes that there is a large body of 
professional opinion which unfortunately assumes lay participants 
(i.e. jurors) should behave like experts and have 
professional expectations. It is interesting to contrast this 
view with Harold Laski's observations after he had participated 
in a 20 day trial as a juryman. He states, 'I firmly believe 
all my life in the glory of the jury system' (Howe, 1953). 
Thompson (1978) also expresses concern about modernisation which 
finds democratic practice inconvenient and has no use for Lord 
Devlin's fusty old lamp. It can manage us better in the dark 
where it has put out our rights. I like his expression 'muggers 
of the constitution' and 'vandals of the jury box' in this 
regard. Sallmann and Willis (1984) have expressed concern that 
the role played by the jury has been and is still being whittled 
away in Australia, although there is general support for and 
confidence in it by the public. 
Despite these trends there is still extensive and firm ongoing 
support for the jury system in judicial and legal circles. In an 
unpublished address to the 23rd Australian Legal Convention at 
Melbourne in 1985 Canadian Supreme Court Justice William Estey 
stated: 
The more we cut out the jury, the less participation 
there is within the community in the judicial system, the 
less rapport will flow between the citizenry and our 
complex legal system. Jury service seems to be one of the 
great experiences of life of a citizen. Why is that? It is 
because he sees through the window how the system warks, 
where the power is and where his place is in it. 
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At the 1986 Law Summer School in Western Australia the Chairman 
of the District Court His Honour Judge Heenan had this to say: 
Within the legal profession in this country there is 
general satisfaction with the jury system. Perhaps the 
greatest merit of the system is that it infuses the law 
with the community's sense of justice and applies 
community standards in regulating some of the more 
important affairs of life. 
In April 1986, Mr Justice Muirhead presented an unpublished paper 
on 'The Jury System In Today's Society' to the West Australian 
Branch of the Australian Crime Prevention Council. He stated that 
while a strong case can be made out for^the abolition of the 
jury: 
I hope it does not come about; it seems to me its 
advantages are manifest and well tried by history - I 
regard the system as a national asset. Its disadvantages 
can be categorised but in total are not I submit 
significant when compared with the alternatives. 
More recently the Criminal Law Committee of the Western 
Australian Law Society prepared an unpublished position paper on 
the jury in relation to media statements which stated: 
The jury system is still perceived by the community as a 
bastion against the oppressive enforcement of laws. 
My research into public attitudes about the jury revealed that 
well over three quarters of the community has overwhelming 
support for and confidence in the jury system. Green (1980) 
examined the many major trials in the United States to assess 
whether the jury's initial function as a bulwark against 
oppressive government was being performed. She stated that the 
results of her findings had not been to claim that the jury is 
beyond reproach or incapable of error but: 
My aim has simply been to show how an institution run by 
amateurs, directed and organised by ordinary people, using 
their common sense, and following formal rules, can 
perform its duty in a consistently responsible manner; how 
it can stand above popular prejudice and deliver verdicts 
that experts steeped and trained in law can expect 
(Green, 1980, 147). 
I find these sentiments most acceptable. Perhaps the last word on 
the public attitude to the jury should be left to the writer and 
poet G. K. Chesterton who once served on a jury and later very 
perceptibly wrote about the experience in his essay 'The Twelve 
Men': 
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I saw with a queer and indescribable kind of clearness 
what a jury really is and why we must never let it go. The 
trend of our epoch up to this time has been consistently 
towards specialism and professionalism. The principle has 
been applied to law and politics by innumerable modern 
writers. 
Many Fabians have insisted that a greater part of 
our political work should be performed by experts. Many 
legalists have declared that the untrained jury should be 
altogether supplanted by the trained judge. 
Our civilization has decided, and very justly decided, 
that determining the guilt or innocence of men is a thing 
too important to be trusted to trained men. When it wishes 
for light upon that awful manner it asks men who know no 
more law that I know, but who can feel the things that I 
felt in the jury box. When it wants a library catalogued, 
or the solar system discovered, or any trifle of that 
kind, it uses up its specialists. But when it wishes 
anything done which is really serious, it collects twelve 
of the ordinary men standing round. The same thing was 
done, if I remember rightly, by the Founder of 
Christianity (Chesterton, 1968, 86). 
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I 
MEDIA RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAIR TRIAL 
Mr Tom Molomby 
Talks Department 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
It has long been acknowledged that there is a conflict between 
the rights of freedom of the press and the rights of the 
individual to fair treatment under the legal process, 
particularly to a fair trial before a jury. In the United States 
in particular, it is frequently referred to as the free press 
versus fair trial debate, or a version of that label. There, of 
course, that debate has a different legal context, because of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution. But the practical 
considerations which govern the debate are the same, and the 
American literature, which is copious, and their experience, have 
a great influence over the debate here. 
Now one thing I should make clear at this point is that though I 
come from the media, I do not claim to represent their point of 
view on this issue. There is not, of course, a single media point 
of view. There is a considerable range, though I think it is fair 
to say that they all support the general proposition that 
restrictions on the media should be the least possible. It is in 
the arguments which go to support that proposition, and in 
exactly where it is argued the line should be drawn, that the 
variations are to be found. It is not difficult to find among 
some sections of the media views on this topic which are 
essentially rat-bag, thoroughly self-interested and 
disreputable. There is, however, a history of thoughtful 
consideration of the issue by the more responsible, though even 
among them there are, as might be expected, differences of 
opinion. 
I do not propose today to try to pronounce upon what ought to be 
the media's responsibilities, or how the law ought to provide for 
them; rather I shall try to outline what seem to me some of the 
important facts that are necessary to understand in order to 
appreciate the views held by the more thoughtful media of their 
responsibilities in this area, and other matters which I suggest 
ought to be under the attention of those whose task it is to make 
and review and administer the law in this area. 
Having said that, I have to say immediately that in an absolute 
sense, I do not believe most of the media see themselves as 
having any responsibility for fair trial at all. That is not to 
say they set out to be unfair, but their guiding principle is 
somewhat different. It rests on the proposition that a free press 
is fundamental for a free society. 
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To support this unexceptional proposition, they will quote 
ringing declarations such as that of Mr Justice Black of the 
United States Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers case: 
In the first amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free 
press the protection it must have to fulfil its essential 
role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, 
not the governors. The Government's power to censor the 
press was abolished so that the press would remain forever 
free to censure the Government. The press was protected so 
that it could bare the secrets of Government and inform the 
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively 
expose deception, in Government ... 
And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is 
the duty to prevent any part of the government from 
deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands 
to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell (New 
York Times v. United States, (1971) 403 US 713 at 717). 
Relying on declarations like that, the Australian media argue 
that they should be as unrestricted as possible. They tend to 
regard the principle of a free press as fundamental and 
inalienable, in the American constitutional sense, and I detect 
very little tolerance for the concept that the rights and 
interests of society in a free press may on occasion have to be 
balanced against other rights and interests, such as those of the 
individual to a fair trial, and on occasion have to yield to 
them. 
The more thoughtful do of course acknowledge the importance of 
fair trial, but they tend not to concede it the status of a 
principle, certainly not a principle of the same status as 
freedom of the press. The rights of a free press are paramount, 
tends to be the attitude. As with most principles, the real test 
of what they mean is when it comes to application in individual 
cases, and here the media use various arguments. In one, the 
freedom of the press becomes a duty to the community. 
There is a good example of that in action from Melbourne 
last month, where the radio station 3AW and Derryn Hinch were 
charged with contempt of court in relation to broadcasts in 
which Hinch had revealed and discussed a prior conviction of a 
priest who was awaiting trial on a number of sexual offences 
involving children. Hinch admitted that he knew this could 
prejudice the trial. He was asked 'In your set of values, the 
desirability of stopping him was more important than the 
possibility of affecting his fair trial?'. His reply was 'I 
felt I had a bigger responsibility to the community at large than 
I did to Father Glennon'. 
That attitude, I suggest - that is, that the media's 
responsibilities to society are greater than their 
responsibilities to the individual - is the media's normal 
response to such situations. 
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Some in the media would take an even stronger attitude. I cite a 
striking instance from a recent issue of The American Lawyer 
magazine, in which the editor was discussing a New York 
U.S. Attorney's practice of calling a press conference to 
announce indictments, a practice which some had objected to as 
prejudicial to defendants. The magazine said: 'In our society 
reputations are often sacrificed to the value we put on a 
free flow of information and expression. The presumption of 
innocence, after all, is an evidentiary rule, not a pretext for 
thought control'. (The American Lawyer, December 1985, 30). 
I might say I have read a number of articles by the editor of 
that magazine, and never found him an unsophisticated or 
unthoughtful person. But what that quotation seems to me to 
imply is that inhibiting publication to prevent prejudice is 
thought control and therefore unacceptable, and that what 
defendants are entitled to Is only the benefit of the 
presumption of innocence - which is conveniently reduced to 
the status of an evidentiary rule so that those outside the 
court process are free to say and think otherwise if they 
choose - and therefore ultimately that if the benefit to the 
defendant within the legal process of the presumption of 
innocence is undermined by the effect of the prejudice 
created outside it, then that is tough. 
At least in those two instances the media were willing to 
acknowledge that there was prejudice to a fair trial. Another 
argument used in support of the paramountcy of free press is to 
deny the existence of prejudice, or at least to demand that there 
be not just the possibility or risk of it, but proof of a real 
danger. 
Something along this line seems to have been put forward in 
defence of Mr Hinch in the case I mentioned earlier, where, 
according to Age on 29 April, the barrister appearing on his 
behalf said that there had been no real or serious threat to a 
fair trial, the words used being transitory and not in printed 
form, and it being a commonplace thing for listeners of radio to 
be bombarded with items of a sensational nature. I pause to 
remark that this seems to be trying to have it both ways, as Mr 
Hinch's reason for broadcasting the item in the face of his 
recognition that it could be prejudicial was that it was for the 
benefit of the community, presumably meaning that his words, 
transitory, not printed and commonplace sensational though they 
were, had to be and were intended to be remembered. (Hinch was 
found guilty of contempt of court on Thursday, 22 May 1986.) 
Proponents of the view that a real danger of prejudice must be 
proved point to cases, mostly in the United States, which have 
received enormous publicity of a type traditionally regarded as 
prejudicial, yet in which the verdicts reached are generally 
accepted as correct, and argue that the traditional restraints of 
our contempt law depend - to quote one unpublished journalist's 
submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission - 'on 
unproved assumptions about the effect of publicity on potential 
jurors and their presumed inability to decide cases on the actual 
evidence presented during a court hearing'. 
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That submission brands the view that jurors might be influenced 
by factors outside the evidence presented in court as 
'fundamentally elitist'. I must say I find that attitude rather 
strange. One does not have to go far in history to find examples 
of people taking all sorts of cruel and oppressive action, to the 
point of the extermination of others, on a basis of prejudice. 
The human mind is not as purely rational as we would like it to 
be, and the proposition that the worst the media could do would 
necessarily be evaded by the right words of advice from the trial 
judge is to me absurd. 
Test that in contemporary circumstances by asking what chance of 
a fair trial there is now for Morgan Ryan. 
It may well be that in a relatively stable society such as ours, 
in a climate conditioned by the existing law of contempt, many of 
the excesses or aberrations of the media which actually occur 
could in fact be successfully countered by advice from the trial 
judge. But it cannot be assumed, if the restrictions of contempt 
law were removed, that the behaviour of the media would remain 
unchanged. It would, I think, very soon come to excel the 
American media, and while there is much to be said in their 
favour in the public arena generally, there are some sorry 
examples indeed in the area of prejudice to fair trial. A recent 
documentation of an appalling demonstration of that is Ludovic 
Kennedy'8 book on the Lindbergh kidnapping case, The Airman and 
the Carpenter (1985). 
On this point I quote from a speech given in December last year 
by Katherine Graham, chairman of the board of the Washington Post 
Company. She was discussing the responsibilities of the media in 
covering terrorism in the context of the suggestion that 
publicity is the life blood of terrorism, but the point on which 
I am quoting her was a general one: 
All serious professional media around the world are anxious 
to be as responsible as possible. Unfortunately, high 
standards of professionalism do not guide every media 
organisation or every reporter. And I regret to say that 
once one of these less scrupulous or less careful people 
reports some piece of information, all the media feel 
compelled to follow. Thus it is true: the least 
responsible person involved in the process could determine 
the level of coverage'. (1985 Churchill Lecture, 6 December 
1985, reported in The Guardian, 29 December, 1985, 11). 
That, I suggest, is no less true in Australia. Let me mention 
just one example in our own media. It involves once again 
Mr Derryn Hinch. Some years ago, when everyone in the Australian 
media was keeping a discreet and sympathetic silence about the 
fatal illness of the wife of the Premier of South Australia, 
Hinch, no doubt in performance of his duty to the community at 
large, revealed it in a broadcast. That immediately changed the 
situation for everyone else. 
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While they would not have done it first themselves, once someone 
else had, they all felt free, perhaps more than free, compelled 
to use Katherine Graham's term, to follow. I think I recall some 
even using the sophistical justification that they were not 
revealing the woman's illness, because Hinch had already done 
that, but commenting on the questionable thing which he had done. 
Personally I'd much rather have seen him tried for that, - not 
for contempt of court, of course, but contempt of humanity. 
The phenomenon to which Katherine Graham was referring is an 
example of the effects of the pressure under which the media 
operate - the great pressure of competition which is at times an 
enormous distorting influence on judgment. The competition is 
essentially one to be first with the latest; immediacy becomes 
the highest value, and so for many being late is worse than being 
wrong. The old fashioned press used to work to one deadline a 
day; then there came early and late editions, and earlier and 
later editions, all under the pressure not to miss the 
opportunity to be first with something. For the electronic 
media, radio especially, the pressures are now formidable, with 
deadlines as frequently as every hour. Sober and settled 
judgments are not made under such pressures, particularly when 
one of the worst failings of all is to have the opposition 
broadcast an item of popular scandal, titillation or amusement 
which you yourself had but decided through some moral principle 
or fear of the law not to use. 
Let me quote on this point from a letter to the Australian Law 
Reform Commission from an adviser to a major media group: 
.... a lawyer giving advice on contempt to media which is 
published on a regular periodic basis in a highly 
competitive market treads an exceptionally fine line. 
Should he counsel publication of contemptuous material he 
and his editor are quite likely to finish up in gaol; 
should he repress material which is not in contempt his 
error is likely to be exposed the very next morning when the 
opposition will publish with impunity, what he kept out. 
The problem is compounded when what he represses and the 
opposition publishes is in fact clearly in contempt. If no 
proceedings for contempt are taken against them their 
publication is nonetheless likely to be seen by his own 
group as an aspersion on his credibility. 
As a result of all that, I suggest that it has to be accepted 
that a major factor to be considered in all this is the 
behaviour, not of the thoughtful and responsible media, but of 
those I will politely call the others. Let me use as an example 
Mr Rupert Murdoch, one of the most influential media figures in 
the world, and an instance which does not involve prejudice to 
fair trial, but one which involves attitudes to the truth, which 
ought to be similarly strict. 
94 
Murdoch's Times, with Murdoch's own personal involvement, was 
heavily involved in the expensive purchase and publication of the 
Hitler diaries, which soon turned out to be a little less 
reliable even than Mr Murdoch's newspapers. Murdoch's three 
recorded public comments on this fiasco as noted by Harris (1985) 
we,re: 
Nothing ventured, nothing gained. 
. After all, we are in the entertainment business. 
. Circulation went up and it stayed up. We didn't lose money or 
anything like that. 
It is almost too easy to find examples of the crude standards and 
absent ethics of the Murdochs of the media. I mention them 
because sometimes in discussion with reasonable and responsible 
media representatives it is easy to forget how bad many others 
are. And they have an influence which cannot be ignored, because 
of the factor to which Katherine Graham draws attention. 
I said early on in this paper that I believed most of the media 
did not see themselves as having any responsibility for fair 
trial at all. I have already outlined some of the arguments -
not very sophisticated ones - which they use to evade any such 
responsibility. Let me outline another one which I think is 
crucial to understanding a lot of media thinking. It is perhaps 
an attitude rather than an argument as such. I illustrate by way 
of an example from the television program '60 Minutes', not 
the Channel 9 one here but the American one from which it is 
copied, and from which sometimes the local one takes items. 
In March this year they showed an item on the litigation 
explosion, and amazing buckets of money being handed out by 
juries as damages in civil suits of various sorts. This item 
treated a case in which a ladder manufacturer had been sued 
successfully by someone who had fallen off one of its ladders. 
The ladder had collapsed, and the company had gone down for 
$300,000, and all because, according to the television program, 
the ladder had been placed on horse manure and had slipped, and 
the company had failed to give a warning that the ladder could 
slip if it was placed on horse manure. Now the program made that 
statement through the mouth of the ladder manufacturer, in an 
interview. They didn't research the court records or talk to 
anyone on the other side. The American Lawyer magazine did, and 
discovered that that story was completely wrong - the case was 
about a defectively manufactured ladder, not a failure to warn. 
So the magazine phoned the reporter on '60 Minutes' and asked 
why he had not made the inquiries which they had. This is his 
answer: 'Because we were only trying to present this 
man('s) ... perspective. We weren't taking one side or the 
other ... All we did was broadcast what one man said' (The 
American Lawyer, May 1986, 12). 
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So there it is. Freedom of the press is not freedom in the 
interests of broadcasting the truth; it is freedom to broadcast 
whatever people say whether or not it is the truth, and without 
trying to do anything to discover whether it is. 
As long, of course, as it is a good story in the first place. I 
should remark that this approach conditions quite an amount of 
media thinking in relation to defamation law; every time reform 
of defamation law is discussed, you will find lurking somewhere 
the suggestion that the media should be free to publish things 
with impunity simply because other people say them. 
You will notice even now sometimes that some use the words 
'allegedly' and 'reportedly' in articles, as though that is 
incorporating some sort of protection for themselves on that 
basi s. 
I said earlier that the media do not concede that fair trial is a 
principle of the same importance as a free press. A telling 
indication of that is that when faced with a potential conflict 
between the two they demand proof that material which would 
generally be regarded as prejudicial is in fact prejudicial in 
the particular case, but always assume that the publication of 
any material, however mindlessly prurient or scandalous, is 
necessarily in the interests of the public which are served by 
the principle of a free press. 
I believe that both are important principles, and that when they 
conflict, they can be reconciled, though not in the way that many 
of the media would wish. To accord primacy to the freedom of the 
press over fair trial is in my view to fail to understand the 
purpose for which the principle of a free press exists. A free 
press is an essential part of the free society, but the process 
of reasoning does not stop there. The free society has an 
objective, and that is the liberty of the individual. Free trial 
affects the liberty of the individual in the most direct possible 
way, and that is why the principle of free trial must have 
primacy. That primacy will exist only if it is guaranteed by 
law. 
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JURY PERSUASION 
Mr W. D. Hosking Q.C. 
Deputy Senior Public Defender 
New South Wales 
Editor's Note: Mr Hosking gave an illuminating and entertaining 
address to the seminar based on his lengthy experience as counsel 
in criminal trials. The following are extracts from his address 
that indicate the issues he saw relevant to jury persuasion. 
Jury persuasion begins even before the selection process. The 
accused is advised to be well groomed and conservatively dressed 
to make an initially favourable impression upon the jury. The 
actual selection process is surrounded by considerable mystique 
and folklore but it is very unscientific, as one never knows 
whether the decision to reject prospective jurors was right or 
wrong. It is of course, different in provincial centres where 
most potential jurors are known to local practitioners. 
In New South Wales, the prosecution and the defence each have the 
right to eight peremptory challenges (twenty in murder cases). 
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission has recently 
recommended that these challenges be reduced to three. Whether or 
not this will operate to the disadvantage of an accused is open 
to question. What a reduction in challenges would do is prevent 
practices such as occurred recently in the Georgia Hill case. 
Hill was charged with the murder of her husband and the 
prosecution must have exhausted all their challenges on the way 
to getting a jury of eleven men and one woman. (That jury did 
convict Mrs Hill.) 
All that is known of the prospective juror is his or her name 
in the short time between the calling of the name and the moment 
of decision, such things as an R.S.L. badge or the carrying of an 
expensive brief case, can inspire the rejection of that juror. On 
the prosecution side, beards, a leather jacket or even worse 
still, no tie can be a negative factor in jury selection. 
At the end of the trial neither side is any better informed as to 
the wisdom of their respective choices as the jurors sink back 
into the community. After almost twenty years engaged almost 
exclusively in appearing in criminal trials, I confess I am none 
the wiser. 
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As already observed, the task of jury persuasion begins with the 
grooming of the accused. The legendary Tony Bellanto Q.C. 
elevated this to an art form. Such things as mauve shirts, white 
shoes and loud ties were discarded in favour of dark pin 
stripes and conservative hues. Bouncers and burglars became 
indistinguishable from bankers. Bellanto in New South 
Wales was also the outstanding jury advocate of his 
generation. His strong voice combined with a passion and sincere 
presentation represented the pinnacle of the persuader's art. 
One summer afternoon pleading for the liberty of a mother of 
three, accused of murdering her husband, Bellanto so hypnotised 
a young constable guarding the dock, that when he uttered the 
closing words of his address 'unlock the door of the dock and 
return this mother to the arms of her children who are waiting to 
receive her', the officer was in the process of doing just that 
before the judge jerked him back to reality. 
Styles of advocacy vary with the era and there are many 
outstanding examples of florid and dramatic performances by 
counsel attempting to sway the jury to accept their point of 
view. Colourful phrases and imagery are of course a big help. 
Ridicule is also a useful weapon, for example: 
You have heard the evidence of 'X'. If you can swallow 
such nonsense, it will be the greatest gastronomical 
achievement since the Adventures of Jonah. 
In another case, an alleged accomplice gave damning evidence 
against the accused. Counsel, with great emphasis, Introduced his 
analysis of that evidence in this way: 
The witness 'Y' was called to the witness box and sworn on 
the Bible in solemn form. Perhaps it would have been 
better if he had been sworn instead on the dagger - the 
proper symbol of his profession. 
Such exaggerated analogies are designed to leave a lasting 
impression on the jury. Whereas they are exceedingly unlikely to 
make such an impression on a judge sitting alone. 
THE JUDGE AND THE FACTS 
The jury's function is to determine matters of fact and I would 
suggest that judges are no more skilled than ordinary members of 
the community at doing that. Indeed the whole jury system is 
based on the community having the view that decisions on fact 
affecting the liberty of the accused are far too important to 
leave to judges and those are the decisions that we as a 
community seek to keep in our own hands. However, jurors coming 
to court for the first time face a strange environment, steeped 
with ancient ritual. It is the role of the advocate to make sure 
that the jury understood what is their task, the principles which 
must guide them and what their responsibilities are. 
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A familiar attitude is that the jury say, 'Well the barristers on 
both sides are paid to advance a particular point of view. The 
Judge is impartial and has great experience. He will give us a 
hint as to what the correct verdict should be.' This of course, 
is wrong, as the judge in law has no responsibility for decisions 
on matters of fact. 
The fact that the judge is entitled to express a view on the 
facts is often a source of difficulty. How far, if at all, should 
the judge be allowed to intrude and even persuade the jury on the 
facts? A judge who does express a view on the facts must tell the 
jury that the decision on the facts is theirs alone. A strong 
argument can be mounted that a judge should not enter this 
area at all. 
During the course of counsel's address, it is vital to remind the 
jury again and again that the facts are for them alone. Counsel 
would also be wise to tell the jury matters of law, such as (in 
New South Wales) the need to be unanimous where such a direction 
by the judge is not mandatory. 
All juries are different and indeed some are quite volatile. 
There is a story told of a jury at Darlinghurst being sent out 
late one afternoon and after four hours, with much noise 
emanating from the jury room they were brought back into court. 
The judge asked the foreman of the jury to stand, and two jurors 
rose. The judge remarked 'It looks as if we are in for a late 
night'. It was. 
However, juries are not fools; they are the conscience of the 
community and a cross-section of it drawn by lot. They represent 
its sense of justice and its wisdom, they rarely get it wrong in 
the conviction of an innocent person. The jury system is healthy 
and the fact that the jury cannot be swayed by rhetoric alone 
indicates they deal with the real merits of the case. 
I 
SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS RELEVANT TO THE JURY 
Professor Peter W. Sheehan 
Department of Psychology 
University of Queensland 
The task for jurors is a tremendously complicated one. For the 
most part, the information that is presented to them is piecemeal 
and fragmented. More often than not, it relates to problematic 
situations in which the members of the jury have to reach a 
decision about guilt or responsibility by reducing the ambiguity 
of the information that is available in order to arrive at a 
judgment that itself is probablistic in character (Holstein, 
1985). Emotional factors can motivate them to reconstruct the 
events of the courtroom in order to justify their private 
interpretations of behaviour. They also represent a social group 
in which plausible alternative explanations of behaviour are 
presented, their task being to resolve the conflict implied by 
these co-existing accounts so as to arrive at a judgment that 
hopefully has the agreement of the remaining jurors in their 
group. Not only must they come to a well-reasoned conclusion 
about what they have decided to accept, but they must also 
evaluate with considerable critical scrutiny the attempts by 
others to persuade them to accept alternative accounts of what 
has occurred. Finally, in this task, they must responsibly resist 
possible bias emanating from the trial conditions and any 
influence of attitudes and knowledge about the case that is 
extralegal in character. 
The aim of this article is to capture something of this 
complexity by reviewing a number of the factors that may affect 
juror decisions and which can lead jurors to make erroneous 
judgments. The processes responsible for these influences will be 
canvassed broadly, and data examined especially in relation to 
jurors' judgments from the viewpoint of the conceptions held by 
them about how memory works, eyewitness accuracy, and the 
confidence placed in witness reports. Finally, a number of 
procedures will be reviewed which may help overcome some of the 
biasing influences to which jurors are exposed. 
OVERVIEW OF SOME MAJOR FACTORS OF INFLUENCE 
Influences that affect jurors In reaching judgments of guilt or 
innocence derive from a number of major sources. These relate to 
NOTE: The author wishes to thank Peggy Doherty for her help in 
the preparation of this paper. 
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the selection of the jurors themselves, and to jurors' 
perceptions of the accused and of the alleged crime. Extralegal 
factors may also be Implicated through the influence of jurors 
attitudes toward prosecution and conviction. 
The verdicts jurors reach are affected not only by the strength 
of the evidence that jurors perceive, but the perceived strength 
of the evidence is associated directly with the jurors' attitudes 
toward the case (Hepburn, 1980); a more favourable attitude to 
punishment, for example, may enhance the perceived strength of 
the prosecution's case. Also, legal procedures themselves may 
exert a biasing influence on jurors' decisions, especially in 
relation to the way witnesses' memories are tested. 
Jury Selection 
The legal system acknowledges the right to an impartial jury, but 
the conditions that ensure impartiality need to take some account 
of the way the jury is selected, its composition, and the venue 
of the trial. Considering the first of these in some detail, the 
main aim of jury selection is to exclude those jurors who are 
least likely to reach an impartial and fair verdict (Hepburn, 
1980), but there are subtle factors operating in the jury 
selection process that can be easily overlooked. Repeated jury 
service produces several effects amongst jurors, for example, and 
one of them is that repeated service creates an Increased 
disposition toward conviction of criminal defendants (Dillehay 
and Nietzel, 1985). Dillehay and Nietzel (1985) examined 175 
criminal trials in order to address the problem of the 
relationship between juror experience and verdicts and found 
that there was a greater tendency to convict when there were 
large numbers of experienced jurors on a jury. 
One of the most focused areas of discussion of factors affecting 
jury selection relates to the consequences of excluding people 
who are unwilling to impose the death penalty. Those who are 
included constitute what is known in the American criminal 
justice system as death-qualified juries, and the findings on 
such juries have converged on the conclusion that they are biased 
against capital defendants. Juries sampled in this way are 
usually unrepresentative of the communities from which they are 
drawn. Research has shown that proponents and opponents of the 
death penalty, differ, for example, in their attitudes across a 
broad spectrum of issues related to criminal justice. Death-
qualified jurors have attitudes that predispose them toward the 
prosecution point of view and consequently toward conviction; 
excludable jurors have less punitive attitudes than includable 
jurors, and are more open to particular kinds of criminal defence 
(Fitgerald and Ellsworth, 1983). 
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Perceptions of the Criminal and the Crime, and Effect of 
Dispositions. 
Factors affecting jurors' decision-making can emanate from their 
perception of stimuli impinging on them in the actual courtroom 
setting, and these include the defendant and the nature of the 
crime. Jurors' reactions to people as stimuli are likely to be 
founded on an initial evaluation of complex physical 
characteristics that incorporate physical appearance, the actions 
of the persons involved, style of clothing, facial expression, 
and manner of talking. The influence of these impressions allows 
one in turn to infer the operation of specific personality 
traits, intentions and dispositions (see Yarmey, 1979). Factors 
of these kinds can explicitly affect jurors when, for example, 
counsel is permitted by the judge to introduce the photographs of 
victims as evidence in court. Here, the degree of harm done to 
the victim (as perceived by the juror) has been reported to lead 
to harsher judgments about the alleged harm-doer (Joseph 
and Tedeschi, 1983). And such processes of perception are 
compounded in their influence when they relate to stereotypes 
that members of the community may share about the victims of 
crimes and their perpetrators. If defendants possess 
characteristics, for example, that fit the stereotype of 
criminals then the accused may be more readily judged as 
guilty of a criminal act (Deaux, 1976). Further, if jurors 
see the defendant as different from themselves in the values and 
life styles that they possess, then the accused is more likely 
to be categorised as criminal and to receive a severer verdict 
and sentence (see Dane and Wrightsman, 1982). The influence of 
factors of these kinds and internal dispositions of jurors (such 
as authoritarianism) is subtle and unwitting in its effects. 
Many influences on a jury are inadvertent, but there is strong 
evidence to indicate that when they are not, the manipulations 
that are attempted frequently do not have the effects that are 
intended. Consider, for example, the introduction of prior 
conviction evidence. This is introduced to attack the credibility 
of a witness, but it can also affect juries' decision-making in 
ways that conflict with legal instruction on how the evidence 
should be heeded. Knowing that a defendant has a prior conviction 
may change the meaning or significance of other evidence in a 
case (Hans and Doob, 1976), decrease the standard of proof or 
the amount of evidence necessary to find a person guilty 
(Lempert, 197 7), and motivate a jury to generalise negative 
characteristics and overestimate criminality (Lempert, 1977). 
One may argue, in fact, that defendants are best protected by 
excluding evidence of their prior convictions so that the 
jury's decision processes will not employ the evidence in 
ways that the law does not condone. 
Impact of Legal Procedures 
Procedurally, the structure of the questioning process and the 
procedures of memory testing have major consequences for 
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influencing jurors' judgments and perceptions. By asking too many 
questions to get answers, for example, the lawyer can be 
perceived as hostile (Yarmey, 1979), and this is particularly 
a risk when the information may equally have come from events 
being freely narrated. Further, when both lawyer and witness 
speak at the same time, the lawyer may be perceived as not in 
control and less credible as a result. Also, attorneys typically 
suggest multiple interpretations of events for jurors to 
consider, yet Holstein (1985) has shown that presenting more than 
one interpretation in support of a particular verdict does little 
to help that verdict's chances. Decision-making becomes more 
complex when the number of different versions of 'what really 
happened' increases and the likelihood of a jury reaching an 
unanimous verdict then decreases. 
The major problem that emerges from memory testing derives from 
the impact of information witnesses receive after the original 
event (which may be the subject of the trial) has occurred. The 
information may come in the form of incorrect facts contained in 
leading statements in court, or from questioning conducted in 
trial or pretrial procedures. Postevent information may be 
assimilated into memory and the reorganised memories accepted as 
real. Jurors in turn are subject to the acceptance of witnesses' 
revised memories and to the biasing influences of the new 
information that is suggestive. These are problems to which we 
will return later when they are considered in relation to the 
specific conceptions held by jurors about how memory operates and 
the findings available in the literature on eyewitness accuracy 
and confidence. 
PROCESSES RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLUENCES 
The processes that explain why jurors make the decisions they do 
are multiple and diverse and no one theory adequately encompasses 
their influences (for review of several of the theories, see 
Weiten and Diamond, 1979). Existing theories cover such 
processes as the extent to which jurors identify or reject the 
defendant in terms of the reinforcement provided for their own 
life-styles and attitudes, the degree to which the evidential 
and non-evidential information to which jurors are exposed is 
evaluated, weighed and combined by them in a conceptually 
unified way, the social or group dynamics of the jurors making 
the final decision, and the nature of the attributions made 
by jurors in relation to the events of the case. Given 
the focus of much of the recent literature on the biasing 
possibilities of witness testimony and identification, 
however, there is considerable agreement in the literature on 
the importance of processes that cast the problem within a 
social-cognitive perspective. The nature of the jurors' 
task is such that some account must be provided of the 
cognitive processes involved in judgment formation, as well as 
the social nature of the give-and-take of opinion in the 
collective group. 
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Two specific processes that can be generalised across different 
theoretical orientations are those of overbelief and cognitive 
discrimination. Given the extent of response bias evident in 
witnesses' reports (for review of the evidence, see Hall, Loftus 
and Tousignant, 1983), the problem of overbelief depicts the 
extent to which jurors believe too uncritically in the 
witnesses' reports; this tendency to overbelief is more 
extensive when original witnessing conditions are poor 
(Wells, 1983) and the process obviously implicates jurors' 
socially determined attitudes. Discrimination expresses the 
extent to which jurors can discriminate between accurate and 
inaccurate testimony, regardless of their scepticism about the 
witnesses' testimony, even when the testimony itself is 
incorrect, and jurors may fail to discriminate between accurate 
and inaccurate evidence regardless of their beliefs about the 
evidence. 
The processes of overbelief and discrimination are traditionally 
discussed in the literature in relation to the use of expert 
testimony aout eyewitness behaviour, particularly with respect to 
the question of whether expert testimony is safe and effective. 
They reflect processes, however, that are related directly to the 
accuracy of jurors' final judgments. Overbelief, for example, 
expresses a general tendency, now well established, for jurors to 
be willing to believe eyewitness testimony, especially if the 
testimony in question is reported confidently. And the concept of 
discrimination expresses the related process of judging accuracy 
when there are competing, biasing influences at work in the 
courtroom setting. The important questions lying behind the 
relevance of the two processes are 'Can jurors be sceptical 
enough of the evidence that they receive to assess the evidence 
objectively?' and 'Is there room for improvement in jurors' 
ability to discriminate accuracy from inaccuracy?'. The evidence 
for and against these questions is debated in the literature (see 
Egeth and McClosky, 1983; and Wells, 1983, in reply), but a 
reasonable conclusion on the results of the research that has 
been conducted is that overbelief and lack of discrimination do 
exist; there is no firm guarantee that eyewitness evidence can be 
analysed or evaluated completely objectively through normal 
courtroom and juryroom procedures; and new and more effective 
legal methods are required to render jurors more critical of the 
evidence that is presented to them, and more knowledgeable about 
the influential nature of the ways in which it is communicated. 
THE MISCONCEPTIONS OF JURORS 
It is important in the context of these remarks to recognise that 
eyewitness testimony is one of the most persuasive kinds of 
evidence that frequently leads to conviction (Loftus, 1975). 
Loftus found, for instance, that simulated juries were much more 
likely to vote for conviction if there was eyewitness 
verification or corroboration of the crime; and Brigham and 
Bothwell (1983) found that over 50 per cent of subjects who were 
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tested were unaware that an eyewitness's identification of a 
person from a set of photos was likely to produce an 
identification of the same person from a lineup at a later date, 
regardless of whether that person was guilty or not. Both law 
professionals (Loftus, 1979) and jurors (Deffenbacher and Loftus, 
1982) carry false beliefs about witnessaccuracy and how it can be 
achieved. Loftus found, for example, that law professionals 
believe incorrectly that high arousal leads to more accurate 
facial recognition, while Deffenbacher and Loftus found that 
jurors are frequently ignorant of the factors which actually 
affect eyewitness accuracy. Wells, Lindsay and Ferguson (1979) 
also report that jurors rely heavily on their assessment of 
eyewitness confidence in judging accuracy. The majority of people 
consider that there is a positive and strong relationship between 
confidence and accuracy, believing that if a witness is confident 
about what is recalled, then he or she is much more likely to be 
accurate in their recollection. In all of these instances common 
sense assumptions differ from the empirical findings and while 
there is much empirical evidence to show that eyewitness 
testimony is unreliable, jurors continue to operate under 
attitudes that assume substantial accuracy and relative lack of 
fallibility. 
The misconceptions of jurors, however, run deeper than inferring 
incorrectly about the fallibility of witnesses. They run to 
holding mistaken conceptions about how memory itself operates. 
Buckout (1974) argues that most laypersons believe that the 
perception of events is recorded in the brain in a veridical and 
literal way - somewhat analagous to a video recorder that records 
events just as they are happening. According to this view, the 
impression that is laid down will be retrieved in the same form 
once the playback mechanism is brought into operation. Also, 
according to this view, memory duplicates the original perception 
and original experiences can be retrieved relatively easily by 
expert hands. Such a model of memory is totally incorrect, 
however. 
The tape recorder model of memory says that memory is inviolate 
to change. The contemporary model of memory, particularly that 
proposed by Loftus and her associates, says that memory is 
constructed and can readily assimilate false, suggested 
information. As a result, witnesses exposed to new information 
that is incorrect may not only fail to retrieve their original 
memories, but may behave in ways that will convince others that 
they should share the same conviction about its veracity as 
themselves. Threading through both these misconceptions (about 
the accuracy of witnesses and the essential resistance of memory 
to change) is the common, general misconception that memory 
itself is reliable. All of us need only to introspect about what 
we think we remember concerning this morning's events to know we 
generally think we are accurate. If all of us, however, checked 
independently on whether we are right we would learn that we are 
not, and that our confidence is misplaced. 
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to look more closely at how memory works and the 
its capacity to change. We will also briefly review 
forensically relevant findings on accuracy in 
both witness identification and witness testimony, 
will consider the matter of confidence and its 
accuracy and how firmly we ought to believe in 
that have been worked through by methods intended 
the accuracy of recall. All of the data have major 
for how jurors operate and how their judgments can 
MEMORY, ACCURACY AND CONFIDENCE AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR JURORS 
How Memory Works 
Memory is considered to involve three stages: encoding, storage 
and retrieval. An encounter with an event (person, or situation) 
necessarily starts with the process called encoding, or 
acquisition of information. This information forms the basis of 
later retrieval. Once registered, the information is stored in 
memory and there are a variety of processes that may contribute 
to why that information will not be retrieved or recalled at a 
later date. The information, for example, may be destroyed, 
replaced by other information, or simply misplaced. The main 
problem in retrieval is that of gaining access to the material 
that has been encoded and stored. Access may be especially aided 
as in recognition, where the alternatives for recollection are 
provided and the person has to choose the right answer or access 
may be unaided, as in recall, when there are no alternative 
answers at hand, and the person has to remember by reporting 
freely, just as events come to mind. Recognition is rather more 
subject to the influence of suggestion than free recall, because 
the alternatives provided can subtly or unsubtly suggest the 
wrong replies. 
These three stages of memory are interactive, or related. 
Encoding, for example, influences storage which also affects 
retrieval. Also, it is an organised store from which information 
is retrieved. Organisation plays a critical role in the recall of 
most types of information and the fact that the process of recall 
involves the reconstruction of information allows us to infer a 
close relationship between perception and memory. Mental 
representations that form our immediate perceptual experience are 
influenced greatly by knowledge stored in memory, and just as our 
perception of the world is far from being a passive copy of that 
world (Glass, Holyoak and Santa, 1979), memory too is actively 
constructed on the basis of past experience and our knowledge and 
expectations of what that experience is supposed to be. When 
viewing conditions are poor, for example, as when a street is 
dimly lit, details of perception are filled in by memory, and 
expectations of what ought to have been there or what was 
supposed to be present structure what we see and remember. 
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A major factor in understanding memory and perception and their 
functions is the role of meaning. We encode material in terms of 
its meaning and most recollections involve the recall of meaning. 
One distinction that conveys this point clearly is that made by 
psychologists between verbatim recall (remembering things in a 
literal way) and remembering its meaning in terms of the general 
gist of what has occurred. How often, for example, do we maintain 
the general gist of things correctly, whilst recalling in a 
literally quite inexact way? For example, I may remember the 
instruction given to me at the commencement of this seminar to 
'present a paper for 45 minutes' or I may remember it as 'talk 
for about 16 pages of text'. In both these cases, I may have the 
gist of the communication correct, but be quite wrong. The actual 
instruction could have been 'begin at 12 p.m. and talk until 
about lunch time'. All convey the same meaning, but the 
first two plausibly reconstruct what was said - but wrongly 
so. What is said blurs easily with time, and it is thus not 
surprising that all of us have difficulty in 
distinguishing plausible reconstructions from each other and 
from actual memories. 
Given these assumptions about how memory works, the data can be 
fitted with the model that memory is essentially constructive in 
character. Past experience is organised in ways that are 
meaningful to the person who is remembering and the rules of 
organising are the themes we use to help recall and construct the 
facts. Subsequent judgments come to be influenced by the 
recollection of the organising themes rather than by the original 
facts themselves (Sherrod, 1985). After a verdict of liability 
for example, a jury, over time and when faced with the task of 
assessing the damages, will be likely to recall more facts 
relevant to the theme of guilty than innocent, and forget 
irrelevant facts by drawing or constructing inferences that are 
supportive of the prosecution's case, rather than that of the 
defence, and the delay is likely to bias the memory or prior 
information in the direction of rendering salient beliefs and 
attitudes more influential. 
Perhaps the most intriguing question to pose about memory and its 
operation is to ask whether the original memory is lost after new 
additional information has been assimilated. After seeing an 
accident, for example, someone may ask us how fast the car was 
going when it smashed into the other car. They might have asked, 
however, how fast the car was going when it hit the other one, or 
how fast the car was going when the two cars collided. These 
three different ways of asking the question subtly convey 
different messages about the event that was observed (see Loftus, 
1979), and the new information that is suggested or implied 
(e.g. the car was going fast, otherwise it would not have 
'smashed' into the other vehicle) may be incorporated into the 
original memory in a way that makes it difficult for the original 
experience ever to be retrieved. New details that are suggested 
can enhance existing memories, but Loftus argues they can change 
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the memories themselves, or at least become incorporated into 
previously acquired memories and coexist with the original 
impressions (see Hall et al; 1983 for the debate). Loftus and her 
associates tell us that if we do not detect that there is a 
discrepancy between what we are told subsequently and what we saw 
originally, then when we try to retrieve the original experience, 
our reports will be appreciably influenced by the fact that the 
new information has transformed the original memory. If old 
memories are restructured into new ones when new information is 
added by experiences that occur after the event, then witnesses 
will be influenced in their recall by legal procedures that 
subtly pose false information to them (e.g. via a legal 
attorney's inquiries). Jurors will be similarly influenced in 
their interpretation of events by their perceptions of witness 
events, and the plausible themes for organising material that 
jurors carry in their own memory store. 
We turn now to look more closely at the evidence for the 
influence of suggestion on memory, in particular. Two areas have 
specifically attracted wide attention in research. These are 
suggestion in eyewitness Identifications, and the possibilities 
for distortion in eyewitness testimony following the introduction 
of postevent information. Related to both is the major issue of 
the impact on jurors of the confidence expressed by witnesses in 
their verbal reports. 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
Essentially, the task of a witness in eyewitness identification 
is to choose a member of the lineup as the offender and in this 
task there are multiple possibilities for the operation of 
suggestion. Suggestion can be communicated through the social 
interactions involving people who are present, or through the 
structure of the lineup itself (Malpass and Devine, 
1983). Witnesses, for example, who believe the lineup is held 
because the police think they have a very likely suspect will be 
prone to believe that the offender has to be in the lineup and 
thus will make a firm identification. The task is a complex 
interaction of the witness choosing, the person who Is chosen, 
and whether the offender is available to be chosen. The 
factors that are most relevant to the role of suggestion are 
probably those that relate to the act of choosing, and the choice 
behaviour is the result of the interplay of witness beliefs and 
expectations about outcomes, the information that witnesses 
actually have, and the probabilities of outcomes matching their 
beliefs (Malpass and Devine, 1983). So extensive are the 
opportunities for suggestion in this situation that Re (1984) 
concludes it is dangerous for any jury to assign probative value 
to identification evidence and she cites examples of cases where 
identification evidence has been accepted in court when 
suggestion must have been in operation. In one instance, 
identification was accepted on the basis of a fleeting glimpse 
made by a policeman 25 yards from the offender, and 
identification was made at another time from a photograph in 
which the person identified was wearing a face stocking. 
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Witness Testimony 
The problems associated with witness testimony loom more largely 
in some cases than in others (in robbery and rape than in drug 
possession, for example), but witness testimony remains the major 
source of bias in the courtroom setting. The final trial also 
comes at the end of a series of opportunities for recollection, 
each of which carries its own potential for suggestion. Before 
the trial, the witness typically answers questions about what 
happened, is asked perhaps to report on photographs in order to 
detect the offender, answers questions by the police and the 
lawyer that focus sharply on the crime, and finally is asked to 
rehearse these recollections in court whilst answering additional 
questions and adding new evidence. At each stage of the process, 
new facts may interfere with memory or become assimilated into 
memory to form restructured recollections. When questions are 
asked either in the pretrial police procedures or the trial 
itself, new information that is not true may be suggested by 
leading questions (e.g. 'Did you see the stop sign at the scene 
of the accident' v. 'Was a stop sign there?'), or by new 
information that is injected into the questions that are asked or 
the statements that are made (e.g. 'When you saw the stop sign 
at the scene of the accident, did you stop?). In situations like 
these, the evidence is consistent with the view that when 
witnesses are presented with new information they may incorporate 
the new material into memory, and the new facts may change the 
character of the original memory. Loftus and her associates (see 
Loftus, 1979) have shown, for example, that subjects remembered a 
give-way sign when they actually saw a stop-sign, and remembered 
a stop sign when they actually saw a give-way sign, depending on 
the nature of the information given to them prior to their being 
asked to remember what they saw, and witnesses reacted as if the 
original memory and the postevent information had been 
'inextricably integrated' (Hall al. 1983, 127). 
The research literature is quite specific about the conditions 
under which the memory distortion will be maximised. The 
distortion effect is greater if the misleading information is 
embedded in complex questions; and the error effect is more 
likely to occur when the information that is suggested concerns 
peripheral rather than salient material (where the witness may 
become aware of the discrepancy from fact). The distortion effect 
also occurs when memories are worked upon by police or by an 
attorney and when the intention is to enhance memory by the 
introduction of novel procedures such as hypnosis. Recollections 
overworked through the application of hypnosis, for example, are 
just as prone to the distorting effect of misleading information 
as recollections that are tested in the standard way (Sheehan and 
Tilden, 1983). 
Confidence 
The evidence indicates that jurors are more likely to believe 
witnesses who are convinced about the accuracy of the memories 
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they report and two central facts emerge as important in the 
research literature. First, witnesses are frequently confident 
about memories that demonstrate the assimilation of incorrect 
facts. The acceptance of the wrong information about the stop/ 
give way sign, for example, was accompanied by greater conviction 
for the material that was incorrect. The second fact is that for 
the most part, confidence relates poorly, not well, to accuracy 
of recall. Despite the intuitive appeal of a close association 
between confidence and accuracy of memory, the relationship 
between confidence and accuracy of memory is actually quite weak 
under good laboratory conditions and functionally useless in 
forensically representative settings (Wells and Murray, 1983). 
The median correlation between accuracy and confidence 
reported by Wells and Murray across the sample of studies they 
considered was just 0.23; only 5 per cent of the variance 
in accuracy was accounted for by eyewitness confidence. As 
social influences increase that association becomes weaker, and 
as reconstructive memory processes become more influential the 
association becomes smaller. 
In the lineup identification situation, the witnesses' confidence 
stems from the commitment implied by the fact that a choice has 
been made (Hall al., 1983) and in the work reported by Wells 
and Murray, witnesses who made a choice were far more confident 
in their decision than witnesses who did not. Choosing someone 
often means that choice behaviour is accompanied by conviction 
and even making a tentative decision that the criminal is in a 
lineup or photospread is sufficient at times to promote 
confidence in the decision itself. 
The major problem created by witness confidence, however, stems 
from the fact it reliably influences jurors and others to infer 
that accurate recall has, in fact, occurred. Jurors give 
confident eyewitness report far greater weight than other sorts 
of evidence when deciding upon a verdict (Re, 1984) and judgments 
about accuracy in this instance are frequently based on intuition 
rather than fact. 
Implications For Jurors 
Each facet of this view of memory and how it operates has major 
implications for jury decision-making. Consider encoding, for 
example. Some aspects of encoding promote stronger acquisition 
than others. Research has shown, for example, that upper features 
of the face are encoded better than lower portions and this has 
definite implications for judged accuracy of criminals based on 
identification evidence that focuses on facial features (Ellis, 
1983). Attorneys trying to elicit descriptions of a criminal 
might better concentrate on the witness's ability to provide 
details of hair and eyes rather than nose, mouth and chin -
unless the latter are particularly noticeable. 
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Jurors, like witnesses and the general public, are not aware of 
subtle differences in wording that can convey misleading 
information about events that have been experienced. Consider the 
question, for example, 'How tall was the person you saw?'. An 
attorney might have asked 'How short was the person you saw?' or 
'What was the height of the person you saw?', 'Was the person you 
saw tall or short?', or 'Was the person you saw short or tall?'. 
In each case, the possibilities for influence are different. 
Jurors, however, typically assume that questions asked in court 
are not biasing recall, but only testing the veracity and the 
validity of memory (Yarmey, 1979). In this, they are mistaken. 
If counsel should ask a witness if he or she saw anyone standing 
at the kerb and the witness says 'No', both jury and witness may 
register the suggested fact that a person was there, even if the 
person was not. But both juror and witness may accept the fact 
that the person was there, because the witness's answer subtly 
implies an acknowledgment of that person's presence. The 
acceptance of misleading information is probably easier for the 
juror than the witness, however, because the juror has no 
original experience to conflict or interfere with the new input. 
The witness has a memory trace that implies the opposite, whereas 
the juror has not. Thus, the juror has multiple reasons perhaps 
for thinking the person was present: the force of the counsel's 
question, and the answer provided by the witness. Errors in 
jurors' judgments may come to be compounded, then, due to the 
reinforcement that is provided them from different sources. 
The processes of memory construction are obviously similar for 
witness and juror and there is no reason to doubt that memories 
that are formed and constructed by jurors will be reorganised by 
them similarly in the face of new and conflicting information. 
The evidence tells us that the operation of suggestion in court 
is mostly inadvertent, but the problem Is given extra emphasis in 
the case of the juror because the experience that is assimilated 
has been communicated by the witness with conviction. The bias 
for the juror operates not only through encoding, storage and 
retrieval of information gathered during the trial, but in the 
reconciliation of inconsistent facts during decision-making, and 
the influence of other jurors in the course of the jury 
deliberations (Hans and Vidmar, 1982). 
SOME PROCEDURES FOR ADDRESSING THE RISKS 
Given the complexity of the jury decision making process and the 
extent to which jurors may be exposed to the inadvertent 
influence of suggestion, some practical guidelines are necessary 
on ways in which the validity of the decisions made by jurors 
might be increased and the impact of suggestion reduced. 
A number of specific guidelines may be formulated regarding 
lineups, witness testimony and confidence. In witness 
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identification, for example, witnesses should not be allowed to 
glimpse the defendant in the officer's presence at any time prior 
to line-up, and neither should witnesses be asked to identify the 
criminal in each other's presence where social facilitation 
effects can operate (Grano, 1983). In witness testimony, 
videotape technology might also be contemplated so that the 
testimony of the witnesses can be played back whenever required 
(Saks, 1982). Reliable indices of witnessing conditions might 
also be constructed (Penrod, Loftus, and Winkler, 1982), and 
witness recollections are probably best collected in free 
narrative form before specific questioning is introduced in ways 
that inadvertently suggest new and misleading information 
(Sheehan, 1982). The optimal combination for collecting memory 
information is probably to allow the witness to free recall and 
then to follow this recall by more structured questions that do 
not suggest (obtrusively or unobtrusively) any incorrect or 
misleading information about the events that have taken place. 
Further, when recollections have been overworked, either through 
the introduction of hypnosis or other methods designed to 
increase memory accuracy, the prosecution should be obliged to 
declare the method that has been used and when it was introduced. 
In New Zealand, for instance, when a prosecution witness has been 
hypnotised for any purpose relevant to a trial or investigation, 
this fact must now be disclosed to the defence. 
The two major methods of reducing the risks of bias in juror 
judgments and which relate most directly to current debate in the 
literature about inadvertent suggestion in the legal setting are 
cautionary instruction, and expert testimony. 
Cautionary Instruction 
Instruction to the jury about the risks of suggestion and the 
possibilities for distortion in both perception and memory is 
argued by many as a very useful tool in the legal process. It 
will not remedy the deficiencies of perceptions and recall, but 
may help eliminate some of the dangers emanating from suggestive 
procedures (Grano, 1983). How witnesses are informed will affect 
their choice behaviour and the confidence of their judgments in 
witness identification and also influence jurors to be more 
objective in their evaluation of the evidence (Malpass & Devine, 
1983). Re (1984) argues, however, that it is not sufficient to 
give a general warning regarding the unreliability of 
identification evidence, but a warning should be given that 
acknowledges the reasons for the warning itself, the possibility 
of the witness being mistaken (and the fact that several 
witnesses may all be mistaken), and the warning should also 
extend an invitation to the jury to examine closely the 
circumstances of the identification. If such guidelines are 
accepted, however, it is important that courts are consistent in 
their adoption. It seems incongruous, for example, that 
guidelines about identification vary in this country across 
courts; in the Victorian Supreme Court and the N.S.W. Court of 
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Appeal, for example, the guidelines appear to differ appreciably 
in the precision of their instruction about the possibilities of 
error (Re, 1984). 
Expert Testimony 
There are many advantages to the use of expert testimony on the 
processes which affect jury decision-making. Properly delivered 
expert testimony, for example, can reduce the ambiguity about the 
probable meaning of certain factors (Wells, 1983) and can have 
the effect of increasing the deliberation time spent by jurors in 
discussing eyewitness aspects of the case (Loftus, 1983). 
Simulation studies on the Impact of expert psychological 
testimony on eyewitness reliability, for Instance, (see Wells, 
Lindsay and Tousignant, 1980) have shown that exposure of jurors 
to an expert reduces the effect of eyewitness testimony, probably 
by causing the jurors who are involved to critically evaluate the 
testimony more closely. It is important to recognise in the use 
of expert testimony, however, that its use is not intended to 
invade the province of the jury. However, the knowledge and 
experience of the juror ought to be as much a question for 
scrutiny as that of the witness who is asked to give evidence. It 
is the jury's responsibility to consider the facts about the 
process of its own decision-making, and accord them the weight it 
considers appropriate. 
One may recommend more radical alternatives for change such as 
reducing jury size, permitting minority verdicts to be expressed, 
and lessening the impact of initial majority opinion; but the 
more general suggestions for change are those likely to gain the 
wider support. There are caveats among them, however, that 
require mention. In giving cautionary instructions, for example, 
the court must be careful not to comment on the evidence itself, 
but provide the kind of detail that ensures that the appropriate 
warnings are properly understood by the jury. In some cases, 
also, the evidence shows that juries may overattend to what they 
have been told precisely to avoid (Kaplan, 1982). The juror must 
also not be turned simply into a processor of expert facts about 
the likelihood of risks, then, due consideration of the facts of 
the case may be given less emphasis than it should. 
Cautionary instruction and expert testimony should both usefully 
work toward emphasising the possible fallibility of the witness, 
and render the juror appropriately sceptical of what happens in 
the courtroom. Jurors must not overestimate the probability that 
eyewitnesses will be incorrect, nor should they distort the 
probability that witnesses will be truthful. Since adoption of 
these mechanisms necessarily accentuates the fact that 
the processing of facts within the legal system is based on 
probabilistic information, least of all, they should draw the 
juror away from the task of reaching particularised decisions 
(Egeth and McCloskey, 1983). 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this article has attempted to review a number of 
the more salient factors that relate to jurors' decision-making 
and the processes that lie behind it. Of particular importance, 
is the jurors' processing of the information presented in court 
and the recollections they construct about the events reported 
there. A wide variety of issues is involved in assessing the 
possibility of bias in their judgments and these range from 
considering how the processes of perception and memory actually 
work, evaluating the validity of inferences drawn from the events 
of the trial concerning the accuracy of witnesses, and accounting 
for the meaning of confidence that witnesses express. 
It is important to recognise that jurors share a number of major 
common misconceptions about how memory works, and are especially 
unlikely to be aware of the possibilities of memory changing 
after new facts in a case are introduced. They also share common 
intuitive judgments about what conviction means in terms of 
accuracy, and are generally ignorant of the fact that their 
assumptions frequently depart from the empirical findings. The 
adoption of special procedures is necessary to increase the 
validity of jurors' judgments and enhance jurors' ability to 
discriminate accurate from inaccurate testimony. 
The law may feel it is substantially on the alert for the 
elimination of bias and suggestion and that no new procedures are 
required. Current procedures, however, do not appear to be 
adequate in coping with the biases that can occur and 
considerable potential for juror error appears to remain. 
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REFORMERS' VIEWS OF THE JURY 
Mr Paul Byrne 
Commissioner 
N.S.W. Law Reform Commission 
I propose to make some brief remarks about the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission's Report The Jury in a Criminal Trial 
which has only recently been completed and was distributed 
yesterday to participants in this seminar. The Report covers a 
wide range of issues but the comments in this paper will be 
restricted to a consideration of the three issues which created 
the greatest discussion during the course of the Commission's 
deliberations. 
In relation to two of those questions, the Commission 
ultimately failed to reach a unanimous conclusion regarding 
proposed changes in the law and practice relating to the jury 
system. These three issues have, not surprisingly, already 
been frequently mentioned in the proceedings of this seminar. 
REPRESENTATIVENESS AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
The first matter which I propose to examine is the question of 
representation on juries with particular reference to the right 
of peremptory challenge. As a general rule, jury service 
should be available to all adult members of the community and 
be shared equally by them. In this way, the representative 
character of juries is preserved. There may be, however, 
certain groups who should be excluded or excused from jury 
service. The grounds on which this may be done can be broadly 
stated as being, firstly, personal hardship and, secondly, 
public necessity. 
The jury selection process in New South Wales appears to work 
reasonably effectively in the sense that jury panels, and 
indeed juries, are reasonably representative of the general 
community.^ 
Once the jury selection process reaches the court room, 
however, the parties to the litigation have, I suggest, the 
power to make a significant impact upon the constitution of the 
jury. This can be achieved by the use of the system of 
peremptory challenges. In New South Wales an accused person 
has the right to make a maximum of 20 peremptory challenges in 
a murder trial and eight in any other case.^ Where there are 
a number of accused people jointly tried, each of them has the 
same number of challenges and the number of challenges 
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available to the Crown in any case^ is equal to the sum of 
those available to the individual accused. 
A majority of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission has 
recommended that the relevant legislat ion should be amended to 
provide that the maximum number of peremptory challenges 
available to an accused person should be reduced to three 
irrespective of the offence being tried. 
A further recommendation is that the maximum number of 
peremptory challenges available to the Crown should be reduced 
to three for each accused person irrespective of the offence 
being tried.^ Two of the Commission's six members dissented 
from these recommendations. 
One was of the view that the maximum number of challenges 
available should be six; another considered that it should be 
four but only if the occupation and residential address of the 
potential juror was disclosed. 
In order to place this issue in some perspective, it should be 
noted that at common law an individual accused had the right to 
make 35 peremptory challenges.5 This was, of course, in the 
days when it was much more likely that an accused person would 
know and perhaps have reason to object to the people called to 
serve as jurors from the local community in which the accused 
person usually lived. This common law rule has been gradually 
altered as the representative character of juries has been 
enhanced. Now that jury service has become more widely 
available, the likelihood of persons known to the accused being 
called to serve as jurors has accordingly been diminished. The 
position has now been reached where New South Wales has a 
larger number of peremptory challenges available to the accused 
than any other State or Territory.6 
The essential principle with which these recommendations are 
designed to conform, is that the jury should be representative 
of the general community. While the accused person and the 
Crown each has the right to trial by an impartial jury of 
twelve people selected randomly from the community, neither 
party has the right to trial by a jury of its choice. If this 
argument is taken to its logical extension, it would support 
the complete abolition of peremptory challenges, leaving only 
the right to challenge for cause as a means of eliminating 
jurors who are or who may be seen to be biased. Abolition of 
the right of peremptory challenge would also mean that the 
accused person would be denied any role in the jury selection 
process. 
The Commission is of the view that it is legitimate to allow a 
degree of participation by the accused in the selection of the 
jury but we do not consider that this level of participation 
should be extended to permit the accused to eliminate 
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particular groups in the community from the jury. Another 
reason for preserving the right of both parties to make 
peremptory challenges is that this procedure avoids the 
potentially embarrassing spectacle of the reasons for challenge 
for cause having to be given in open court. 
The right of the Crown to make peremptory challenges was the 
subject of much discussion. The conclusion the Commission has 
finally reached is based on a number of practical 
considerations. One of those has just been referred to. 
Another is that the Crown may see the need to use its right of 
peremptory challenge to make the jury more representative of 
the general community. 
The empirical surveys which the Commission conducted revealed 
that the practice of Crown Prosecutors in exercising the right 
to make peremptory challenges varied considerably.^ In 
one-third of trials there were no challenges by the Crown. In 
the others the Crown averaged three challenges. In some cases 
the Crown challenged more people than the accused. According 
to some practitioners, the reasons for Crown challenges depend 
very much on the whim of the individual prosecutor concerned. 
In order to overcome this apparently inconsistent approach and 
to ensure that challenges are based on legitimate grounds, the 
Commission has recommended that the Attorney General, in 
consultation with the Crown Prosecutors, should establish 
guidelines to govern the Crown's exercise of the right of 
peremptory challenges and that these guidelines should be 
published.® 
The publication of guidelines of this kind would avoid, for 
example, the situation referred to by Bill Hosking, Q.C., in 
his address to you earlier today^ when he cited the Georgia 
Hill case. In that trial of a woman charged with murder, the 
Crown Prosecutor challenged twenty women with the result that 
the jury was constituted by eleven men and only one woman. 
In order to appreciate the impact of the changes proposed for 
the system of peremptory challenges, it is necessary to bear in 
mind that a number of further recommendations made by the 
Commission relate directly to the process of jury selection. 
The Commission's view is that there are a number of alternative 
and preferable procedures which could be adopted to achieve one 
of the few legitimate objectives of the peremptory challenge 
system, namely the elimination of jurors who are not impartial 
or who may not be seen to be impartial. 
The first of these is a procedure which envisages that the 
Crown Prosecutor make a short address to the jury panel before 
the selection process commences. This would contain a broad 
outline of the facts and circumstances of the case and advise 
the panel of the names of the prosecution witnesses. The judge 
would then be obliged to invite any member of the jury panel 
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who felt that they would be unable to give impartial 
consideration to the case to apply to be excused. We would 
expect that the direction given by the judge would emphasise 
the fact that potential jurors should only apply to be excused 
where the nature of their previous association with the case or 
the witnesses is such as to give rise to a real risk of bias or 
prejudice or a real risk that bias or prejudice may be seen to 
exist. 
There is, in addition, a procedure recommended which provides 
that where the judge is, on application by a party, satisfied 
that the nature of the issues to be tried is such that people 
of a nominated occupation, or who live in a nominated area, may 
be unsuitable as jurors, the judge should ask the jury panel 
whether any of their number is a member of that g r o u p . A n y 
potential juror who is should be liable to challenge for cause 
by either party without further proof being required of the 
grounds for the challenge. We consider this procedure to be 
preferable to the alternative of disclosing the occupation and 
residential address of each potential juror to the parties. 
The combined effect of these two procedures should be to 
eliminate sources of prejudice or potential prejudice in a more 
effective manner than the peremptory challenge procedure 
currently permits. 
THE JURY IN A COMPLEX TRIAL 
The second question that I propose to deal with is the 
suitability of the jury as the tribunal of fact in the trial of 
cases which involve complicated or technical evidence. In 
recent years there has been a consistent, and at times 
vigorous, campaign to abolish the jury, at least in certain 
criminal trials, on the ground that juries are incapable of 
coping with the complexities of the modern criminal trial. 
This argument has been most prevalent in the field of white 
collar crime. 
Earlier this year the most authoritative of all the committees 
so far established to examine this question reported and 
recommended that trial by jury should be abolished in the case 
of some fraud trials. This suggestion was contained in the 
Report of the Fraud Trials Committee, a body which had studied 
the question for two years under the chairmanship of Lord 
Roskill, one of the Law Lords in the United Kingdom. The 
foundations upon which this recommendation is based are 
doubtful. The Report of the Roskill Committee itself notes 
that such evidence as there is would seem to suggest that 
juries are in fact capable of accurately judging the issues in 
complex commercial cases and that they usually reach what is 
seen as a correct or at least an understandable decision. 
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There are two important reasons why these cases should continue 
to be tried by a jury made up of twelve people randomly 
selected from the general community. Firstly, the presence of 
a jury ensures that the standards to be applied in assessing 
dishonesty are those of ordinary people. The decision to be 
made in the trial of almost all commercial crimes is, as a 
matter of common sense and, according to the standards of 
reasonable people, "Was it dishonest?", "Was it a swindle?". 
Twelve ordinary citizens using their own experience and common 
sense of fairness and being given guidance on the law are best 
equipped to answer that question. The second important reason 
is that the presence of a jury ensures a publicly 
comprehensible presentation of the case. 
There is the danger in trial by experts that the public 
dimension will be lost. As Mr. Merricks, who dissented from 
the Roskill Committee's recommendation to abolish trial by jury 
in some fraud cases said in his dissenting opinion: 
I do not think that the public would or should be 
satisfied with a criminal justice system where citizens 
stand at risk of imprisonment for lengthy periods 
following trials where the State admits that it cannot 
explain its evidence in terms which are commonly 
comprehensible.^ 
In his judgment in Kingsweli's case, which has been mentioned 
earlier in the proceedings of this s e m i n a r , M r . Justice 
Deane said: 
[a] system of criminal law cannot be attuned to the 
needs of the people whom it exists to serve unless its 
administration, proceedings and judgments are 
comprehensible by both the accused and the general 
public and have the appearance, as well as the 
substance, of being impartial and just. In a legal 
system where the question of criminal guilt is 
determined by a jury of ordinary citizens, the 
participating lawyers are constrained to present the 
evidence and issues in a manner that can be understood 
by laymen. The result is that the accused and the 
public can follow and understand the proceedings.^ 
Much of the criticism of the jury system appears to me to be 
based on the perceived inability of individual jurors to 
comprehend difficult evidence. Such an approach seriously 
misses the point that jurors do not act as individuals in 
fulfilling their task. The jury itself is a single unit 
comprised of twelve individuals. The collective wisdom of 
those people is likely to mean that the jury will be able to 
follow the evidence and reach a "correct" decision. 
Some of the remarks that I had proposed to make about the 
jury's collective wisdom have been tempered in the light of 
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Professor Peter Sheehan's response to the question from Keith 
Mason, Q.C. At this seminar Professor Sheehan observed that 
jurors were liable to make erroneous decisions and that in his 
view there was no safety in numbers. There is no adequate 
research on this topic which could be used to reach a reliable 
conclusion about the efficiency of the jury as a fact-finder. 
The lack of real information is disturbing in the light of the 
very confident claims that are sometimes made about the lack of 
juror comprehension in complex cases. 
The case against juries in complex cases is far from 
compelling. It is made even less attractive by the fact that 
those who argue it cannot conceive a suitable alternative. 
UNANIMOUS OR MAJORITY VERDICTS 
The third issue is the question of whether the jury's verdict 
should be a unanimous one. 
Unanimity has long been considered an essential and fundamental 
feature of trial by jury. The existing rule, which appears to 
have been settled midway through the fourteenth century, is of 
ancient origin.^ There are, in my view, two major arguments 
in favour of preserving it. 
Allowing a majority verdict diminishes the important protection 
afforded by the high standard of proof required in criminal 
cases. Where there is only a majority verdict of guilty it can 
clearly be said that (in the absence of corruption) there 
exists in the mind of at least one member of the jury a 
reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused person. It is 
simply not valid to say that if a doubt is entertained by only 
one among twelve, then it cannot be a reasonable doubt. It is 
inescapable that the existence of a dissenting voice casts a 
shadow over the validity of the verdict. The acceptability of 
the verdict may be called into question by the participants in 
the trial and the general public alike. William Forsyth, a 
nineteenth century historian who was acclaimed for his work on 
trial by jury, was a staunch supporter of the rule requiring 
unanimity. He expressed his view in vivid terms: 
And how must it paralyse the arm of justice, when from 
the very tribunal appointed by law to try the accused, a 
voice is heard telling her that she ought not to 
strike?18 
The second major argument in favour of retaining the rule 
requiring the verdict of the jury to be unanimous is that the 
incidence of juries failing to agree is, and always has been in 
New South Wales, relatively low. The figure has apparently 
remained reasonably constant over time at approximately 3 per 
cent of criminal t r i a l s . ^ 
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It should also be noted that there have been few, perhaps only 
two in New South Wales, cases in which the jury has failed to 
agree on a verdict after a long trial. "Majority" verdicts, as 
have been introduced in various parts of Australia, do not, of 
course, eliminate the problem of jury disagreements. They 
merely provide a means of reaching a final verdict in those 
cases where there is only one or two dissentients from the 
majority view. 
The experience in England following the introduction of 
majority verdicts is revealing. Majority verdicts were 
introduced there in 1967. At that time the rate of jury 
disagreements was in the region of U to 5 per cent. Over the 
years following the introduction of majority verdicts, the 
incidence of juries giving them gradually increased. In 1968 
there were majority verdicts in 7.7 per cent of cases, in 1969 
this increased to 8.3 per cent and in 1970 to 9.1 per cent. It 
appears that the rate at which majority verdicts are given in 
criminal trials in England has now levelled out at 
approximately 13 per cent. The important fact that should not 
be overlooked in all of this is that there are still jury 
disagreements in England - in those cases where less than ten 
members of the jury agree on a verdict. 
In order to reduce a small number of unsatisfactory verdicts 
(in the form of jury disagreements) there has been a massive 
increase in the number of verdicts which are unsatisfactory in 
another way, that is because they are not unaninmous. The U to 
5 per cent rate of disagreements has been reduced but not 
eliminated. At the same time a 13 per cent rate of majority 
verdicts is tolerated. It would appear that the proposed 
solution to the problem of jury disagreements created a monster 
of greater proportions than the problem it was designed to 
solve. 
There is an additional matter of relevance to this issue area. 
It was raised by Bill Hosking, Q.C., in his address to you 
earlier this morning. He noted that the trial judge is not 
bound to tell the jury that their verdict must be unanimous. 
Whilst this is the law in both England and Australia, in 
practice judges and counsel, particularly defence counsel, do 
advise juries that their verdict must be unanimous. 
Verdicts which are less than unanimous are permitted in 
criminal cases in South Australia, Western Australia and 
Tasmania. Majority verdicts are permitted in civil cases in 
New South Wales. Quite apart from those who may come from 
other States, there are many people resident in New South Wales 
who are qualified to serve on a jury who come from countries 
where there is no jury system at all. It cannot be presumed 
that jurors in New South Wales are so well acquainted with the 
unanimity rule that it is not necessary to inform them of this 
feature of the jury system in criminal trials. 
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Accordingly, the Commission has recommended that the trial 
judge be required to direct the jury in a criminal trial that 
their verdict must be unanimous. This is consistent with the 
principle that juries should be informed of the law they are 
required to apply. The requirement of unanimity is a 
fundamental feature of trial by jury. The deliberations of the 
jury must be guided by knowledge of its existence. 
There are, of course, many other matters in the New South Wales 
Report which would be worthwhile discussing at a seminar of 
this kind. This paper has concentrated on those which seem to 
me to be the more topical and the more interesting. I urge you 
to read the Report and would welcome any comments that you may 
have about the recommendations contained in it. 
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A REFORMER'S VIEW OF JURY SECRECY* 
Professor Michael Chesterman 
Commissioner 
Australian Law Reform Commission 
THE AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS ON JURY SECRECY 
In its recently published discussion paper, Contempt and the 
Medial, the Australian Law Reform Commission put forward two 
alternative proposals as to legal controls on the disclosure 
and publication of jury deliberations. The preferred proposal 
was for what I will call a 'bare minimum' set of restrictions 
coupled with a further set of 'add-on' restrictions. The less 
favoured proposal was that the 'bare minimum' restrictions 
should be the only ones to apply. 
In outline, the 'bare minimum' restrictions are as follows: 
no disclosure or publication of particulars of jury 
deliberations should occur in the case of a criminal 
trial until sentence has been passed; 
the identity of jurors within a particular trial should 
not be published or disclosed, except that a juror may 
disclose his or her own identity; 
no person should solicit, harass or seek to induce a 
juror to disclose or publish his or her identity, or 
particulars of the deliberations of the relevant jury; 
and 
no juror should solicit publication of jury 
deliberations for the principal purpose of financial 
gain.^ 
The 'add-on' restrictions are described in the discussion paper 
as follows: 
In addition to the restrictions outlined above, there 
should be a prohibition on publishing jury deliberations 
in a manner which identifies the trial concerned. This 
prohibition should cease one year after the jury 
verdict, or when all appellate and other legal processes 
relating to the trial have come to an end, whichever is 
the later. 
* Except where otherwise indicated, the views expressed in 
this paper are those of the author, not of the Commission. I 
would like to acknowledge the considerable assistance furnished 
in the preparation of this paper by Mr Ian Freckelton, Senior 
Law Reform Officer, Australian Law Reform Commission. 
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In addition, the publisher should be entitled to raise 
at any time a 'public interest' defence, along the 
following lines: that, having regard to the significance 
of the matters disclosed, both for the trial in question 
and for the administration of the system of justice in 
general, and to the extent to which prior disclosure by 
the juror concerned has resulted in official 
investigation, it was in all the circumstances in the 
interest of the administration of justice that the 
material should be made public. A court trying an 
offence against this prohibition should have a 
discretionary power to order that the media not publish 
details of the deliberations in question.3 
The proposals are intended to relate to civil trials as well as 
criminal trials, though obviously it is the latter which 
deserve most attention. A careful distinction is drawn between 
'disclosure' and 'publication'. 'Disclosure' is intended to 
cover any form of communication, whether public or private, and 
whether by a juror or anybody else. On the other hand, 
'publication' refers to dissemination by the established media 
and other organs of communication to an audience or readership 
comprising the public or any significant section of the public. 
Although put forward as alternatives, these two sets of 
proposals (the 'bare minimum' restrictions and the combination 
of 'bare minimum' with 'add-on') are perhaps more profitably 
viewed as an indication of the legitimate spectrum of 
restrictions on disclosure and publication of jury 
deliberations. The Commission is saying, provisionally, that on 
any view of things the 'bare minimum' restrictions are 
essential, but that if any further restrictions are also to be 
imposed, they should go no further than the 'add-on' 
restrictions. The Commission may ultimately recommend 
prohibitions somewhere within the spectrum, rather than at one 
or other end of it. 
In this paper, I shall outline briefly what I consider to be a 
rationale for these two sets of proposals, dealing with the 
Commission's fall-back position first, then with the preferred 
alternative. 
THE NATURE OF THE 'BARE MINIMUM' RESTRICTIONS 
The Commission's fall-back position is that only the 'bare 
minimum' restrictions should apply. Most of them are relatively 
non-controversial.^ Dealing with them in the order in which I 
have listed them, their principal justifications can be 
expressed as follows: 
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'Clamp-down' until sentence passed. 
The dangers arising from disclosure or publication of jury 
deliberations before the verdict is entered are well 
recognised. In particular, it could lead to a distortion of the 
verdict by virtue of pressure put upon the jurors by the media, 
or by or on behalf of a party to the case who appears to be in 
danger of losing. 
The extension of this 'clamp-down' to the time when sentence is 
passed reflects the consideration that the judge should be 
entitled to exercise the broad and difficult judicial 
discretions in the matter of sentencing on the basis that the 
verdict is final and wholly unqualified.^ If jury room 
revelations were allowed to occur before sentence was passed, 
the judge might be tempted, or might appear to be tempted, to 
take account of them in passing sentence. If it were later 
established that the revelations had no real significance, the 
appropriateness of the sentence would be very much open to 
question. In the vast majority of cases, the extension of the 
clamp-down from the time of verdict to the time of sentence is 
a very short one, less than 24 hours. It should be noted, 
however, that this proposal would have banned some of the jury 
revelations in the days following the first Murphy trial. 
Identity of jurors. 
The right of a juror to remain anonymous, whether on grounds of 
personal security or on account of a more general wish for 
privacy, is well recognised. It is common for legislation in 
Australia to prohibit at least the publication, if not the 
disclosure, of the identity of jurors, both during the trial 
and afterwards.^ While generally the Commission's proposals 
do not envisage the prosecution of individual jurors, or indeed 
other members of the public, for disclosure falling short of 
publication, this seems to be one area where a prohibition in 
these terms should be framed. A juror may want to tell friends 
or relatives that he or she has served on a jury in a 
particular case, but there seems no reason why the names of the 
other jurors should be spread around in this way. 
Soliciting, harassing or seeking to induce jurors. 
The task of jurors is difficult and demanding enough without 
their having to face the prospect of being badgered to relate 
their jury room experiences. At worst, this prospect might have 
a direct influence upon their deliberations. They may feel 
that, if they deliver what is likely to be an unpopular verdict 
in a highly publicised and controversial case, they will have 
to account for it publicly in front of microphones, television 
cameras, reporters' note-books etc. The Commission's 
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consultations suggest that, in the main, media representatives 
accept a prohibition along these lines as a legitimate aspect 
of the preservation of the right of juries to perform their 
task free from outside intrusion. 7 There may be some 
difficulty in determining whether a communication by a reporter 
to a juror along the lines 'I am available to hear your story 
whenever you want to contact me' would fall within the proposed 
prohibition. If the communication went no further than this, I 
myself do not consider that it would have to be prosecuted. In 
any event, in these days of talk-back radio, most jurors know 
full well how to get in touch with the media and express their 
views. 
Jurors selling their stories 
As far as the Commission is aware, this has not happened in 
Australia, though ex-jurors in America have been hired to give 
television or radio broadcasts, act as consultants in re-trials 
and write books about their experiences. The dangers would 
appear to be two-fold. First, if an arrangement to disclose 
jury deliberations for financial gain is made before the trial 
is over, it may actually distort the juror's decision in the 
case. He or she may be induced to vote for the verdict which 
will make the story most saleable. Secondly, even a story which 
is 'sold' after the verdict may depict the decision as a whole, 
and the fellow-jurors in particular, in ways which suit the 
commercial market rather than the pursuit of truth. It may be 
that this prohibition may. have to be modified slightly to make 
allowance for royalties or other payments received by jurors in 
return for producing or contributing to serious research 
studies of the jury process. But otherwise, the prohibition 
reflects an underlying philosophy that, if jurors are to be 
permitted to speak out on the subject of jury deliberations in 
a particular trial, and to procure the publication of what they 
have to say, this should be done out of a concern for the 
quality of the verdict in the particular trial, or for the 
workings of the jury system in general, rather than for 
commercial motives. 
CERTAINTY IN THE LAW AND RESPECT FOR FREE SPEECH 
Except for (a) statutory prohibitions preserving the anonymity 
of individual jurors, (b) the more broad-ranging prohibitions 
on disclosure and publication recently enacted in Victoria® 
and (c) the legal obligation of confidentiality imposed on 
jurors in Tasmania by their oath of office^, restrictions on 
disclosure and publication of jury deliberations are imposed 
entirely at common law, under the law of contempt. This makes 
for considerable uncertainty, because the only criterion 
offered by contempt law is whether the particular disclosure or 
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publication 'interferes with the administration of 
justice'.^® A detailed interpretation of the operation of 
this criterion might well produce a set of prohibitions similar 
to the 'bare minimum' restrictions just discussed.^ But this 
could not be guaranteed. A clear advantage of the approach 
underlying the 'bare minimum' restrictions is that the 
prohibitions imposed would indicate not only what jurors, other 
individuals and the media could not do by way of disclosing or 
publishing jury deliberations, but also what they could do. 
Furthermore, what they could do in most instances would be to 
exercise the right of freedom of speech and publication. The 
overall effect of the 'bare minimum' restrictions is to put 
very few obstacles in the way of free disclosure and 
publication of jury deliberations, even when they relate to a 
specific, identified trial and are made public in the immediate 
aftermath of the trial. Practices which more than once have 
been deplored by judges, without being actually prohibited^, 
would receive the 'green light' from the law. The terms of 
reference for the Law Reform Commission's inquiry into contempt 
specifically require it to have regard to the guarantee of 
freedom of speech and publication in Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the 
equivalent clause in the draft Australian Bill of Rights is 
Article 7, though it must also take account of the provision in 
Article 14(1) of the Covenant guaranteeing to individuals a 
'fair . . . hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal' in any case in which they are engaged (in the draft 
Australian Bill of Rights, see Article 26). 
Some reasons why this leeway given to freedom of speech and 
publication under the 'bare minimum' restrictions, taken alone, 
might endanger the rights of those involved in jury trials, or 
the system of administration of justice in general terms, will 
be explored now in my discussion of the Commission's preferred 
alternative, namely, the 'bare minimum' restrictions taken in 
conjunction with the 'add-on' restrictions. 
THE CASE FOR 'ADD-ON' RESTRICTIONS 
In its discussion paper, the Law Reform Commission, not without 
some hesitation, came down on the side of 'adding-on' a 
prohibition on publication of jury deliberations, to take 
effect after verdict and sentence have been delivered. The 
prohibition is, however, limited in several important respects: 
It bears upon publication only, not disclosure. It thus 
does not affect private communications by jurors in any 
way. 
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It only applies to publications which identify, or 
render identifiable, the trial involved. A publication 
describing the deliberations in 'a recent trial' would 
thus be acceptable unless further information contained 
in it made it clear to all concerned which trial was 
being described. 
The prohibition would have a 'sunset' clause: that is, 
it would cease one year after the verdict, or at the 
time when all appeal processes in the case had been 
exhausted, whichever was the later. 
Even within this period, the 'public interest' defence 
would be available if the conditions set out in it could 
be satisfied. 
Despite these limitations, the prohibition undoubtedly 
infringes freedom of speech and publication, though it does so 
to a significantly lesser degree than the legislation against 
disclosure of jury deliberations recently enacted in 
Victoria1^, England^ and Canada.^ jn brief, the 
arguments in favour of the type of secrecy sought to be 
achieved by these prohibitions focus on four considerations, 
some of which are interlinked. These are: finality of jury 
verdicts, 'jury equity', the due conduct of appeal processes, 
and privacy for the other jurors involved. I will elaborate on 
each of these in turn. 
Finality 
The argument based on finality of verdicts is that, to the 
extent that revelations of jury room deliberations may lead to 
official or unofficial questioning of verdicts once reached, 
one will never be able to say that a case is concluded when the 
verdict is delivered. The prospect of further hearings by way 
of appeal, review, investigation, etc., will always be present. 
If every possible doubt about a verdict that might come to 
light through such revelations were to provide grounds for 
re-opening the verdict by one or other of these means, the 
system of administration of justice would be placed under 
intolerable strain. The search for finality, in this sense, 
justifies the use of twelve individuals, with all the expense 
that this entails, and the requirement of a unanimous verdict. 
Not merely one person but twelve people must be satisfied of 
guilt before a conviction can be entered. The advantages of 
concluding the case finally in this way would be dispelled if 
the disclosure and publication of doubts, second thoughts, 
slip-ups etc within the jury room could go ahead unchecked 
immediately after the conclusion of the trial. 
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'Jury Equity' 
The argument here is that a well-recognised and often-praised 
feature of jury trials would be undermined if secrecy were not 
preserved. It has long been recognised to be a prerogative of 
juries to modify the letter of the law by bringing in verdicts 
— usually acquittals — which reflect what the jury thinks the 
law ought to be, rather than what it is. A classic example is 
the refusal of English juries in the 18th and 19th centuries to 
enter a conviction for larceny above the value of AO shillings 
where this would result in a death sentence. This was done even 
when the value of the property stolen was clearly more than AO 
shillings. A jury would find it much harder to exercise this 
prerogative if it believed that any one juror could 'spill the 
beans' to the media and have the detailed grounds for the 
verdict widely publicised. 
Concern for the workings of the appeal system 
The argument here draws attention to the fact that, despite 
what I have just said, a jury verdict is not completely and 
wholly final. It may be upset on appeal and a retrial may be 
ordered. It may therefore be asked: why, if challenges on 
appeal are a normal feature of the system, should not 
allegations of misconduct within the jury room, 
misunderstandings by jurors or other jury room events likely to 
cause a miscarriage of justice be barred from publication? 
Should not these matters be brought into the open and treated 
as grounds of appeal? The response of the present law, 
contained in a rule known as 'Lord Mansfield's rule', is that, 
generally speaking, such allegations are not admissible on 
appeal. In extreme cases, they may form part of the grounds for 
an special inquiry into a conviction, such as occurred in New 
South Wales in the Ananda Marga case. Lord Mansfield's rule has 
been subjected to criticism on o c c a s i o n s ^ and the Australian 
Law Reform Commission has provisionally recommended, in its 
Interim Report on Evidence, that evidence be permitted to be 
given in appeal proceedings on matters which would constitute 
an offence against the administration of justice, such as a 
threat or an offer of a bribe being communicated to a 
j u r o r . B u t as long as Lord Mansfield's rule remains within 
the law, it can be argued that appeal courts are embarrassed, 
if not positively impeded, by being compelled to assess the 
validity of a verdict without paying attention to highly 
publicised revelations from the jury room, even though the 
decision reached on appeal appears wholly at odds with these 
revelations. 
Privacy of Jurors 
The privacy of members of the relevant jury other than the 
juror who reveals its deliberations must be considered. 
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Although, under the 'bare minimum' restrictions, the names of 
these jurors must not be divulged against their consent, their 
statements and attitudes within the jury room may well be 
seriously misrepresented in the revelations. In addition, they 
may feel that, had they known that their remarks would be 
widely publicised after the verdict, they would have spoken 
differently in the juryroom, and possibly even sought to be 
excused from jury service.18 It may be argued that there is a 
fundamental contradiction between, on the one hand, impressing 
upon jurors the need to conduct their deliberations in private 
and to talk freely and openly in reliance on this privacy and, 
on the other hand, allowing individual jurors, once the trial 
is over, to procure publication of the full particulars of 
these deliberations, including the identity of the trial. If 
the law is going to impose obligations of confidentiality 
during the trial, in order that the verdict should be the 
outcome of wholly secret deliberations, it seems logical that 
this confidentiality should be preserved afterwards as well. 
THE CASE AGAINST 'ADD-ON' RESTRICTIONS 
The principal arguments against imposing the 'add-on' 
restrictions can be summarised under three heads: freedom of 
speech and publication, jury research, and justice in the 
individual case. 
The argument based on freedom of speech and publication is that 
under long standing common law principles, reinforced by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and (if 
enacted) the Australian Bill of Rights, the onus of justifying 
a restriction on freedom of speech and publication should lie 
on those who seek to impose the restriction. This argument is 
of particular strength when the restriction imposed is backed 
up by penal sanctions. It is questionable whether the arguments 
just outlined are sufficient to discharge this onus. 
Secondly, restrictions on disclosure and publication of jury 
deliberations can severely inhibit research into the operations 
of juries. In this event, the restrictions, far from protecting 
the interests of the system of administration of justice, act 
to the detriment of those interests. Important information on 
such matters as the level of understanding of relevant issues 
by jurors, the degree to which matters of fact and law are 
successfully communicated to them and the problems arising from 
unfamiliarity with the law and legal processes may never be 
properly researched. The likely outcome is that juries will not 
evolve in response to changes in the environment in which they 
operate. The history of the common law jury shows how important 
it is to leave scope for evolution. It is noteworthy that, 
after s 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 had imposed a broad 
prohibition on the disclosure and publication of jury 
deliberations in England, the Fraud Trials Committee, chaired 
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by Lord Roskill, reported in 1986 that it found its work 
hampered seriously by this prohibition. 
The third argument, that justice may not be done in the 
individual case if jury room deliberations must forever remain 
secret, is perhaps the most important one. Taken to extremes, a 
prohibition on disclosure and publication would make it illegal 
to publish an allegation, however well substantiated, that the 
jury had tossed a coin to determine the verdict, or had been 
subject to bribes or threats from one of their number, or from 
an outside source, in reaching the verdict. An abstract 
principle of 'finality' should never be permitted to prevent 
such matters being revealed, particularly where the verdict 
entered by the jury was a conviction. The issue is, of course, 
linked with 'Lord Mansfield's rule'. Most people would agree 
that this rule should never impede an appeal court or another 
review body from overturning a verdict which is clearly tainted 
with impropriety in the jury room. The controversy arises where 
the only matter revealed from within the jury room is that some 
limited extraneous considerations were taken into account, or 
that some of the jurors had second thoughts, for a while at 
least, or that a particular strong personality dominated the 
discussion in a manner which detracted from the unanimity of 
the verdict. If evidence law were altered so as to make matters 
such as these admissible on appeal, it would be self-defeating 
to prohibit their disclosure. But this proposition opens up a 
further question: is it sufficient to permit such matters to be 
disclosed to relevant authorities — such as the 
Attorney-General's Department, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions or a judge — while still prohibiting publication, 
at least until the allegations in question are brought to light 
in subsequent proceedings of a court or other reviewing body? 
The difficulty about adopting this distinction between private 
disclosure to an appropriate authority and full-scale 
publication by the media is that an individual juror may feel 
daunted by the prospect of speaking to official authorities, or 
may encounter official resistance or inaction. Yet to allow the 
juror to go straight to the media on the grounds that his or 
her concerns about the verdict might conceivably justify a 
retrial or some other sort of review process is to jeopardise 
the law's concerns, as outlined above, regarding finality and 
conf identiality. 
A BALANCING ACT 
In the manner of many proposals by law reform commissions, the 
discussion paper, Contempt and the Media, attempts a balancing 
act. It seeks to accommodate these various arguments by framing 
the limited prohibitions which I have described as the 'add-on' 
restrictions. The discussion paper seeks to explain and justify 
this balancing act in the following way: 
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This proposal allows jurors themselves to disclose 
deliberations in whatever way is thought fit, so long as 
their actions do not amount to the prohibited 
publication. It does not prevent jurors who are 
concerned about an aspect of the trial making 
representations to the Attorney-General, the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, the Ombudsman, a judge or another 
appropriate official. It places the onus upon the 
publisher to observe the law without placing a heavy 
burden upon jurors who are concerned about what 
transpired in the jury proceedings in which they 
participated. The Commission is not inclined to 
recommend punishment of those who simply supply 
information to the media without demonstration of 
further culpability on their part: once it is supplied, 
the media have the choice about whether or not to 
disseminate it. They also have readier access to 
informed legal advice about their rights and 
obligations. The proposal also dispenses with the need 
for express permission for all circumstances in which a 
juror could properly disclose information without the 
possibility of incurring liability for prosecution. On 
the other hand, the media and any other persons engaged 
in publishing are still free to publish 'jury 
revelations' which do not identify the trial or any 
juror. If they identify the trial, they must be ready to 
argue the 'public interest' defence. This is framed in 
such a way as to recognise their watchdog role as 
regards both court cases and the actions of the 
executive in dealing with complaints or anxieties 
expressed by individual jurors. They are protected in 
any case where a miscarriage seems to have occurred in 
the jury room but the efforts of one or more individual 
jurors to have the matter investigated are, or appear to 
be, frustrated by a 'cover-up' or by official 
inaction.20 
The question whether this form of compromise is an appropriate 
resolution of all the issues is now one for public discussion, 
particularly in the public hearings which begin in Canberra on 
22 May and continue over the next month in all the other 
capital cities. 
I would like to throw in three final comments. First, I think 
that we have some more work to do at the Commission in terms of 
examining the validity and viability of 'Lord Mansfield's rule' 
in its present formal and tailoring the proposed 'public 
interest' defence under the 'add-on' restrictions more closely 
to the terms of that rule, as possibly modified. What I am 
suggesting is that, in determining whether the media can 
successfully plead the proposed 'public interest' defence, due 
regard should be had to the extent to which the allegations 
which they have publicised might possibly be admissible, 
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whether or not in precisely the same form, in appeal 
proceedings. Secondly, the proposed 'sunset clause' may require 
modification. One year may be too short a time, in view of the 
high level of sustained publicity given to some cases (the 
outstanding example being of course the Chamberlain case) and 
we should consider whether, in circumstances where the appeal 
proceedings last longer than one year or any substituted 
period, the prohibition should itself last still longer, in 
order to protect the integrity of the appeal proceedings. Third 
and finally, a useful practical suggestion which has twice been 
put to me in talk-back radio programs dealing with these 
proposals is that jurors who have concerns as to how the 
verdict was reached should have already been told (for example, 
in a brochure issued at the beginning of the trial) what agency 
is the appropriate one to hear their complaint. It is all very 
well for lawyers to talk about individual jurors taking 
allegations of bribery, misunderstanding etc to 'the 
Attorney-General' or 'a judge', but this gives no indication 
whatsoever as to how a juror should approach any of these 
somewhat remote individuals. This is not to say that we need a 
new government agency, called the Jurors' Complaints Board, but 
that some person or department within an existing office, such 
as the Sheriff's Office, should be formally designated to act 
as a receiving agent for juror concerns. 
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THE JURY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Dr Jocelynne A Scutt 
Deputy Chairperson 
Law Reform Commission, Victoria 
The role of the jury in criminal cases, its utility or otherwise, 
its position as bastion of civil rights or over-inflated 
anachronism have long been subjects for debate. Of late the jury 
system has been vigorously discussed as a result of instances 
where jurors have spoken out about the decision-making processes 
of the jury room. At the same time, the perennial debate about 
the usefulness of the jury in complicated commercial trials has 
continued, and argument about the value or otherwise of juries in 
cases where forensic evidence is put forward by competing experts 
has not lessened. Possible jury prejudice in particular instances 
relating to racial, religious, ethnic or political background, 
and also to gender of offender or of the victim of a crime, has 
been the subject of comment. 
It is always possible for the criminal justice system to be 
improved. It is also imperative that the criminal justice system 
maintain the confidence of the community generally; of those 
being dealt with as offenders, accused persons, victims and 
witnesses; and of those operating within it as professionals: the 
judiciary, magistracy, lawyers, workers from support services and 
court personnel generally. The onus on law reform commissions, 
governments and those concerned with the just operation of 
criminal justice is to pinpoint areas of legitimate concern, then 
work toward correcting deficiencies. 
JURY PREJUDICE 
It is imperative that jurors be enlightened as to possible 
prejudices they may harbour as a result of socialisation or 
cultural beliefs. For civil juries, in an address to the 
Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs, the Hon. Justice 
Gobbo of the Supreme Court of Victoria defined the problem thus: 
... in my experience barristers infrequently refer to 
cultural factors in their addresses to juries. For 
example, a witness may have given what appears to be an 
exaggerated version of ... symptoms [in claims for damages 
for injury]. A barrister will seldom say to a jury that 
this may reflect his client's fears in a new land or his 
desire to stress the threat to his life posed by the 
injury. Nor will he point to other possible cultural 
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factors. This either represents their professional 
judgement or it shows an insensitivity to the cultural 
background. In my view it is their skill rather than their 
insensitivity. It is unfortunate then that experienced * 
barristers are not confident that juries can always be 
trusted not to throw up some intolerance or bias against 
the non-British migrant, or at any rate, to understand a 
particular resort to special cultural factors. This is not 
an area where progress or change can be effected by rules 
or regulations. Sensitivity and acceptance through the 
community of differing social attitudes to injury and pain 
and, indeed, community acceptance of the spirit of 
multiculturalism, cannot be achieved by legislation. It is 
essentially for education - a difficult task if one talks 
of altering existing attitudes. (Gobbo, 1983,4) 
As Justice Gobbo states, rather than simply asserting that juries 
may be prejudiced, or individual members of a jury may be 
prejudiced, on various counts, it is important that possible 
prejudices are confronted effectively. And as another judge of 
the Supreme Court of Victoria has pointed out, it is not only 
jurors who may suffer from such human fallings. Judges too are 
human (Age, 23 November, 1985). 
Justice Gobbo went on to enumerate various means of educating 
juries and improving the system - including the access of persons 
of non-English speaking backgrounds to competent interpreter 
services at all levels of the system: 'Considerable progress has 
been made, but much remains to be done'. Traditional doctrines 
must be interpreted to reflect the multicultural nature of 
Australian society, as for example in the High Court decision of 
Moffa v. the Queen, (1977, 138, CLR, 601), taking into account 
cultural factors in the question whether the hypothetical 
ordinary person would have been provoked, where the charge is 
unlawfully killing. A legitimate assessment of such issues must 
be put to juries for adequate decision-making. 
Other groups similarly disadvantaged include black Australians: 
Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders. In its 1975 Interim 
Report - Criminal Investigation the Australian Law Reform 
Commission recognised this in relation to police interrogation. 
The Report cites instances of difficulty experienced by black 
Australians of the traditional culture in contacts with 
Europeans: 
Aboriginal people [may be] severely limited in their 
understanding of English ... [Some of the] people have no 
understanding of connecting or qualifying words like 'if', 
'but', 'because', 'or'. For these there is one ending that 
goes on other words. Most of the people when ... 
speak[ing] English leave out these words. When they hear 
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them they don't understand their meaning. [They] have a 
different idea of time ... They [may seem] confused about 
place. If asked 'Did you go into his house?' they will say 
'yes'. It may have been only in the driveway, or inside 
the fence, but that means 'in the house' to them. (ALRC, 
1975, 119) 
Concepts in the English language are not necessarily the same as 
concepts in other languages, including Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait languages. As well, some persons in particular cultural 
groups may be susceptible 'to authority situations which ... 
[means] there is a tendency to give the answer thought to be 
expected, rather than that necessarily the case'. The Australian 
Law Reform Commission found that this difficulty was highlighted 
by many witnesses giving evidence to the Commission during its 
researches on the criminal investigation reference. Further, that 
Commission currently has before it a reference on Aboriginal 
customary law. A number of discussion papers have been produced 
in relation to the reference. As with the matters disclosed 
during hearings on the criminal investigation reference, some of 
these issues are directly relevant to jury decision-making. 
The Commission points out, for example, that Aboriginal 
defendants 'on occasions ... have little or no understanding of 
the nature of the criminal trial': 
The difficulty is not confined to problems of language 
many of the concepts upon which criminal trials are based 
have no equivalent in Aboriginal law. The greatest 
difficulty is experienced by traditionally oriented 
Aborigines but Aborigines with limited English may also 
find it difficult to follow the course of the trial. The 
problem has two facets. First, the pleas at the beginning 
of the trial may be unintelligible to a traditional 
Aborigine. Aborigines have no word for guilty or not 
guilty. The view taken by the criminal law that an accused 
is entitled to test the prosecution case against him 
rather than plead guilty is foreign to customary law 
(ALRC, 1980, 76). 
Just as cultural differences of those recently emigrated to 
Australia, or those who have retained part of their non Anglo-
Saxon cultural heritage though having spent longer in Australia, 
may be relevant to defences to murder (as the High Court pointed 
out in the Moffa case), those differences may be relevant to 
defences for persons of Aboriginal descent. The Australian Law 
Reform Commission said: 
Although an Aborigine may have killed another, a defence 
may be available to a charge of murder on the ground of 
provocation or self-defence. An Aborigine may not 
understand the distinction between murder and 
manslaughter. According to his law a person who has killed 
another has committed that act and is guilty and there may 
be no amelioration (ALRC, 1980, 76). 
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The view was put to the Commission that 'a white jury is not 
qualified to decide on the guilt of traditional Aborigines' as a 
result of the substantial differences in cultural perceptions and 
thought processes which have been documented. In the Northern 
Territory the practice has been for judges to sit without juries, 
on criminal trials. Suggestions were made to the Commission that 
Aboriginals should be tried by alternative methods than jury 
trial, perhaps by two assessors sitting with a judge, or a 
'special court of native affairs'. The Australian Law Reform 
Commission commented in response that experience in Australia 
with special courts of native affairs 'is not encouraging'. It 
was considered there was no evidence before the Commission to 
justify special tribunals to try Aboriginals charged with serious 
crimes. 
As well, women'8 socialisation and the double standard having 
effect in the court system - both at juvenile and adult level -
are matters requiring consideration (Mukherjee and Scutt, 1980; 
Edwards, 1984). Legitimate debate has commenced about the 
relevance of 'reasonable man' standard where a woman stands 
accused of a crime. (Edwards, 1984; Scutt, 1983) 
This is a matter of importance to jury decision-making in 
important instances, with, for example, instances of pleas of 
provocation, self-defence, diminished responsibility and the 
like. The aim in attempting to acquaint juries with these factors 
is not to convey the idea that particular groups are 'hard done 
by' or require paternalistic or 'soft footed' treatment. Rather, 
it is to incorporate into the system avenues for conveying the 
reality of offences to jurors, taking into account cultural 
context and other relevant matters. 
EXPERT EVIDENCE 
From time to time in Australia criminal cases have become 
celebrated causes, not the least on the basis that forensic 
evidence has been admitted, or not admitted, which has swayed a 
jury in a seemingly inappropriate way. Others have asserted that 
experts can be found to support whatever case a prosecution 
wishes to run and that it is not difficult for the defence 
simultaneously to find equally qualified experts to argue for the 
precise opposite. 
According to the philosophy of our legal system, expert witnesses 
are not engaged by the prosecution to take a partisan pose in the 
criminal trials. Standards should be set high. As the former 
Director of the Australian Institute of Criminology has pointed 
out in an unpublished paper 'The Relationship Between Criminology 
and the Forensic Sciences': 
The modern forensic scientist is not always happy with 
his apportioned role as an adjunct to the police forces. 
He too has been affected by the modern emphasis on the 
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balance which needs to be maintained between law 
enforcement and human rights. More than that, the forensic 
scientist as a scientist is jealous of the independence of 
his discipline. He prefers to serve the court 
independently and not any system of law enforcement. He 
wants his services to be truly forensic or judicial and 
less partisan. 
The standard desired is not always reached. As the Hon. Justice 
Murphy stated in Perry v. The Queen (1983, 57, ALJR, 110): 
The prosecution's evidence fell far short of this ideal. 
If the expert assistance available to the prosecution in 
this case is typical, then the interests of justice demand 
an improvement in investigation and interpretation of data 
and presentation to the court by witnesses who are 
substantially and not nominally experts in the subject 
which calls for expertise. 
Sometimes it is alleged that expert witnesses for the prosecution 
identify with the cause of 'proving' the accused guilty of the 
crime charged. This is not the role of an expert witness for the 
prosecution, just as it is not the role of the prosecution to 
seek to have the accused person convicted, whatever the rights or 
wrongs of the case. 
It has been suggested that a way to overcome the problem is to 
eliminate juries; replace the jury with a 'jury of experts'; 
improve the state of forensic science generally. The elimination 
of juries would not solve the problem, however, judges are not 
necessarily well-versed in matters of forensic medicine, nor 
immune from partisan persuasion of experts. 
Training of judges, as recommended by the Shorter Trials 
Committee in Victoria, (Sallmann, 1985) should go some way 
toward improving judicial knowledge and understanding in this 
area. It is also open to suggest equally strongly that education 
of jurors in relation to forensic evidence and expert witnesses 
may be of similar value. 
Indeed, the training of judges would enhance juror understanding, 
by ensuring judges convey the information in the most readily 
understood way. The 'jury of experts' proposal is not without 
flaws. Just as it can be asserted that experts may easily be 
found to support the prosecution case as to support that of the 
defence, it is open to believe that a jury of experts would 
harbour amongst its members those agreeing with prosecution 
expert witnesses, those agreeing with expert witnesses for the 
defence, and doubtless those emerging with an entirely new view 
of the evidence and what it conveys in terms of guilt or 
innocence, or its inappropriateness to conclusively or 
supportively decide either. Dr Ben Selinger of the Australian 
National University has suggested that three basic rights should 
extend to those accused of crimes, where forensic evidence is 
relevant: 
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the right to immediate access to all scientific evidence 
the right to obtain independent scientific testing of 
samples 
the right to challenge the evidence before its 
presentation to a jury. 
He also contended that strict screening processes should cover 
admission of scientific evidence in trials, including questioning 
of the techniques used, questioning whether the tests are 
appropriate for eliciting evidence of possible innocence as well 
as possible guilt; standardisation of procedures so that disputes 
arise less often about the 'Tightness1 or 'wrongness' of tests; 
the admission into argument of all outcomes of tests, not just 
those directed toward the support of a guilty finding (Sellinger, 
1984). 
At the same time the Attorney-General for Victoria, the Hon. 
J.H. Kennan, M.L.C. announced the establishment of a Chair of 
Forensic Medicine at Monash University. The appointed professor 
will simultaneously hold the post of Director of the Victorian 
Institute of Forensic Pathology. The Institute is to be 
established to provide 'an independent high level of pathology 
service long overdue in Victoria'. In a press release on the 
project issued on 19 December 1984 the Attorney-General said: 
In 1977 the Coroner's Court Review Committee commented on 
the lack of qualified pathologists with specialised 
training in forensic pathology in Victoria. The proposed 
institute ... will ensure that the quality of forensic 
pathology services available to the Coroner is sufficient 
for proper administration of justice. 
Obviously, rather than seek to place blame on juries for failures 
in the giving of expert evidence or adequate forensic testing and 
the like, it is wiser to take the Victorian government approach 
of ensuring that evidence given in criminal cases involving 
forensic medicine is of the soundest quality possible. Together 
with this, education of jurors and juries in the most appropriate 
way to handle expert evidence and consider forensic evidence of 
all types should be a priority. Ways of effecting this education 
should be devised and implemented without unnecessary delay. 
COMPLICATED COMMERCIAL CASES 
It may be considered odd that complicated commercial cases are 
singled out for attention, as somehow distinct or apart from 
other complex cases of a non-commercial nature: there is no 
reason to believe that tangled commercial matters are more 
difficult to understand the labyrinthine conspiracy cases, or 
cases of another nature involving convoluted fact situations and 
perplexing evidence of various types. 
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It is not immediately evident why it should be accepted wisdom in 
some quarters that juries are incompetent to deal with such 
matters, and that to leave these cases to judges would be 
preferable, or non-problematic. No doubt judges may have a 
difficult time understanding knotty commercial matters: not all 
are well versed in commercial law. Not all, even if expert in 
some or many commercial law areas, need be without any 
difficulties in handling decision-making in this area, as in 
other areas of complexity in criminal trials. 
Were a decision made to eliminate jury trials from complicated 
commercial matters, how would it be determined which commercial 
matters are so complicated that they should go to a judge sitting 
alone, or a specially constituted tribunal? If the defendant is 
to be given a choice, in which cases would the choice be 
relevant? Taking such routes might well create problems directly 
related to selecting out cases, selecting 'special' tribunals and 
the like. This process would have Its own momentum, delay and 
complexity. And would such an approach in fact lead to greater 
justice, more efficiency, or greater respect for the criminal 
justice system? 
The response to problems of the sort arising in complex criminal 
cases cannot readily be dealt with, and particularly not by knee 
jerk reactions. The involvement of the jury in the criminal 
justice system would better be enhanced by considering means of 
properly educating jurors to participate competently in trials be 
they of whatever nature. Eliminating jurors from the system would 
serve only to further remove the criminal justice system from its 
origins as a relevant part of the community, whilst removing the 
community from its major opportunity to participate in our system 
of justice. 
EDUCATING THE JUDGES AND THE JURORS 
Real efforts are being made in some jurisdictions to ensure that 
the courts are as well equipped as possible to carry out their 
task of implementing the criminal law. In Victoria the Shorter 
Trials Committee has commented upon 'the important dimension to 
the role of the judge in a criminal trial' as being 'expertise in 
the substantive and procedural aspects of criminal law and the 
running of a criminal trial'. The Committee noted the general 
acceptance, today, that the criminal law is 'a complex area of 
law and becoming more so, and that the conduct of criminal trials 
is a demanding task' (Sallmann, 1985, 186). The views of 
Victorian judges on the idea of judicial training were sought, 
with particlar emphasis on the conduct of criminal trials. 
Slightly more than half the two thirds of judges expressing a 
view did not favour judicial training. A number, however, said 
'it would be a good idea for new judges unfamiliar with the 
criminal jurisdiction to 'watch their senior brethren running a 
trial' and to 'receive guidance and assistance from the senior 
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judges'." The Committee concluded that it 'would like to see a 
programme of training established in this area for newly 
appointed judges' (Sallmann, 1985, 186-7). 
In support, the former Chief Justice of Australia, Chief Justice 
Barwick, was quoted as saying: 
Judges in our system are drawn predominantly from the Bar. 
It is thought, and you might think correctly thought, that 
the work of the Bar provides a very good in-service 
training for the potential judge, though it by no means 
follows that a successful advocate becomes a good judge or 
that there is not room for continuing education of the 
judge in the art of being a judge. The training of a new 
judge in what to him is a new role is a matter which ought 
to be taken in hand on a systematic basis (Barwick, 1979, 
490). 
It should be noted that in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom the idea of judicial training is not new, and indeed 
those jurisdictions have gone beyond the idea to the 
implementation of judicial training schemes. The Shorter Trials 
Committee commented that 'the concept and the practice of 
training for judges is now well entrenched in England and is 
generally accepted as performing an essential part of the 
quipment of all members of the judiciary' (Sallmann, 1985, 187). 
The Committee called for a training scheme for judges to be 
developed on a national basis, noting with approval that the 
Australian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA) is 
currently working on a scheme for judicial training: 
The work of the AIJA in this regard should be firmly 
supported from Victoria, especially by the judiciary and 
the Government. The Committee takes the view that the 
skill and competence of judges in conducting criminal 
trials is an important factor in determining the length of 
trials and that the training of judges in these skills can 
make a worthwhile contribution to improving their 
performance (Sallmann, 1985, 187). 
As judges are 'at the coal-face' with regard to their role in the 
courtroom and their interaction with the jury at what might be 
considered the most crucial stage of the criminal justice 
process, it is vital that they be equipped to convey as clearly 
as possible to jurors those matters which are relevant to jury 
deliberations. It is also vital that they ensure that jurors are 
not potentially befuddled or bemused by irrelevant or 
Inadmissible evidence creeping into the arena. The Shorter Trials 
Committee observed that this is a difficult area for the 
judiciary, but emphasised that judges 'can and certainly should 
exercise a firm hand on the tiller of the trial', within the 
limitations laid down by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of South Australia: 
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It is well recognised that a trial judge has a duty to 
supervise the trial in such a way as to prevent undue 
repetition and prolixity ... It is a duty which must be 
exercised with tact and purdence. Injustice can easily 
result from ill-advised interventions by the judge. The 
judge does not know what is in counsel's brief and a line 
of questioning which may appear to the judge to be 
repetitious or have little bearing on the case may be 
fully justified by counsel's instructions ... 
Nevertheless, judges must not lose sight of the importance 
of that part of their function which is concerned with 
controlling the length of proceedings in the interests of 
economy (Sallmann, 1985, 186). 
These words are equally applicable to the issue at hand, namely 
the need for jurors to clearly understand the issues before them, 
and the fact that it is the judge overall whose responsibility it 
is to ensure that, as far as possible, jurors are appraised of 
the matters relevant to the decision they are called upon to 
make. 
Jury directions have been the subject of criticism on occasions. 
The Victoria Law Foundation currently has before it a project to 
research the most easily understood manner of conveying to jurors 
the matters which are important in assisting them to reach a true 
verdict. Various judges have made exceptional efforts to assist 
jurors in this regard, in Victoria as elsewhere. A recent note in 
the Australian Law Journal, 1985, has commented upon this in a 
case before the Supreme Court of New South Wales where the Chief 
Justice suggested a form of directions by a trial judge to the 
jury, where the accused was seeking to rely upon a plea of self-
defence to a charge of murder or attempted murder, or a charge 
for an offence involving an intent to murder or to cause grievous 
bodily harm: 
This suggested form represented an attempt by his Honour 
to translate into language, which a jury might be capable 
of readily undertanding, the six-point formulation of the 
jury's task in dealing with a plea of self-defence to such 
charges, as stated by Mason J., with the concurrence of 
Stephen and Aickin JJ. in the leading High Court decision 
of Viro v. The Queen ... 
Chief Justice Street of the New South Wales Supreme Court stated 
that his intention in formulating the directions was that: 
I have drafted the ... direction in the contemplation that 
trial judges may find it of assistance to use it in 
preference to the terms of the six-point crystallisation 
[as made by Justice Mason of the High Court]. Whether or 
not to use it, whether or not to amplify it, how it is 
used, how it is related to, and explained in the context 
of, the evidence, are essentially matters for the trial 
judge. 
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I Intend it as no more than a suggested paraphrase of 
the Vlro crystallisation in terms that may be more 
meaningful to jurors (Current Topic, 1985, 645). 
Certainly it has been the case the judges at all times have been 
mindful of the need to ensure jurors understand what they are 
saying and the import of the directions they give. Yet is is 
equally certain that the project being undertaken by the Victoria 
Law Foundation could well be of Immense assistance in ensuring 
that these efforts are universalised. The good operation of the 
jury system and the criminal justice system as a whole, and the 
perception of accused persons, witnesses, victims of crime and 
the general community of the criminal justice system will surely 
be enhanced by these and like efforts. 
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REFORMING THE JURY: THE COMMON GROUND 
Mr Mark Findlay 
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
SYDNEY N.S.W. 
When faced with the responsibility of proposing reforms to the 
structure and operation of the jury, law reform bodies are 
confronted by a unique ideological framework. More than any other 
institution within the criminal justice process, the jury is both 
represented and perceived of, as embodying and promoting the 
rule of law. The police, the judiciary and the legal profession 
can be appreciated ambivalently by the general community (as it 
the case in some states more than others) and the operation of 
all other institutional aspects of the trial process might be 
signficantly criticised as working against the achievement of 
equality, unanimity and universality of the legal process. But 
not so the jury. We heard much yesterday to confirm the view that 
whether by 'epidemic suggestion' or not, the vast majority of 
citizens hold great confidence in the institution of the jury. 
They believe in the 'communion of peers'. Yet as is the case with 
much justification behind arguments for and against the jury, I 
believe that such confidence rests on ideology rather than 
experience or factual understanding. For example, what is meant 
by the communion of peers, so that it can be so trusted? Does it 
mean the judgment of one's equals or neighbours, the judgment by 
a body of fair minded people, the judgment of an Independent or 
impartial body, the judgment of a randomly chosen body of 
persons, the judgment of a representative body of persons, or the 
judgment by twelve clones of the accused? Towards which of these 
images is confidence directed? 
Faced with a fairly strong and uncontested ideological base for 
the jury which is so significantly endorsed by the community, 
reformers might fear that their options for reform might be 
somewhat constrained. I would argue not so. In fact any number of 
reform directions might be made all the more acceptable and 
achievable so long as they are argued for as consistently 
supporting the accepted ideology. 
As Peter Duff and I have argued in our recent unpublished paper, 
'The English Jury and Due Process', the rhetoric surrounding 
reform challenges to the jury consists largely of claims that 
disputed territory is really common ground. Both for those 
reformers who principally hold crime control values, and those 
who are more concerned with the preservation of due process, the 
contest is over whose reform direction best colonises the common 
ground. 
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In order to substantiate this point, and draw my commentary back 
to the specifics of what have been put forward by the previous 
three speakers I propose to look at several of the central 
ideological premises on which the jury is said to be built, and 
to look at the different lines of argument and forms of reform 
direction which are supposed to ensure that: 
i) the jury is the best finder of fact in the trial process 
ii) the jury adds certainty to the law 
iii) the jury presents a 'just face' for the trial process 
iv) the jury is a mechanism for lay participation and the 
representation of the community conscience 
These four are the central ideological presumptions that Duff and 
I identified in our article entitled 'The Jury in England: 
Practice and Ideology (1982). 
THE JURY, LAY PARTICIPATION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF COMMUNITY 
CONSCIENCES. 
As I said yesterday, in open discussion, the decision that 
community involvement in the justice process is a good thing, is 
a political decision as much as anything else. In fact it is in 
keeping with Bankowski and Mungham's (1976) challenging 
assessment of the jury that 'the function of the jury is 
ideological' and Baldwin and McConville's observation that: 
It is clear that arguments about the retention or 
abolition of the jury are at base, political in nature. 
The particular value of empirical research is that it may 
provide a better understanding of the circumstances in 
which lawyers and juries will differ. If it does that, it 
will at least impel the disputants to make more explicit 
the philosophical and political assumptions on which they 
found their beliefs (1979, 19). 
I would suggest that the substance of concern about lay 
participation revolves around issues such as independence, 
impartiality and representativeness. (In passing it is worth 
noting that these ideological concerns may in fact be somewhat 
mutually inconsistent. It is therefore difficult as Paul Byrne 
says, to advance them as of similar import.) Consider the 
proposition that a representative jury may well be partial, and 
an independent jury may well not be representative. 
The protection of impartiality and representativeness might be 
explored at the level of jury selection. Here recommendations 
regarding the extension of jury franchise, the extension of 
exclusions, the restriction of challenges, and the consideration 
of vetting may all be relevant. 
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But arguments for or against any of these may not be consistent. 
For instance, with respect to vetting, proponents and critics all 
argue that their position better ensures representativeness and 
independence. The English position is that vetting overcomes 
juror 'nobbling' and bias, whereas the N.S.W.L.R.C. argue that 
vetting works agai nst the concept of random selection. 
Interestingly then, while admitting that the challenge system may 
also go against randomness and impartiality, the N.S.W.L.R.C. 
accepts a continuation of the challenge system in a somewhat 
reduced form. Perhaps this recognises the view that both the 
crown and the defence actively promote a partial or biased jury, 
or at least one which might be representative of their view. 
(This could be the only justification for the practice of 
allowing more challenges for murder charges.) Also, the challenge 
system, as Jocelynne Scutt implies, obviously works against the 
representation of the male, middle class and 'middle minded' 
view. 
As to independence, some would argue that the very arbitrariness 
and prejudice evidenced by juries in certain celebrated cases 
(which a variety of reform proposals may be designed to overcome) 
is in fact evidence of its independence. The very 
unpredictability of the institution is said to ensure this. The 
argument in favour of special or expert juries (which after all 
are only examples of sophisticated vetting) might revolve around 
considerations of greater efficiency and certainty, but depending 
on the perspective of the arguer, they are usually proposed as 
being more likely to return the type of verdict which that party 
wants. 
Proposals to expand jury franchise such as those proposed by the 
N.S.W.L.R.C. and to change the rules governing jury 
disqualification may be couched in a concern for fairness, 
efficiency and justice, but what do they mean for random 
selection and representativeness? 
These two aspirations may work against one another by leading to 
an expansion or contraction of the significance of the jury 
respectively. 
IDEOLOGY OF CERTAINTY AND PREFERRED FACT FINDER 
The arguments voiced in support of jury secrecy and the retention 
or abolition of the majority verdict are seen as motivated by a 
desire to enhance the jury's fact finding potential or ensure 
greater certainty. The latter also attempts to overcome public 
trial rather than the court based monopoly over such trial. 
Yet one could argue that an absolute, incontrovertible and silent 
verdict does as much to confuse the appreciation of the dynamics 
of the verdict process, as it does to ensure public confidence in 
the certainty of the law. Hence, the balancing act required when 
looking at juror disclosure and contempt is, certainty versus 
public interest. 
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On the unanimous versus majority verdict debate, it is worthwhile 
reflecting on the separate arguments referred to in the N.S.W. 
L.R.C. (1986) report at pages 143 and 151. I would suggest that 
while being somewhat similar in substance, they lead to quite 
different reform proposals. 
There is also the issue of conflicting objectives which is well 
evidenced in the debate over jury secrecy and the 
incontrovertible verdict. Are we to go for certainty, the 
appearance of unanimity, the recognition of juror diversity, or 
public accountability? 
FACT FINDER 
As for the jury's dominion over the finding of fact, there are a 
great variety of recommendations concerning juror comprehension, 
the rules of evidence, the judge's direction etc. which are put 
forward against one another, in support of this aim. These are 
attempts to deal with problems associated with the functional 
reality of the jury as constrained from the start by the 
artificial rigidity of the 'fact/law' distinction. 
THE JUST FACE OF THE JURY 
Finally, all the mechanisms proposed to minimise jurors' 
waywardness and unpredictability and in fact limit their ability 
to ignore repugnant laws, may militate against this. Are we 
anxious to make the communion of peers little more than twelve 
versions of the trial judge? 
As was stated by Baldwin and McConville: 
So although serious criticism may be levelled against the 
jury on the grounds of arbitrariness, prejudice and the 
like, one may nevertheless state with confidence that the 
very unpredictability of the institution is the surest 
evidence of its genuine independence (Baldwin and 
McConville, 1979, 131). 
CONCLUSION 
While certain law reform proposals may appear contradictory this 
may be a natural consequence of the internal contradictions 
within the ideology of the jury, and between this ideology and 
the reality of the jury's function. 
Generally both critics and proponents of the jury alike, absorb 
and absolve the failure of the jury, in both an ideological and 
functional sense, too simply on the basis of a dichotomy between 
the administration of justice and the rule of law. 
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They argue over the apparent irreconcilability of the ideology 
and function of the jury as if it were a contradiction in logic. 
Yet such a dichotomy is only as real as the paradoxes on which 
all aspects of criminal justice are based. How else could one 
explain the perpetuation of the jury as common ground? 
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UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Professor Wayne T. Westling 
Law School 
University of Oregon, U.S.A. 
Uniform jury instructions are commonplace in the United States 
and while this may be reason enough for Australians to view the 
concept sceptically, the experience gained in the creation and 
use of these uniform instructions in the various jurisdictions 
may prove to be of some value as Australian courts experiment 
with such instructions. Experiments are currently under way in 
three states: Western Australia has been using the forty-one 
specimen directions issued by the Judicial Studies Board in 
England; in New South Wales a committee of Supreme Court and 
District Court judges has drafted some initial standard jury 
instructions; and in Victoria the Victorian Law Foundation has 
begun a project to develop standard jury instructions. 
This article will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of uniform 
instructions, describe the procedures for their creation and use, 
and provide specific examples from the California Jury 
Instructions - Criminal [CALJIC] (1986)., some of which are 
reproduced in the Appendix. 
STRENGTHS 
The obvious strength of uniform instructions is uniformity. 
Similar cases will be subject to the same legal direction. 
Similar issues which occur in otherwise differing cases will be 
subject to the same legal direction. 
In addition to uniformity, the use of prepared uniform 
instructions decreases the chance of reversal for misdirection. 
In a foreword to the third edition of CALJIC in 1970, which was 
directed to the California bench and bar, the then Chief Justice 
of the California Supreme Court noted: 
California Jury Instructions - Criminal, ... for many 
years have filled a vital need in criminal jury trials. 
Moreover, their use has reduced the causes for appeal and 
thus lessened the load of the Supreme Court and Courts of 
Appeal. More importantly, they have decreased the number 
of new trials necessitated by reversals due to erroneous 
jury instructions. 
The third main value is that the preparation process for creation 
of the instructions produces a better instruction than could 
reasonably be expected from even the most careful deliberations 
of a single judge performing the task. 
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SPECIFIC EXAMPLES 
Jury instructions in most jurisdictions are assembled in book 
form. Some of these are bound volumes, such as the California 
Jury Instructions some' of which are reproduced in the Appendix to 
this article. Where the instructions are bound, they are usually 
supplemented with periodic pocket parts. Other jury instruction 
books such as the Oregon Dniform Jury Instructions are issued in 
loose-leaf form. Where they are in loose-leaf form, revisions are 
issued which take the place of the prior instruction. 
Within the book, instructions are generally grouped by broad 
categories, much as chapters in a narrative book. CALJIC 2.80 on 
expert testimony appears under the specific chapter heading 
'Evidence and Guides for its Consideration', and is an 
illustration of the general category of how jurors are advised to 
approach their task. It includes instructions on topics such as 
the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof and is 
reproduced in the Appendix. Contrary to the Australian rule of 
not elaborating on the notion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
(Dawson v. R (1961) 106 CLR 1, per Dixon CJ; Green v. R., (1971) 
126 CLR 28), courts in the United States usually provide a 
definition of the term (e.g. CALJIC 2.90). The chapter also 
provides guides for the evaluation of witnesses with instructions 
covering credibility of witnesses (see CALJIC 2.20 in Appendix), 
wilful false testimony, conflicting testimony when a witness has 
been convicted of a felony, character evidence, and the claim of 
a privilege by a witness. And it includes guidance on general 
credibility factors including demeanour of a witness, capacity of 
a witness to perceive, recollect or communicate, character for 
honesty or veracity 'or their opposites1, bias, interest, motive, 
prior inconsistent or prior consistent statement, an admission of 
untruthfulness, and the witness's attitude toward the giving of 
testimony. 
Likewise, CALJIC 14.50 defining the crime of burglary illustrates 
the way in which specific crimes are defined in the uniform 
instructions. Similar definitions are included for all crimes 
which might be tried before a jury. United States Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the constitutional guarantee of a jury 
trial in criminal matters have limited summary jurisdiction to 
cases in which the risk of imprisonment is for no greater than 
six months (Baldwin v. New York, 399 US 66, to S.Ct. 1886 (1970)). 
Thus jury trial is available in many cases tried summarily in 
Australia. The definitional chapters in the uniform jury 
instruction books are therefore quite large. A third example is 
the section on defenses, illustrated by CALJIC 4.50 through 5.30 
which are reproduced in the Appendix. 
It should be noted that these uniform jury instructions are 
secondary authority, and thus are not binding. However, because 
of the process of preparation they are very likely to be accepted 
as authoritative. The 'Use Note' and 'Comment' which follow most 
instructions shows the sources of the instruction. Thus, the 
comment to CALJIC 2.80 cites statutory authority, treatises and 
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an appellate case. The use note adds a guide for the trial judge 
reminding him or her that the instruction should be given sua 
aponte whenever an expert has given an opinion. 
The use notes and comments to, for instance, CALJIC 2.80, 5.50 
to 5.54 and 14.51 to 14.58 are fairly short and to the point, 
those accompanying CALJIC 14.50 and other instructions may 
require extensive and detailed comments and use notes. These 
include CALJIC 2.50 (Evidence of Other Offenses); CALJIC 2.60 
(Defendant Not Testifying - No Inference of Guilt May Be Drawn); 
CALJIC 2.62 (Defendant Testifying - When Adverse Inference May Be 
Drawn.) 
CALJIC 14.50 provides an illustration of drafting instructions in 
the alternative, employing brackets for the different options 
(see Appendix). This instruction also leaves blanks to be filled 
in by the trial judges as required by the specific case. The use 
note guides the judge in selecting among bracketed portions and 
completing the blank. The use note also directs the judge to a 
different instruction when the burglary involves entering a 
motor vehicle. 
The self-defence instructions illustrate the way in which the 
uniform instructions have been drafted so as to anticipate the 
various situations which might arise in a self-defence situation. 
The trial judge should select the appropriate instruction and 
include it with the rest of the instruction. The result will be 
the inclusion or exclusion of a particular paragraph in the 
judge's total summing up to the jury. 
PROCEDURES 
One of the strengths of uniform jury instructions is that they 
are compiled through a collaborative process. Each jurisdiction 
has its own format, but generally there is a committee which 
includes trial judges at all levels of jurisdiction, 
and practicing lawyers from both the prosecution and defence 
sides. Some states also include appellate judges on their 
committee. 
The committee reviews all relevant authority, any existing 
instructions in the state, comparable instructions from other 
states, and the standard from which may have come into common 
use. Then draft instructions are prepared and circulated 
(generally in large lots, chapter by chapter). These drafts are 
revised in sub-committee and full committee, approved and 
published. The final instruction benefits from this group 
deliberation and is likely to be an accurate unbiased statement 
of the appropriate law for the jury's guidance. As years pass, 
this process is repeated to take account of new developments in 
the law, and the committee considers the experience of use under 
the prior instruction. Thus, the instructions become better and 
more refined as years go by. 
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The usual practice in United States' courts is for counsel on 
either side of the case to submit proposed jury instructions 
either at the beginning of the case or at the close of all the 
evidence. These proposals are developed either by preparing draft 
instructions from the uniform book and submitting them in final 
textual form, or by requesting standard instructions by number, 
leaving it to the judge to actually assemble the text from the 
uniform jury instruction book. In California the most common 
instructions are printed on separate pages and are available to 
both the judge and counsel. At the close of all the evidence -
but before the closing addresses to the jury - the judge will 
hold a conference with all counsel to discuss the proposed 
instructions. This conference may be in open court with the jury 
excused, or may be in chambers. It is common for the conference 
to be recorded contemporaneously by the court reporter, but this 
is not necessary so long as the results and any objections are 
recorded at the end of the conference. At this conference the 
judge will consider the proposed instructions, hear submissions 
from counsel in the event of a conflict, and decide which 
instructions to give. The ultimate responsibility for giving 
correct instructions remains with the judge, but in many 
situations the failure of a party to request a particular 
instruction will be fatal to an appeal from the failure to so 
instruct. 
The value of this jury instruction conference is twofold. First, 
the judge is unlikely to give an incorrect instruction if he or 
she has heard from both parties in advance of the instructions. 
Exceptions to the proposed instructions will be made and recorded 
either at the time of the conference or immediately upon the 
conclusion of the instructions and the retirement of the jury. 
Some jurisdictions do have a statutory requirement that counsel 
take formal exception to the summation at the conclusion the 
judges' summing up. Failure to do so may result in waiver of the 
issue on appeal. Under this procedure the only time the judge 
should have to recall the jury and re-instruct or correct an 
instruction is the rare circumstance in which the judge has 
changed his or her mind between the time of the conference and 
the submission of the case to the jury. 
Second, the settling of the instructions before the closing 
addresses to the jury improves the quality of the addresses, 
particularly in that respective counsel will know precisely which 
matters are going to be covered in the summation, and the form of 
words to be employed by the trial judge. 
A related point comes from publication of the uniform 
instructions for the entire legal community. Not only will 
counsel know at the end of the evidence precisely which 
instructions will be given by the trial judge, but they will also 
know the form of words that the judge will use in describing the 
law on a particular point as they prepare and present their case. 
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This advance knowledge allows the counsel to focus their case 
presentation, as well as their closing argument. In my judgment, 
this improves the quality of advocacy throughout. 
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission (1986) conducted a 
survey of judges and found that approximately two-thirds of the 
judges responding felt that pattern jury instructions would aid 
the jury, and approximately three-quarters felt that they would 
aid the judge. No survey has been conducted of lawyers, but my 
guess would be that nine-tenths of lawyers would express the 
opinion that the existence of a uniform jury instruction book is 
a great aid to the lawyers. 
The breakdown of the instructions in a point by point way and the 
use notes and comments which follow the instructions are a 
useful research aid when commencing the case. This is valuable 
for both the judge and counsel, particularly when facing an 
infrequent crime or an unusual trial situation. 
WEAKNESSES 
The instructions included in the Appendix are representative of 
uniform jury instructions throughout the United States. Although 
some attempts have been made to simplify instructions and write 
them in 'plain English', the law is not always capable of 
accurate simplification as noted locally by Potas and Rickwood 
(1984). Since appellant decisions generally approve jury 
instructions which follow the language of the relevant statute, 
there is a great temptation to draft uniform instructions in the 
same language that the legislature used in defining the crime, 
defence or rule of evidence. With the greatest of respect, 
statutory language is rarely in 'plain English'. This is a 
weakness in the uniform instructions. 
The other main weakness of the uniform instructions in the United 
States is that they are so thorough and complete that a judge 
could properly instruct a jury without deviating one word from 
the uniform instruction. This is useful in avoiding error in 
instructions, but the price paid is the failure to personalise 
the Instructions to the case before the jury. 
This failure to personalise to the particular case is not 
accidental. Generally, judges in the United States are more 
restrained in their comments on the evidence than are judges in 
Australia. In a number of states the constitution of the state 
forbids judges from commenting on the evidence. Where comment is 
allowed, the judge is generally required to confine his or her 
comments to a particular place in the summing up, clearly draw 
the jurors' attention to the fact, and inform the jury that his 
or her comments are not binding on them. 
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This limitation is foreign to Australian jurisprudence and can 
be easily corrected to suit local conditions. Uniform jury 
instructions would be particularly helpful to Australian judges 
in complex areas such as joint trials, unsworn statements by the 
accused, lesser included offences, and complicated definitions of 
crime. Such instructions would avoid reversible error, ease the 
burden on the trial judge at the conclusion of the trial, and 
ensure greater uniformity. But they need not be as complete as 
the uniform instructions described in this article; the trial 
judge could weave them together with appropriate comments 
concerning the case before the jury, thereby injecting the 
personal features of the case on trial which is unfortunately 
lacking in most trials in the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
Uniform jury instructions have reached a level of detail and 
sophistication in many jurisdictions in the United States which 
makes the task of the judge and counsel much easier, improves the 
accuracy of instructions given in cases, and ensures greater 
uniformity in treatment of cases and Issues. In the process such 
uniform instructions run the risk of being too 'legalistic' for 
ready juror comprehension and of being too abstract to bear ready 
relationship to the pending case. 
Taking these factors into account, the experience gained, both in 
substance and in the procedure, may be of some guidance as 
various Australian courts strive to make the task of summing up 
more uniform and easier, while retaining the traditional role of 
the judge to comment on the evidence and to relate the law to the 
facts of the particular case on trial. Finally, the quality of 
advocacy may be improved by advance knowledge of the form of 
words to be used by the trial judge for many of the issues which 
will arise in a trial. 
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APPENDIX 
The following are examples of the California Jury Instructions, 
Criminal, extracted with acknowledgement from West Publishing 
Company's Fourth Revised Edition (1979) and Cumulative Pocket Part 
(1986). 
CALJIC 2.20 (1980 R e v i s i o n ) 
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS 
Every person who testifies under oath [or affirma-
tion] is a witness. You are the sole fudges of the 
believability of a witness and the weight to be given 
the testimony of each witness. . 
In determining the believability of a witness you 
may consider anything that has a tendency in reason 
to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony 
of the witness, including but not limited to any of the 
following: 
The extent of the opportunity or ability of the 
witness to see or hear or otherwise become aware of 
any matter about which the witness has testified; 
The ability of the witness to remember or to 
communicate any matter about which the witness has 
testified; 
The character and quality of that testimony; 
The demeanor and manner of the witness while 
testifying; 
The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, 
or other motive; 
Evidence of the existence or nonexistence of any 
fact testified to by the witness; 
The attitude of the witness toward the action in 
which testimony has been given by the witness or 
toward the giving of testimony; 
[A statement previously made by the witness that 
is [consistent] [or] [Inconsistent] with the testimony of 
the witness;] 
[The character of the witness for honesty or truth-
fulness or their opposites;] 
[An admission by the witness of untruthfulness;] 
[The witness' prior conviction of a felony.] 
USE NOTE 
Any of the paragraphs not applicable under the evidence should 
be stricken. 
Jurors must be instructed sua sponte that they are the exclusive 
judges of the credibility of the witnesses. Penal Code, § 1127. 
The substance of this instruction must be given sua sponte in 
every criminal case, omitting those paragraphs inapplicable under 
the evidence. The paragraph as to the "existence or nonexistence 
of a bias, interest, or other motive" and the paragraph as to the 
attitude of the witness "toward the action in which he testifies, 
etc.," should be given in any case in which the victim of an alleged 
offense has testified for the prosecution, regardless of whether 
specific evidence of any motive or disposition to misstate facts on 
the part of the complaining witness has been adduced by the 
defendant. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cat.3d 864, 123 Cal.Rptr. 
119, 538 P.2d 247. 
Impeachment of a witness generally, see Fricke-Alarcon, Calif. 
Crim.Evid. (8th ed.), pp. 229-260. 
COMMENT 
Evid.Code, § 312; Penal Code,' § 1127. 
' Witkin, Calif.Evid. (2d ed.), §§ 1109-1116; Jefferson, Calif.Evid. 
Benchbook, §§ 28.2-28.4, 28.8. 
, . This instruction catalogs the matters affecting-credibility : as set 
forth in Evid.Code, §§ 780 and 788. 
Prior inconsistent statements are not admissible as substantive 
evidence under Evidence Code, § 1235 for lacik of cross-examination 
under California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 
489, on remand 3 Cal.3d ,981, 92 Cal.Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998, where 
' the declarant takes the stand but refuses to admit, deny or qualify 
his previous statements. People v. Woodberry;'10 Cal.App.3d 695, 
89 CaUptr. 330. 
Evidence .of prior arrests of. a witness cannot be used for 
, impeachment to prove his bias under Evid.Code, § 780(f) against 
peace officers. Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal.3d 575, 86 Cal. 
Rptr. 465, 468 P.2d 825. 
! Under proper circumstances and upon request the defendant is 
entitled to an instruction relating to the credibility of a witness by 
considering whether the witness is under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs while testifying. People v. Barnett, 54 Cal.App.3d 1046, 127 
CaLRptr. 88. 
Deletion of provision re inconsistent statement is error if there 
is any evidence of an inconsistent' statement by a witness. 
People v. Galloway, 100 Cal.App.3d 551, 160 Cal.Rptr. 914. 
CALJIC 2.20 and 2.27 adequately alerts the jury to examine and 
view an informer's testimony in the light of bias, interest or other 
motive that may be demonstrated by the evidence, and it is not 
necessary to give an instruction that testimony of a paid informer 
should be viewed with suspicion. People v. Castro, 99 Cal.App.3d 
191, 160 Cal.Rptr. 156. 
Former CALJIC 2.91 and CALJIC 2.20 (1980 Revision) "are not 
alone sufficient to render the failure to give requested instruction 
linking reasonable doubt to identification harmless error." People 
v. Brown, 152 Cal.App.3d 674, 199 Cal.Rptr. 680. 
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CALJIC 2.80 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
A person is qualified to testify as an expert if 
he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert 
on the subject to which his testimony relates. 
Duly qualified experts may give their opinions 
on questions in controversy at a trial. To assist you 
in deciding such questions, you may consider the 
opinion with the reasons given for it, if any, by 
the expert who gives the opinion. You may also 
consider the qualifications and credibility of the 
expert. 
[In resolving any conflict that may exist in the 
testimony of expert witnesses, you should weigh the 
opinion of one expert against that of another, in 
doing this, you should consider the relative qualifi-
cations and credibility of the expert witnesses, as 
wed as the reasons for each opinion and the facts 
and other matters upon which it was based.] 
You are not bound to accept an expert opin-
ion as conclusive, but should give to it the weight 
to which you find it to be entitled. You may dis-
regard any such opinion if you find it to be un-
reasonable. 
USE NOTE 
When the opinion of any expert witneaa haa been received in 
evidence, thia instruction must be given aiia aponte. Penal Code, 
I 1127b; People v. Bowena, 229 Cal.App.2d 690, 40 Cal.Rptr. 
436; People v. Ruiz, 11 Cal.App.8d 852,90 Cal.Rptr. 110. 
COMMENT 
Penal Code, i 1127b; Evid.Code, 8 720; Witkin, Calif.Evid. 
(2d ed.), §§ 406-424; Fricke-Alarcon, Cal.Crim.Evid. (8th ed.), 
pp. 191-209; People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 795, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 
894 P.2d 959. 
Library Rafaraaeat : 
* W i t t ' i K i ; No. Dlcctta, Criminal Law «=»782<5), 788(7). 
CALJIC 4.50 (1979 Revision) 
ALIBI 
The defendant in this case has introduced evi 
dence for the purpose of showing that he was no' 
present at the time and place of the commissior 
of the alleged offense for which he is here on trial 
If, after a consideration of all the evidence, yoi 
have a reasonable doubt that the defendant wai 
present at the time the crime was committed, he ii 
entitled to an acquittal. 
USE NOTE 
This instruction is designed for use where the only theory of 
the prosecution is that defendant was present at the commission 
of the crime and defendant's evidence of an alibi is admitted. If 
the prosecution theory is either that the defendant was present 
or, if not present, that he was an aider and abettor or a con-
spirator and evidence of an alibi is admitted, Instruction 4.61 
should also be given. 
Alibi instruction is not required to be given sua sponte. Peo-
ple v. Freeman, 22 Cal.8d 484,149 Cal.Rptr. 896, 684 P.2d 688. 
COMMENT 
The function of evidence relating to alibi is not to establish a 
defense nor to prove anything, but merely to raise a reasonable 
doubt of the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime. In 
re Corey, 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 41 Cal.Rptr. 379; People v. Wil-
liamson, 168 Cal.App.2d 735, 336 P.2d 214; People v. Lewis, 81 
Cal.App.2d 119,188 P.2d 271. 
Llkrary Raferaioea: 
W n t ' 1 Key No. Dictate. Criminal Law «=>31, TIM). 
CALJIC 5.30 
SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST ASSAULT 
It is lawful for a person who is being assaulted 
to defend himself from attack if, as a reasonable 
person, he has grounds for believing and does be-
lieve that bodily injury is about to be inflicted up-
on him. In doing so he may use all force and 
means which he believes to be reasonably necessary 
and which would appear to a reasonable person, in 
the same or similar circumstances, to be necessary 
to prevent the injury which appears to be imminent. 
COMMENT 
Penal Code, 5§ 692, 698; 1 Witkin, Calif.Crimes, §§ 169-161, 
168; Fricke-Alarcon, Calif.Crim.Law (11th ed.), pp. 197-198; 
People v. Holt, 26 Cal.2d 69,163 P.2d 21. 
Similar instruction given and approved in People v. Hughes, 
107 Cal.App.2d 487,237 P.2d 64. 
Similar instruction held a correct statement of the law in Bar-
tosh v. Banning, 251 Cal.App.2d 378, 69 Cal.Rptr. 382. 
Person assailed may rely on apparent existence of danger. 
People v. Jackson, 238 Cal.App.2d 689,43 Cal.Rptr. 817. 
Llkrary Rafaraaaea: 
Waat'a Key No. Dl | t a ta , Aaaault and Battery «=67, 80(3); Homi-
cide «»aoo<2,8). 
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CALJIC 14.50 (1981 Revision) 
BURGLARY—DEFINED 
[Defendant it charged in [Count of] the 
information, with the commission of the crime of 
burglary, a violation of Section 459 of the Penal 
Code.] 
Every perton who enters [any structure of the 
type shown by the evidence in this case] [any 
], [with the specific intent to steal, take and 
carry away the personal property of another of any 
value and with the further specific intent to deprive 
the owner permanently of such property] [or] [with • 
the specific intent to commit , a felony], is 
guilty of the crime of burglary. 
It is immaterial whether the intent with which the 
entry was made was thereafter carried out. 
In order to prove the commission of the crime of 
burglary, each of the following elements must be 
proved: 
1. That a person entered a , 
[2. That at the time of the entry, such person had 
the specific intent to steal and take away someone 
else's property, and intended to deprive the owner 
permanently of such property.] 
[2. That at the time of th* entry, such person had 
the specific intent to commit the crime of — _ ] 
USE NOTE 
The specific felonies, other than theft, which the jury could infer 
that defendant intended to commit, must be stated in the instruction 
and other instructions must be given defining each such felony. 
People v. Failla, 64 Cal.2d 560, 51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39. 
See Instruction 14.58 (1979 Revision) for definition of burglary 
in entering motor vehicle. 
Use second bracket only when specifically naming kind of struc-
ture or place entered. 
COMMENT 
(Penal Code, § 459) 
A general list of structures and places which may be the subject 
of burglary is found in Sec. 459. For more detailed discussion, see 
1 Witkin, Calif.Crimes, § 455; Fricke-Alarcon, Calif.Crim.Law (11th 
ed.) pp. 321-322. 
As to what constitutes "entry", see 1 Witkin, op. cit. §§ 456-457; 
Fricke-Alarcon, op. cit pp. 319-321. 
As to specific intent required, see 1 Witkin, op. cit §§ 458-460; 
Fricke-Alarcon, op. cit. pp. 316-319. 
Entry into a building with intent to steal from an adjoining shed 
which is physically attached is burglary even though shed is not a 
structure within Penal Code, § 459. People v. Wright, 20G Cal.App. 
2d 184, 23 Cal.Rptr. 734. See also In re Christopher Lee J., 102 Cal. 
App.3d 76, 162 Cal.Rptr. 147. 
Even though entry into a building is lawful, it is burglary to 
enter an inner door with intent to commit a felony. People v. 
Davis, 175 Cal.App.2d 365, 346 P.2d 248. 
A defendant may not be convicted of burglarizing his own home 
even though his entry is for a felonious purpose. People v. Gauze, 
16 Cal.3d 709, 125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365. Nor may he or his 
agent acting under his direction be convicted of burglarizing his 
own 8tore. People v. Thomas, 74 Cal.App.3d 320, 141 Cal.Rptr. 340. 
Gauze did not overrule existing authority upholding burglary 
convictions in which there was consensual entry. A person "may 
be guilty of burglary even if he enters with consent provided he 
does not have an unconditional possessory right to enter." People 
v. Pendleton, 25 Cal.3d 371, 382, 158 Cal.Rptr. 343, 349. 
Entry of dwelling without consent is not a lesser and necessarily 
included offense. People v. Lohbauer, 29 Cal.3d 364, 173 Cal.Rptr. 
453; People v. Yoder, 100 Cal.App.3d 333, 340, 161 Cal.Rptr. 35, 39. 
A defendant may be guilty of burglary where he enters the 
lobby of an apartment building with intent to burglarize an apart-
ment. People v. Nunley, 168 Cal.App.3d 225, 214 Cal.Rptr. 82. 

INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
Mr Ivan Potas 
Criminologist 
Australian Institute of Criminology 
Canberra 
About 18 months ago an article by Rod Campbell, entitled 'Inside 
the Jury' was published in the Canberra Times. It was a typical 
article which dealt with jurors' experiences in the jury room. 
It concerned the longest running criminal trial dealt with by the 
ACT Supreme Court during 1984. The case ran for almost 3 months 
and the transcript was 6,000 pages in length. The article 
describes such things as the poor facilities provided for jurors, 
hard benches, cramped claustrophobic facilities and 
unsatisfactory hostel food. Other issues canvassed included, the 
awkwardness of selecting a jury foreman, the jurors' opinions 
concerning the performance of the key participants in the trial, 
the emotional strain of a long drawn out trial and the trauma or 
pain in the process of finally reaching a verdict. 
Campbell reports that the jurors had little notion as to what was 
expected of them particularly during the early part of the 
proceedings. Indeed one juror felt . that the most 'criminal 
looking bloke', who was definitely guilty, turned out to be one 
of the court interpreters. As the trial was a long one the trial 
judge had indicated that it was a good idea for them to take 
notes because of the volume of evidence. In fact it was reported 
that three jurors had taken notes and these were found to be 
particularly valuable at a much later stage of the proceedings 
although they had not appreciated that fact at the beginning of 
the trial. The juror interviewed commented that it would have 
been very useful if the jury had access to the transcripts of the 
proceedings which were available to the judge, counsel and the 
press each day. Even a summary of the transcripts would have 
been appreciated. 
The actual experience of serving on the jury was described by 
this juror as primitive. 
It was not unlike any group of people forced together 
'but under a pressure-cooker situation ..' You can't 
walk out the door and cool down. You're in a place 
about the size of a gent's dunny. 
The jury room appeared to have 'come out of the 
Endeavour' it was abysmal that people should be 
confined in that sort of environment. It should have 
been built on the outside of the building and there 
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should be a window, even if it was only one way. I 
think the idea of having the toilets about 3 feet away 
from the rest of the jurors makes it very embarrassing 
for a lot of people, he said. It was just so 
primitive. 
You're dragged in there, you've no idea why you're 
there, barring that you know you're going to be on a 
jury, maybe. You don't know what your rights are, you 
don't know the way of doing things, what you're allow-
ed to do and what you can get others to do for you. 
It is broadly in this context that we must consider the problem 
of assisting members of the jury to carry out the task for which 
they are selected. Given the discomfort and the confusion thus 
described it is little wonder that many fear or seek to shirk the 
responsibility of jury service. It is these very same issues 
also that lend support for the call to cut down upon the use of 
juries, and it is pleasing to see that the Law Reform Commissions 
of both NSW and Victoria have recognised these defficiencies and 
are proposing appropriate reforms (Law Reform Commision of 
Victoria, 1985; New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 1985). 
It is in my view that many of the criticisms relating to the jury 
could and should be remedied, so that the jury can remain central 
to the administration of criminal justice in this country. 
Despite criticims of these kinds, there is no doubt in my mind 
that the jury is both a workable and worthwhile institution, for 
as Dean J put it in Kingswell (1986 60 ALJR 17). 
The institution of trial by a jury [also] serves the 
function of protecting both the administration of 
justice and the accused from the rash judgment and 
prejudices of the community itself. The nature of the 
jury as a body of ordinary citizens called from the 
community to try the particular case offers some 
assurance that the community as a whole will be more 
likely to accept a jury's verdict than it would be to 
accept the judgment of a judge or magistrate who might 
be, or be portrayed as being, over-responsive to 
authority or remote from the affairs and concerns of 
ordinary people. The random selection of a jury panel, 
the empanelment of a jury to try the particular case, 
the public anonymity of individual jurors, the ordinary 
confidentiality of the jury's deliberatative processes, 
the jury's isolation (at least at the time of decision) 
from external influences and the insistence upon its 
function of determining the particular charge according 
to the evidence combine, for so long as they can be 
preserved or observed, to offer some assurance that the 
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accused will not be judged by reference to sensational 
or self-righteous pre-trial publicity or the passion 
of the mob (1986 60 A U R 257). 
Complex Cases 
From time to time suggestions have been made of restricting the 
use of juries in complex cases. Of course if recommendations 
following the Roskill Committee's report were to be followed in 
this country, and the use of juries in complicated serious fraud 
cases were to be abandoned, the trial judge would not need to sum 
up at the conclusion of the case, but rather would proceed to 
deliver a reasoned judgment in explanation of his findings (1986 
60 ALJ 193, 194). This would greatly simplify the judges task 
and so would do away with misdirections on matters of law or fact 
that currently form the basic ground of many appeals from jury 
verdicts. However I would join professor Harding in his remarks 
concerning the dumping of the jury system, and his criticism of 
the Roskill Committee report in that first it must be established 
that the jury system is failing. The evidence is simply not 
there to establish first, that the jury system cannot cope with 
complicated trials, and secondly, that it cannot be improved or 
modified in such a way as to reduce the general criticisms that 
have been aired of late (see generally Harding, 1986, 'Jury 
Performance in Complex Cases', presented earlier at this 
conference). 
Uhderstanding the Language 
It is trite, yet fundamental that members of the jury should 
understand the evidence which they are called upon to consider, 
and further that they should understand the judge's instructions 
on the law. If the judge misdirects the jury in a material 
particular, then the jury will be misled. Conversely, if the 
judge's summing up is legally correct, yet, owing to its 
prolixity or technical nature, it may not be properly understood 
and therefore applied by the jury. Such errors may lead to 
incorrect verdicts which, if detected, can be identified by an 
appellate court. If they are not detected there is a possibility 
of a miscarriage of justice. 
Concern over this problem has led members of the NSW judiciary, 
and now also I understand the Victorian Law Foundation to 
consider whether the production of standard jury directions would 
assist in reducing the incidence of appeals brought about by 
misdirections. Certainly both the Victorian and New South Wales 
Law Reform Commissions have adverted to this issue (Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, 1985, 182 and New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission 1985, para 6.27, 6.28). In both jurisdictions there 
is research currently undertaken or in contemplation to find the 
most easily understood manner of conveying to jurors the matters 
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which are important in assisting them to reach a true verdict 
(Victorian Law Reform Commission, 1985, 182). 
In recognition of the need to simplify legal language the Chief 
Justice of New South Wales set up a small Committee of senior 
judges, two from the Supreme Court and two from the District 
Court to look into the matter. This Institute also offerred some 
assistance to this committee as it set about considering the 
virtues of producing a set of standard jury instructions. In 
fact this Committee did draft some instructions which it believed 
fitted the bill of being both legally accurate and being 
expressed in simple or plain English. These draft directions, 
which have never been published and have no official status 
covered the following areas: 
Reckless indifference - in murder 
Self-Defence (standard ordinary case where one party 
obviously aggressor. See separate direction for 
cases of murder) 
Good Character 
Larceny 
Common Purpose 
Desirability of Jury Agreeing on a Verdict 
Circumstantial Evidence 
Corroboration 
Statement from the Dock 
Onus of Proof 
Attempt 
Duress 
Lies 
Identification 
Conspiracy 
Previous Inconsistent statement 
Intoxication - specific intent 
Alibi 
Self-Defence - in murder 
Provocation 
At the outset it was quite clear that it would not always be 
possible to express complex concepts in simple terms. There were 
boundaries beyond which it was not possible to go, given that the 
instructions had to be legally accurate, and the judges were 
there to ensure that they did conform to the law. 
Once the instructions had been drafted I, with the assistance of 
a psychologist, Ms Debra Rickwood, set about to measure the 
extent to which ordinary people could understand and apply the 
jury instructions. Our findings are now published by this 
Institute in a study entitled Do Juries Understand? (Potas and 
Rickwood, 1984), and accordingly it is proposed to provide only a 
broad overview of the methodology here. 
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Suffice it to say that the study was undertaken in the tradition 
of "mock jury' research (see generally Law Reform Commission of 
Victoria, 1985 Chapter 4). A fictitious case was devised 
incorporating a large selection of the drafted jury instructions. 
These were presented to groups of young people in the form of a 
judge's summing up in relation to a hypothetical murder robbery 
case involving three accused. The subjects were asked to place 
themselves into the position of jurors and subsequently were 
asked a series of multiple choice questions so that we could 
guage their understanding of the concepts employed. 
The experimental groups consisted of a total of 128 Stirling 
College students. In addition a group of 15 Canberra College of 
Advanced Education students were also tested. The control group, 
which consisted of 24 people, were read the facts of the case but 
were not given the jury instructions at all. 
It did not surprise us to find that the Canberra College of 
Advanced Education students understood the instructions better 
than the younger, less experienced Stirling College students. 
However, the majority of Stirling College students also 
understood the instructions reasonably well although it was also 
found that a minority exhibited very poor understanding indeed 
(Potas and Rickwood, 1984, 45). 
An unexpected finding was that the control group, that is, the 
group which did not hear the instructions, did not differ 
significantly on any of the measures of understanding, 
comprehension or applicability from those students who received 
the instructions. However, the control group did differ in one 
respect - they were less severe in their individual verdicts -
that is they were less likely to find the offenders in the 
hypothetical case guilty of the principal charge for which each 
was tried. 
Figure 1 (over page) describes the procedure that we followed. 
An anticipated finding was that some instructions were less well 
understood that others. Thus, the draft Instructions relating to 
common purpose and self-defence as presented in our hypothetical 
robbery murder case were significantly less well understood than 
directions relating to good character, identification, 
provocation and alibi (Potas and Rickwood, 1984, 50). 
We were at pains to point out some of the limitations of our 
study. The majority of students were aged in the 17 to 18 year 
bracket, and thus were not a truely representative sample of 
jurors. The Canberra College of Advanced Education students were 
closer in age to a typical sample of jurors but were probably 
better educated. Women were also probably over-represented in 
our sample. 
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Flfurt 1 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
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Furthermore, a criticism applying to all mock jury trials, was 
that the testing environment was artificial. Our study did not 
attempt to replicate witness testimony, and so the subjects did 
not have the advantaged of hearing and seeing the witnesses. The 
availability of body language cues, an essential part of normal 
communication processes were therefore lacking, except insofar as 
those cues could have been picked up by the presenter of the 
summing up used in our experiment. 
We had difficulty in explaining why it was that the control group 
seemed to score as well as the experimental groups. We attempted 
to explain this by suggesting that most people have an intuitive 
knowledge of the law. Much is learned via the press, 
particularly the electronic news media, and by court room dramas, 
whether real or fictional. Thus, most people have a baseline 
understanding of legal terms and concepts. A further possible 
explanation for the degree of concordance between the two groups 
may be that the legal concepts themselves are attuned to ordinary 
notions of fairness and morality so that, whether instructions 
are given or not, similar responses are invited once the factual 
circumstances of the offence have been presented. 
We also canvassed the possibility that our methodology was to 
blame for this surprising outcome. However, I note that other 
studies have encountered similar problems. Thus, one group of 
researchers, in the course of reviewing empirical studies of 
linguistic difficulties experienced by jurors noted as follows: 
Recent social science research suggests that juror's 
difficulties in understanding instructions on the law 
are considerable and widespread. Strawn and Buchanan 
assessed juror comprehension of oral criminal pattern 
instructions used in Florida by compairing the under-
standing of subject-jurors who received instructions 
to that of a comparable group of subjects that did not 
receive instructions. They found that although the 
instructions helped to some extent, the instructed 
jurors still missed 27 per cent of the test items and 
failed to show any improved comprehension for four of 
nine crucial content areas addressed by the instruct-
ions. Elwork, Sales and Alfini studies Michigan civil 
pattern instructions on the law of negligence and 
found no reliable differences between a group receiving 
no instructions and a group receiving the pattern 
instructions. More recently, on the basis of further 
extensive testing, these researchers concluded that 
prior to deliberating on a defendant's guilt or 
innocence, the average juror may understand only about 
half of the legal instructions presented by the judge. 
From this they concluded that many verdicts in criminal 
jury trials reflect misunderstandings of the juror's 
role in the process and of what the law required. 
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These data corroborate the subjective impressions of 
the judges and commentators. One Oregan trial judge 
states, for example,'When I read instructions to the 
jury, I hope that I will see a light go on in the 
juror's eyes, but I never do' (Severance, Green, and 
Loftus, 1984, 202). 
The authors of the previous quote have indeed undertaken quite 
sophisticated research on pattern instructions, on revised 
instructions and on super-simplified instructions. They 
illustrate quite convincingly that improvements in communication 
can be achieved through persistent and long term research. 
Certainly there Is a great need in this country to investigate 
the jury with the aim of improving its efficiency and its 
reliability and it is a source of some regret that juries have 
tended to be a closed shop to researchers. There Is no doubt in 
my mind that if the jury system Is to survive, it will have to be 
subjected to some form of empirical investigation and analysis. 
How else can improvements be made? Our humble efforts should be 
but a first step in that direction. 
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INSIDE THE JURY 
Meredith Wilkie 
Senior Legal Officer 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
INTRODUCTION 
It goes without saying that in New South Wales, as elsewhere in 
the common law world, getting inside a jury from the outside is 
impossible to do, at least legally, while the jury is 
deliberating and a difficult move to achieve even after the 
jury is discharged and the jurors lose their character as 
such. An interest in how juries actually work led British and 
American researchers either to film actual deliberations or to 
interview jurors afterwards in several projects in the 1960s 
and 1970s. In both the United States and the United Kingdom 
these practices were soon stopped in one way or another and new 
methods focus on the mock jury, which is, for many reasons, far 
inferior. 
In Australia we have always relied on former jurors 'speaking 
out' in one way or another. From time to time articles have 
appeared in journals or newspapers relating one juror's account 
of his or her experiences in an unidentified trial. More 
recently we have witnessed jurors giving such accounts to the 
media in identified and celebrated trials. These sorts of 
disclosures can highlight important problems in the jury system 
but they are hardly an accurate gauge of its overall 
operation. The New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
determined, early in 1985, on an empirical research programme 
to give it an overall picture of juries and jurors and the 
operation of the jury system. The full report of the results 
of that research will be published soon. In this paper I pose, 
and answer as well as I can, three questions. 
1. Who are the jurors? 
2. What assistance are they given? 
3. How do they feel about their task? 
METHODOLOGY 
Before addressing those questions I should briefly describe the 
Commission's research method. A number of surveys were 
conducted and these are described in turn. 
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Survey of Jury Roll Compilation 
The jury roll for each jury district is renewed at least every 
three years in New South Wales. 
During 1985 jury rolls were renewed for 49 districts. From 
those renewed during the second half of the year, the 
Commission chose to examine the process of compiling the rolls 
for Penrith (an outer metropolitan district), Newcastle (a 
large city) and Dubbo, Cessnock, Bathurst and Lithgow (country 
districts). 
These districts were chosen because together they represent a 
cross-section of New South Wales jury districts. In fact the 
rolls for Newcastle and Cessnock are compiled at the same time 
by the Sheriff and the Commission analysed the results together 
because of the small numbers in Cessnock. The same is true for 
Dubbo, Bathurst and Lithgow. 
The current electoral roll for each electoral subdivision 
within the jury district is stored on a computer. When a jury 
roll is being renewed, a computer is used to randomly select 
the requisite number of names to form 
a draft jury roll. 
All people selected for a draft jury roll are sent a 
"Notification of Inclusion on a Draft Jury Roll". This 
Notification requires the recipient to advise the Sheriff if he 
or she is disqualified or ineligible for jury service, or 
wishes to claim an exemption as of right. 
The first stage of our survey was designed to ascertain the 
numbers of people included on the draft roll who notified the 
Sheriff that they were disqualified, ineligible or exempt from 
jury service and the particular reasons for this. The 
collection of statistics on jury selection consisted of 
categorising notification sheets returned and counting the 
sheets in each category. Table 1 summarises the major findings 
of this survey. 
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Table 1 
Jury Roll Compilation 
Penrith Newcastle- Dubbo-
Cessnock Bathurst-
Lithgow 
n % n % n % 
Total 
Notifications 23605 20241 6608 
Total Returns 7044 7723 1861 
No longer 
qualified (1) 1384 19 .6 1551 20. 1 421 22 .6 
Disqualified (2) 276 3 .9 207 2. 7 52 2 .8 
Ineligible (3) 2164 30 .7 2450 31. 7 447 24 .0 
Exempt (4) 3145 44 .6 3432 44. 4 930 50 .0 
Unauthorised (5) 75 1 .1 83 1. 1 11 0 .6 
1. To qualify for jury service in New South Wales one must 
be resident in the jury district and qualified and 
enrolled to vote: Jury Act 1977 (NSW) ss5,12. The 
category of those no longer qualified includes those who 
are deceased, those who have moved out of the jury 
district and those whose Notifications were returned 
unclaimed. 
2. Schedule 1 to the Jury Act 1977 (NSW) disqualifies for 
different periods people who have been convicted of 
offences and given sentences of imprisonment, 
recognizance to be of good behaviour, probation or 
driver's licence disqualification. 
3. Schedule 2 to the Jury Act 1977 (NSW) lists 24 
categories of people who are ineligible to be jurors. 
They include primarily people involved in the 
administration of justice (and their spouses in some 
cases), the chief emergency services, and people with 
poor English or who are ill. 
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4. Schedule 3 to the Jury Act 1977 (NSW) lists 17 
categories of people entitled to claim an exemption from 
jury service. They may serve if they wish. Some 
professionals, the elderly and people having the care, 
custody and control of children are among those who are 
exempt as of right. 
5. Apart from considering whether a person is qualified to 
be a juror in terms of section 5 of the Jury Act 1977 
(NSW), the Sheriff has no discretion to delete people 
from the roll for reasons other than those listed in 
Schedules 1, 2 and 3. The unauthorised deletions 
recorded included: 
Jehovah's Witnesses and other conscientious 
objectors; 
past offenders no longer disqualified; 
people expressing general bias; and 
self-employed people. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Survey of Prospective Jurors 
Once the Sheriff has certified a jury roll, it will supply 
jurors for the district for up to three years. In response to 
an order from a judge or registrar of a court to summon a 
specified number of jurors for a trial (called a jury precept), 
the Sheriff, using a computer again, selects the required 
number at random from the appropriate current jury roll. Each 
person selected is issued with a Jury Summons through the post 
requiring his or her attendance at a specified place, date and 
time. People so summoned may apply to the Sheriff, personally 
or in writing, to be excused from jury duty on that particular 
occasion. Those who do attend in response to a summons are 
"prospective jurors" who form a jury panel (or panels) from 
which the jury is chosen in open court. 
The Commission surveyed prospective jurors by an anonymous and 
voluntary questionnaire administered when the prospective juror 
arrived at the court and before the empanelment procedure 
commenced. (Although in one case, the trial judge did not 
allow the 12 jurors empanelled for the trial to complete the 
questionnaire). The survey was conducted during two weeks in 
October 1985. All jury panels called on 21, 23, 28 and 30 
October were included and all criminal sittings of the District 
and Supreme Courts in New South Wales were included. 
Prospective jurors were summoned to 16 District Courts and one 
Supreme Court in New South Wales during the survey period. 
Returns were received from 15 District Courts and the one 
Supreme Court. The survey forms did not arrive in time to be 
distributed at one remote country District Court. 
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The questionnaire was designed to elicit three main types of 
information. Firstly, it collected demographic information. 
Secondly, data on the attitudes of prospective jurors to their 
jury service was collected. Thirdly, factual data on financial 
loss and the need of jurors for information was recorded. A 
total of 1779 people responded, a response rate of 98.5%. 
Survey of Jurors 
With the agreement of the presiding judge, jurors who had just 
completed their jury service in criminal trials in New South 
Wales commencing between 30 September and 13 December 1985 were 
invited to answer an anonymous six-page questionnaire. The 
questionnaire asked demographic questions identical to those 
asked by the Survey of Prospective Jurors. Jurors were also 
asked about some of the practices adopted during the trial on 
which they had served, whether they understood the proceedings, 
whether they were inconvenienced, their attitude to juries 
generally and their suggestions for improvements. A total of 
1834 jurors from 181 juries took part in this survey. Court 
administrators estimate that there were about 260 juries 
empanelled in the survey period. 
Survey of Court Procedures 
Judges' associates were asked to complete detailed information 
sheets on each criminal jury trial commenced in New South Wales 
between 30 September and 13 December 1985. The information 
sought can usefully be considered in four categories: 
* Details of the trial, including the location of 
the court, the length of the trial, the jury 
selection process, the provision of documents and 
other materials to the jury, the questions asked 
by the jury. 
* The accused, giving details with respect to each 
accused in each trial, namely sex, charge(s), use 
of peremptory challenges, and verdict(s). 
* Personal applications by prospective jurors to the 
judge to be excused from jury service: the sex of 
each applicant, the reason put forward and whether 
the application was successful. 
* The time taken, both as a total and as a 
proportion of the total length of each trial, on 
various stages including the Crown opening, any 
unsworn statement, jury absences and the jury's 
deliberations. 
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Of the estimated 260 criminal trials which commenced during the 
survey period, such a data sheet was completed and returned for 
197 or three-quarters of all trials. 
Survey of Judges 
The Commission also sought direct information from judges about 
their practices in criminal jury trials and their attitudes to 
a range of proposals for reform. Judges' attitudes to the 
abilities of juries in complex cases were also sought. This 
information was gathered by means of an anonymous questionnaire 
distributed to 60 New South Wales Supreme Court and District 
Court judges in July 1985. A total of 42 judges (two-thirds of 
those invited) completed the questionnaire. 
WHO SERVES ON JURIES? 
Research conducted in 1974-75 showed that an overwhelming 
majority (93.5%) of jurors in New South Wales were males and 
that the number of middle-aged jurors significantly exceeded 
the proportion in the general community. (NSW Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research, 1975). The government acted to 
introduce new juries legislation early in 1977 with one aim 
being to make juries more representative. 
When introducing the new Act the then Attorney General, the Hon 
Frank Walker QC MP, said: 
The jury system aims to provide the courts with a 
tribunal that is both impartial and representative of 
the ordinary citizen. 
He articulated the philosophy underlying the new Act to be: 
... that jury service, so far as is practicable, will be 
shared equally by all adult members of the community. 
(NSW Parliament, 1977, 4254). 
Is jury service now shared equally? Are jurors representative 
of the general community? 
Deletions 
In its Survey of Jury Roll Compilation the Commission found 
that up to 44% of people enrolled to vote and chosen for a 
draft jury roll are deleted before the jury roll is finalised, 
and that, because deletions continue to be made once the roll 
comes into operation, the roll is less than half its original 
size before it's very much older: Table 2. Around 20% of 
initial deletions are of people who are possibly qualified in 
general terms but who have moved from the district (or address) 
in which they are enrolled to vote. 
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Table 2 
Jury Roll History 
Jury District 
Sydney Penrith New- Dubbo Bath- Cess-
castle hurst nock 
Size of 
Draft Roll 202,541 21,477 18,931 2,953 1,994 801 
Notifications 
Returned 
Unclaimed 8,864 632 521 125 92 11 
Applications 
for Exemption 
Refused 
Date Roll 
Proclaimed 
Size of 
Final Roll 
% Deleted 
Before 
Proclamation 
Size of 
Roll at 
March '85 
Total % 
Excluded by 
March '85 
3,652 497 305 
Mar 84 Jun 82 Aug 82 
113,262 14,232 11,894 
44.1 33.7 37.2 
87,959 9,968 8,214 
56.6 53.6 56.6 
57 37 10 
Oct 82 Oct 82 Aug 82 
2,141 1,292 492 
27.5 35.2 38.6 
1,282 808 397 
56.6 59.5 50.4 
Over three-quarters of deletions are for reasons specified in 
the first three schedules to the Jury Act. The Commission's 
Survey of Jury Roll Compilation looked at which particular 
categories account for most deletions. Table 3 summarises the 
major findings for each of the three districts surveyed. 
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Table 3 
Deletions from the Jury Roll 
Category Penrith Newcastle Dubbo-
Cessnock Bathurst-
Lithgow 
n % n % n % 
People having the 
care custody and 
control of 
children under 
the age of 18 
People of or 
above the age 
of 65 
1658 23.5 909 
1031 14.6 2143 
11.8 272 14.6 
27.7 474 25.5 
People unable 
because of 
illness or 
infirmity to 
discharge the 
duties of a 
juror 1042 14.8 1900 24.6 312 16.8 
People unable 
to read or 
understand the 
English 
language 516 7.3 273 3.5 38 2.0 
Total 4246 60.3 5225 67.7 1096 58.9 
The first two categories are categories of exemption as of 
right. People in these categories may serve if they wish. The 
latter categories are categories of ineligibility. The four 
categories are, together with those no longer qualified, 
clearly the major reasons for deletions from final jury rolls, 
but to what extent do they affect the ultimate 
representativeness of jury panels (ie prospective jurors) and 
juries selected from them? 
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Representative 
The Commission's Surveys of Prospective Jurors and Jurors 
revealed that, on the whole, jury panels and juries are 
representative of the general community as derived from the 
latest available census data. (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 1984). Indices investigated were: 
age; 
sex; 
employment status; 
occupation; 
education; 
country of birth; 
length of residence; 
Aboriginality; and 
physical disability. 
The Surveys revealed that about one-half of both samples 
(prospective jurors and serving jurors) were women; all age 
groups were represented; all occupational groups, including the 
self-employed, were represented; all levels of educational 
achievement and all countries of origin were represented. 
Under-representation of some groups did become apparent, 
however. People aged 65 and over were seriously 
under-represented: Table 4. This is to be expected as such 
people may claim an exemption as of right. When aware of the 
extent of under-representation, however, the Commission 
recommended that the age at which people can claim the 
exemption should be increased from 65 to 70. (NSW Law Reform 
Commission, 1986, para 4.35). 
Young males (18-29) were under-represented, a cause for concern 
in light of the fact that 67% of people convicted by the higher 
criminal courts in New South Wales in 1983 were males under 
30. (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1983). Are young males 
the ones moving from district to district without changing 
their electoral affiliation? Are they failing to register to 
vote? Do they ignore the Jury Summons or put forward more and 
better excuses? 
The unemployed were also under-represented among both 
prospective and serving jurors. Again this is a serious matter 
because one-half of people convicted by the higher criminal 
* 
ft 
* 
* 
* 
ft 
ft 
ft 
ft 
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courts in New South Wales in 1983 had been unemployed at the 
time of committing the offence. (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 1983). 
Tradespeople and labourers are quite significantly 
under-represented, a factor, perhaps, of a degree of 
self-employment enabling these workers to satisfy the Sheriff 
of their need to be excused. Tradespeople may be a major 
proportion of people holding tertiary diplomas and 
certificates. 
I have included as a matter of interest the figures for 
Aborigines which do not appear to be significant. The total 
numbers themselves are very small. 
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Table 3 
Classes of People Under-represented 
in Jury Panels and Juries 
Class Population Prospective Jurors 
Jurors 
% n % n % 
65 + 14.6 51 3.0 36 2.0 
Males 18-29 28.7 199 22.4 211 23.6 
Unemployed in 
labour force 7.6 42 3.0 41 2.9 
Tradesmen, 
production-process 
workers, 
labourers 30.8 256 23.9 225 20.4 
Tertiary diploma 
or certificate, 
not university 23.8 274 16.0 332 18.9 
Born in 
continental 
Europe 9.2 121 6.8 114 6.2 
Aboriginal 0.5 8 0.4 7 0.4 
Disabled 11.5 76 4.3 70 3.8 
The sex composition of individual juries was investigated by 
our Survey of Court Procedures in which associates recorded the 
sex only of each juror. In the 197 trials surveyed there were 
no single-sex juries. One-quarter of the juries surveyed were 
constituted by seven males and five females. Well over 
one-half of the juries (113 of 197: 57%) were constituted 6:6 
or 5:7. 
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Table 3 
Composition of Juries Surveyed 
n % 
1 man 11 women 2 1.0 
2 men 10 women 1 0.5 
3 men 9 women 15 7.6 
4 men 8 women 21 10.7 
5 men 7 women 37 18.8 
6 men 6 women 28 14.2 
7 men 5 women 48 24.4 
7 men 4 women 2 1.0 
8 men 4 women 25 12.7 
9 men 3 women 7 3.6 
10 men 2 women 7 3.6 
11 men 1 women 2 1.0 
Not stated 2 1.0 
Total 197 100.0 
Although women were equally represented on juries, foremen 
tended to be males. There was a male foreman in 142 (79%) of 
the 180 trials for which the sex of the foreman was recorded. 
Jurors Excused by the Judge or Challenged 
Once a jury panel is finalised and present in court at the 
beginning of a trial, there are two ways in which the profile 
of the body of jurors compared to that of prospective jurors 
can be altered. These are: 
* personal applications by the individual prospective 
juror to the judge to be excused; and 
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* peremptory challenges exercised by Crown and defence 
counsel. 
The Survey of Court Procedure recorded some information about 
each of these. 
Personal Applications 
Applications to be excused may be directed to the Sheriff. The 
Sheriff has a discretion to excuse people who have been 
summoned on the basis of "good cause". He usually requires a 
statutory declaration. People who don't submit applications 
until the day of the trial (or whose applications are refused 
by the Sheriff) may make their applications directly to the 
presiding judge. Our sample of prospective jurors had yet to 
go through this procedure. 
In one of the trials we surveyed - one expected to be 
relatively lengthy - there were 61 applications to be excused. 
But generally the numbers were more modest with an average of 
four per trial in the trials where applications were recorded. 
We looked at a total of 633 applications and found the sex of 
applicants to be roughly evenly split between males and 
females. 87% of applications made were successful. The 
grounds most often put forward by applicants were: 
* employment difficulties; 
* ill-health; and 
being self-employed. 
194 
Table 3 
Personal Applications to be Excused 
Ground Male Female Successful 
n % n % % 
Employment 
difficulties 113 32.5 71 24.9 81.0 
Ill-health 32 9.2 57 20.0 97.8 
Self-employed 66 19.0 9 3.2 84.0 
Vacation or 
business trip 
planned 40 11.5 28 9.8 77.9 
Care of children 
or sick relative 10 2.9 47 16.5 98.2 
Personal crisis/ 
family event 17 4.9 17 6.0 100.0 
Inadequate 
English 15 4.3 17 6.0 93.8 
Exams 15 4.3 15 5.3 90.0 
Conscientious 
objection 6 1.7 2 0.7 87.5 
Other 34 9.8 22 7.7 76.8 
Total 348 100.0 285 100.0 86.7 
Peremptory Challenges 
In New South Wales each party has eight peremptory challenges 
in cases other than murder and 20 in the case of murder. The 
Crown does not have an unlimited right to stand by potential 
jurors as in some jurisdictions but does have eight (or 20) 
challenges for each accused person when more than one are 
charged together. All parties have unlimited challenges for 
cause in addition but these are rarely used. 
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Crown Prosecutors often assert, in arguing for retention of the 
Crown's right to challenge, that they use the Crown peremptory 
challenges to redress imbalances on a jury caused by defence 
challenges; to secure a representative jury. The Commission's 
Survey of Court Procedures revealed that the Crown did not 
challenge at all in one-third of the trials surveyed (72 of 197 
trials: 36%). In those trials in which the Crown did exercise 
challenges it averaged only three challenges per trial compared 
to a defence average of five. In 17 of the cases surveyed the 
Crown in fact made more challenges than the defence but, on the 
whole, the trend was for Crown challenges to be few and for the 
defence to utilize most or all challenges available. In over 
one-half of cases the Crown made only one or two challenges 
while in the same proportion of cases there were six to eight 
defence challenges per accused. 
Associates recorded the sex of each person challenged and it is 
interesting to note that defence challenges were quite evenly 
split between the sexes (561 (53%) men; 501 (47%) women) while 
the Crown tended to challenge a greater proportion of men (231 
(65%) men; 123 (35%) women). 
Effects on Demographic Profile 
There was considerably less difference between the two samples, 
prospective jurors and serving jurors, than between both 
samples and the population. Some of the more significant 
differences are listed in Table 7. 
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Table 3 
Differences in Demographic 
Profiles: Prospective Jurors and Serving Jurors 
Class Prospective Jurors 
Jurors 
n % n % 
65+ 51 3.0 36 2.0 
Part-time employees 176 10.1 155 8.6 
Self-employed 214 12.3 186 10.4 
Professional, technical 
and related workers 198 18.5 254 23.0 
Sales workers 134 12.5 112 10.2 
Primary school only 
or less than 3 years 
at high school 339 19.9 249 14.2 
HSC but no tertiary 
qualification 291 17.0 356 20.3 
The potential which eight challenges (20 for murder) permit a 
party to affect the representative nature of a jury caused the 
Commission to recommend that the number of peremptory 
challenges should be reduced to three only. (NSW Law Reform 
Commission, 1986, para 4.59). 
WHAT ASSISTANCE ARE JURORS GIVEN? 
American and British research on juries has given us some 
insight into the way they work and the effectiveness with which 
they cope with the manner in which evidence is traditionally 
adduced. Direct questioning of witnesses and counsel by jurors 
is generally forbidden, information is not presented 
chronologically but in a fragmentary manner, jurors are not 
encouraged to take their own notes (and are sometimes forbidden 
to do so) and do not have access to the transcripts of 
evidence. Criminal trials are "dominated by the dispute mode 
and persuasive argument" (Mungham and Bankowski, 1976, 213); 
they are dramas at which the jurors, until the very end, are 
merely the audience. Some argue that this mode of presentation 
requires juries to work irrationally. 
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... how, in the midst of the turmoil of the adversary 
mode, can any jury be expected to do its own work 
'efficiently'? (Mungham and Bankowski, 1976, 213). 
Much of the Commission's Discussion Paper The Jury in a 
Criminal Trial published in September 1985 was devoted to 
examining means by which the rationality of jury trials could 
be improved. Without detailing the proposals tentatively made 
in that Paper, there was an emphasis on improving communication 
between counsel, judges and jurors and on assisting jurors to 
take a more participatory role in trials without altering the 
existing balance of responsibilities and without overwhelming 
jurors. Thus the Commission suggested the provision of 
improved introductory information, in written form with the 
Jury Summons and in oral form by the judge at the beginning of 
the trial. Jurors should be enabled to take notes, the judge 
and counsel should avoid legalese, and so on. 
From our Surveys of Court Procedures and of Jurors we gathered 
some information about the conditions in which juries work and 
the material assistance they are given. What is most apparent 
is that there is little consistency among judges and counsel. 
In some ways, this is to be expected as judges have a very wide 
discretion in the details of jury trial procedure. 
Notes, Transcripts, Questions and Other Aids 
Only one-third (592 of 1834: 32%) of the jurors surveyed took 
notes during the trial. Of those who had not, over 40% (506 of 
1200: 42%) reported notes would have assisted them. Judges, 
however, do not always advise jurors of their right to take 
notes. Nine (21%) of the 42 surveyed never do so and another 
19 (45%) only do so sometimes. 
Judges objections included the danger of "a defective record of 
the evidence being made privately and with no notice of it to 
anyone". The Commission, on the other hand, was persuaded by 
the value of jurors taking their own notes and recommended that 
note-taking should be a statutory right. (NSW Law Reform 
Commission, 1986, para 6.20). 
About half of the jurors surveyed (853 of 1834: 47%) were on 
juries which asked questions of the judge. Our Survey of Court 
Procedures confirmed that about one-half of juries (88 of 197: 
45%) asked at least one question. About one-third of questions 
asked (64 of 202: 31%) were requests made by the jury during 
proceedings for additional evidence or clarification of 
evidence given. Another one-third (66 of 202:33%) were asked 
during deliberations and consisted of requests for directions 
of law to be repeated or for part of the transcript of evidence 
to be read. The high rate at which juries actually do 
participate in the trial by asking questions is surprising in 
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light of the fact that 40% of judges surveyed by the Commission 
reported that they never advise juries of their right to ask 
questions. The Commission recognised the usefulness of 
questions from the jury to or through the judge but did not go 
so far as to propose that jurors should be entitled to have 
their questions put and answered. With respect to questions it 
is clear that the judge should retain control. Nevertheless 
the Commission recommended that judges should advise juries of 
their right to propose questions. (NSW Law Reform Commission, 
1986, para 6.22). 
Of our 197 juries: 
* only 27 (14%) received a copy of the indictment or 
a written statement of the charge; 
* only 4 (2%) received any directions of law in 
writing; 
* only 1 (0.5%) received a copy of any part of the 
transcript (in that case the transcript of the 
dock statement); 
* only 7 (4%) benefited from counsels' use of visual 
aids ranging from a video film through a sketch 
plan of the scene to a magnifying glass; and 
* only 2 (1%) were taken on a view of the scene of 
the alleged offence. 
When jurors were asked whether having any of the above would 
have assisted them, over one-half (1076 of 1834: 59%) affirmed 
that a copy of the charges would have helped and about the same 
proportion (1104 of 1834: 60%) would have liked a written 
statement of what the Crown had to prove. One juror stated the 
jury should have been provided with a statement of the "exact 
nature of the offence" to assist in determining the relevance 
of the evidence. 
One-half (969 of 1834: 53%) of jurors would have liked a copy 
of the judge's summing-up or part of it and about one-half (880 
of 1834: 48%) reported they would have been assisted by a list 
of the available verdicts. 
Two-thirds (820 of 1221: 67%) of jurors answering this question 
felt they would have been assisted by a copy of all or part of 
the transcript of evidence and nine juries had in fact 
requested a copy of the transcript. Nearly one-fifth (57 of 
316: 18%) of suggestions made by jurors for improving jury 
trials related to the availability of transcripts and the 
provision of other written materials. One juror commented "The 
jury was surprised that a transcript was not available." 
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Another suggested that a video film of the proceedings should 
be available in the jury room because "early events tend to 
become clouded" as the trial proceeds. 
Other suggestions included one juror's plea for "explanation/ 
simplification of technical evidence" and another's for "a 
complete guide [as to the role of the jury] [which] would 
assist us in not trying to assimilate irrelevant evidence or 
answers to questions". One juror proposed that jurors should 
be able to question witnesses directly to obtain extra evidence 
or clarification. 
These results raise a difficult issue, namely, whether jurors 
should be provided with more information and assistance and, if 
so, what form it should take. The traditional reluctance to 
provide much in the way of written material may no longer be 
soundly based. Yet, in the absence of solid research on the 
uses and abuses of such materials, judges are in the best 
position to assess their impact. The decisions of some very 
few judges to provide written statements setting out the charge 
and/or written directions of law suggest the value of such 
assistance is being gradually accepted. 
Summing-up 
From what we know of judicial practice, judges do not detail 
how a jury should deliberate or reach a verdict. Not all 
explain about the election of a foreman or that the verdict 
must be unanimous. Several jurors commented that clear 
guidelines on these matters should have been provided. 
When the jury leaves the court room to decide the 
verdict a printed list of instruction should be 
mandatory stating the format of how the case should be 
discussed and the decision reached. 
In spite of such difficulties, the vast majority of jurors 
(95%) felt they had been assisted by the judge's summing-up to 
understand the case. 
HOW DO JURORS FEEL ABOUT THEIR TASK? 
80% (1439 of 1779) of prospective jurors surveyed by the 
Commission had never served on a jury before. To try and gauge 
how prospective jurors were feeling upon their arrival at 
court, our questionnaire asked whether they minded attending, 
would have liked more information, suffered financial loss or 
personal inconvenience or would like to have been exempted. 
One-fifth (315 of 1779: 18%) of prospective jurors objected to 
attending. Self-employed and unemployed people minded most: 
31% and 28% respectively of prospective jurors in these 
categories did mind. 
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One-quarter of prospective jurors who were self-employed (25%) 
believed they should have been exempted because of their 
responsibilities. One-quarter (25%) of students responding 
also felt they should have been exempt. 
Almost one-third of prospective jurors (514 of 1779: 29%) 
claimed to have suffered financial loss as a result of simply 
attending in response to a Jury Summons. Men who were 
self-employed or employed part-time were by far the most likely 
to suffer in this way: 79% and 74% respectively of prospective 
jurors in these categories reported loss. One-fifth (399 of 
1779: 22%) of prospective jurors identified other personal 
problems or inconvenience in attending court. Problems related 
to work were the most often cited (207 of 411: 50%). Others 
included child care (11%), transport difficulties (13%), sick 
relatives (7%) and other personal problems including own health 
(20%). 
Given the opportunity to suggest what further information could 
have been provided, only 13% (229 of 1779) of prospective 
jurors answered that they would have liked more and slightly 
fewer (208 of 1779:12%) actually made one or more suggestions. 
Many of those suggestions (80 of 232: 34%) were for the 
provision of general information about car-parking, overnight 
stays, a contact number and other general operations of the 
system. Another large group of suggestions was for information 
about court procedure and the role and functions of juries (88 
of 232: 38%). 
Serving jurors, on their much longer questionnaire, had a 
greater opportunity to comment on their feelings at the 
commencement of the trial. One stated: 
It should be realised that jurors are mostly unfamiliar 
with the formalities of the courtroom and could be 
awestruck by the scene. 
Another suggested: 
Pamphlets or booklets should be provided as to the 
events that will occur when getting to court as little 
is known beforehand of what to do which unnecessarily 
creates nerves for many jurors. 
15% (276 of 1834) of jurors made at least one suggestion for 
improving the information provided before coming to court. 
They agreed with prospective jurors in nominating the role, 
rights and duties of jurors (91 of 339 suggestions: 27%), court 
procedures (65: 19%) and general information on practical 
issues (61: 18%) as the subjects on which more information is 
most needed. 
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Most prospective jurors, however, did not feel too much 
trepidation (or at least did not admit to any). 70% (1250 of 
1779) actually believed they were going to benefit from the 
experience. 
The average length of the trials surveyed by the Commission was 
three days. One-half lasted a mere 2 days. This is not really 
enough time to become familiar with procedures and proprieties. 
Jurors who, in that time, begin to feel confident enough to 
assert themselves in the courtroom and to court personnel would 
be few and far between. Yet jurors did make some complaints 
about their working conditions. 
One-fifth (392 of 1834: 21%) of respondents made at least one 
suggestion for the improvement of juror's working conditions. 
Refreshments were the subject of most complaints (129 of a 
total of 515 suggestions: 25%). Other jury room conditions 
were also strongly criticised (eg the lack of air-conditioning) 
(127: 25%) as was the seating in the jury box itself (112: 22%). 
Apart from irritations of this kind, it is clear that jury 
duty, even for a short period, is an interruption to one's 
daily life. Some may welcome it; others accept it. Some may 
be quite seriously affected. 
Jurors who had completed their service were asked about 
financial loss and personal inconvenience. One-fifth of jurors 
(411 of 1834: 22%) reported suffering financial loss. Over 
one-half of these jurors (243 of 411: 59%) reported losses 
between $50 and $500 and most loss was work-related. 
Only 16% (301 of 1834) of jurors said they experienced some 
other personal problems or inconvenience. Work-related 
problems again accounted for the bulk of problems (131 of 333: 
39%). Jurors were also affected by the other problems worrying 
prospective jurors: child care, stress, transport difficulties 
and so on. 
In spite of the problems expressed, 90% of jurors surveyed 
(1646 of 1834) had not minded serving. Of those who gave their 
reasons, one-third had found the experience informative and 
educational (342 of 1025: 33%) and one-third expressed the view 
that it was interesting and worthwhile (320 of 1025: 31%). 
Over one-third (370 of 1025: 36%) also stressed that jury 
service is a civic duty or a service to the community. 
Those who did mind serving (136 of 1834: 7%) gave reasons 
including the difficulty of judging the question of guilt and 
emotional stress. 
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CONCLUSION 
Compared to prospective jurors, who tended to be a bit luke 
warm on the advantages of the jury system (66% believed the 
community would benefit), 94% of jurors surveyed agreed that 
juries should be retained for criminal trials. 224 (13%)of 
those jurors had changed their minds on the subject as a result 
of their experience. Only 28 respondents (1% of 1834) had come 
to the view that juries should be abandoned as a result of 
their own experience. 
Jurors were invited to make suggestions for improving jury 
trials and 15% (280 of 1834) did so. Forty-one jurors (2%) 
advocated the introduction of majority verdicts. One juror 
commented: 
I found that a unanimous decision is sometimes very 
difficult and frustrating and led to some very bad 
feelings among the jurors. Especially when it was 11 
for, 1 against. 
Another also commented on the amount of pressure on the jury 
when unanimity is required and stated: 
I feel it should be a majority verdict say 9-3. I feel 
that there should be three options - guilty, not guilty 
or not proven. 
Other changes proposed included the reduction in the size of 
the jury in more minor charges, the use of professional (ie 
full-time) jurors and the screening of jurors "to weed out 
non-interest or low intelligence". Others criticised 
interruptions, repetition and waiting time, seeking a reduction 
in delays and there was also a range of suggestions to the 
effect that the prosecution should get its act together. 
Suggestions and complaints of this kind, together with other 
comments jurors made combine to give a strong impression of a 
group of people who are, on the whole, careful, serious and 
responsible about their task. The majority of prospective 
jurors seem to have been confident and the majority of jurors 
seem to have been satisfied by their performance. The factual 
information on the actual assistance given, however, leaves a 
nagging doubt as to whether these people, strangers to the 
system on whom so much depends, are really given the 
consideration they not only deserve but which they actually 
need to do their job well. 
* I wish to acknowledge the work done on the Commission's 
empirical research programme by Ms Concetta Rizzo, 
consultant statistician. Ms Rizzo directed the project 
and is co-author of the Commission's Report on the 
results of the research. 
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JURORS' REMINISCENCES 
Mr Dennis Challinger 
Assistant Director, (Information & Training) 
Australian Institute of Criminology 
THE EXPERIENCE OF PAST JURORS 
Those members of the public who do serve on juries provide a 
source of information about the jury system that should not be 
ignored. In order to tap that information source, the Institute 
recently used modest advertising, newspaper and radio interviews 
to attract past jurors to reminisce with us about their jury 
service. In the event some two dozen past jurors contacted the 
Institute and their comments covered a range of issues most of 
which have been canvassed in public sources or the academic 
literature. 
Plainly the views of this small sample of jurors cannot in anyway 
be seen as representative of all Australian jurors, but their 
comments are nevertheless real comments from real jurors about 
their real experiences. As such they are worth serious 
consideration especially in the light of contemplating change to 
our existing jury system. 
Why is it that more use is not made of these experiences in 
considering change? Generally disclosure of what happens in the 
jury room is seen to threaten the doctrine of jury secrecy. But 
implicit in that is a strong notion that unanimous verdicts may 
not be quite what many would hope them to be. But, if nothing is 
allowed to become known about the real behaviour of jurors then 
little can be done to improve the operation of the jury (if 
that is shown to be necessary). 
The little of what is known about deliberations in the jury room 
generally emerges from public statements by jurors from notable 
trials such as the Murphy, Maher and Chamberlain trials in 
Australia, and the Jeremy Thorpe trial in England. In the last 
instance, action for contempt of court was taken by the Attorney 
General against the publishers of New Statesman the journal in 
which a juror's recollections were published. But that article 
was more critical of the presentation of the crown case than it 
was fatal to the notion of jury solidarity. In fact the juror's 
remarks about jury dynamics tend to have much in common with 
Australian jurors' remarks that were collected for this paper. 
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JOINING A JURY 
While it sounds slightly dramatic, being taken from the street 
and plunged into legal theatre is itself a difficulty faced by 
many jurors. It commences with jury selection which can 
compromise an episode of some strain. One juror who had 
actually been challenged on three separate occasions said he 
felt exceedingly embarrassed by the procedure. And a female 
potential juror who was challenged twice recently, while not 
as threatened by the procedure, ventured that it was plain 
the defence was aiming for 'an all-male working class jury' 
for their client charged with rape. This, in her mind causes the 
whole representativeness of juries to be quite suspect, and 
she argues for fewer challenges to be allowed. 
After a jury is selected there is further confusion in the minds 
of some jurors. One put it quite elegantly: 
... the whole experience of attending court and the 
several tense hours [sic] during the jury selection 
process is daunting. Most us by the time the trial begins 
are feeling 'numb with shock' but there is no time for 
recovery. None of the assembled court are introduced. 
This juror suggests as a solution to this problem, 'a break in 
proceedings immediately after empanelling to allow [the jury] to 
mentally adjust to their new role. The subconscious preoccupation 
with what is going one in the courtroom is distracting and makes 
concentration at this crucial time difficult'. 
At or around this time it seems the jury could be acquainted with 
courtroom procedure and personnel, and could have the legal 
facts of the particular case explained. This is important as 
several jurors indicated they were not clear what facts 
they were going to need to consider and what their options 
were. For instance one juror in a murder trial related how 
most of the jury were under the misapprehension for some 
time that only a guilty or not guilty for murder was the 
charge [sic] and that manslaughter could not be 
considered. It may have been clearly spelled out (in the 
court's view) early in the trial, but we did not take it 
in properly. 
Indeed a number of jurors indicated that they had difficulty with 
legal arguments and explanations. One bemoaned 'the lawyers 
didn't explain ... we needed it in English'. And ex-juror 
Callinan (1984, 166) remarks on 'the confusion which the law can 
create for people by the intricacies of its rules'. Obviously it 
is the responsibility of participating barristers to ensure their 
point of view is appreciated by the jury; it appears that in a 
number of cases at the moment this does not occur. 
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The fact that there is often a large amount of material to be 
considered, exacerbates the problem of not understanding legal 
niceties. As Du Cann puts it: 'In every trial thousands of words 
are poured into the jury's ears. The amount they carry into the 
jury room with them when they retire can only be a minute 
fraction of the whole.' (Du Cann, 1980, 135) Several jurors in 
this sample commented on this, one saying that after the judge's 
summing up her head was 'reeling'. 
A further task that could occurduring this suggested break 
in proceedings is the selection of jury foreman. An A.C.T. juror, 
who was reported in the Canberra Times related how 'the system of 
electing a foreman had been rather strained' (Campbell 1984) and 
in the Institute's current sample a juror said 'the last bloke 
selected sat in the foreman's chair so he was picked'. Another 
said: 
We were herded into a tiny airless claustrophobic jury 
room to have morning tea and to elect the foreman - in 
approximately 20 minutes! We had absolutely no knowledge 
of each other and in our numbed mental state, we took a 
cavalier approach to choosing our foreman. We did not 
realise at this stage how important this role was to 
become. 
As the jury is meant to operate as a decision-making group it 
does seem that all should be done to make that a more likely 
event. The assistance and briefing period suggested above could 
well enable positive interaction amongst jurors which would 
help them develop the group feeling which is essential to their 
task. 
PRESSURE ON THE JURY 
The consistent psychological and emotional pressure on members of 
the jury was often mentioned by jurors in the sample. In some 
instances the pressure was exacerbated by personality 
considerations: 'Emotionally I shouldn't have been there - I 
couldn't sleep for weeks' said one. In another instance 
additional pressure was environmental. A countrytown juror 
pointed out that 'everyone' in the town knew the defendant and 
the members of the jury, and a finding of guilt was highly likely 
to lead to future uncomfortable scenes in public places when the 
defendant's family or friends encountered jury members. This 
fact, he said, explained why many residents of country towns 
dreaded being selected on a jury. 
These aside, the common pressure faced by all juries results as a 
consequence of being placed in a confined situation to make an 
important decision with major impact on the lives of other 
people. One feature of this pressure is that it is continuous, 
there is no escape from it because as one juror said 'You're 
bunched together all the time and can't talk about (the trial) at 
home'. 
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This last point is another important aspect of the pressure. 
As the American psychiatrist Kaplan puts it 'one of the 
jurors' biggest problems is the absence of their usual support 
systems', which he suggested leads the jurors to grow close to 
each other 'cut off from their usual friends and family' (Kaplan, 
1985, 52). 
This increasing juror solidarity was not usually mentioned by 
jurors in this sample, but some did indicate that they had had 
some post-trial contact with other jurors. 
Others spoke of the relief that followed after the trial when 
they were able to finally talk with their close ones about the 
experience they had been through. One female juror related how, 
after the verdict, she had stayed up till 4a.m. the next morning 
describing the trial to her family. 
It is not surprising that many jurors started to show physical 
symptoms of stress. One admitted she 'didn't want to eat lunch or 
tea or breakfast' as she was too tense. Another juror described 
the 'pill popping' of a fellow juror who was 'finding it hard'. 
These do not concur fully with Kaplan's comment that 'most 
[jurors] suffered intense physiological symptoms during the 
trial' (Kaplan, 1985, 51), but it is plain that the stress of 
being on a jury is severe for some people. 
There is no doubt that the pressure on the jury during 
deliberation is even greater than that during the trial, so there 
is a strong argument for positive post-trial consideration to be 
given to jurors. (One juror did mention some negative post-trial 
attention from police officers 'who were plainly disgusted with 
the acquittal and were really staring at us'.) 
Kaplan (1985) found post-traumatic stress disorder present 
amongst jurors from a capital trial in America, and that led him 
to talk of post-trial counselling for jurors. But there are 
probably less dramatic ways in which recently discharged jurors 
might receive some relief from accumulated tension. 
One was suggested by a juror who indicated that his jury had 
'felt really involved in their task', had deliberated for almost 
ten hours and reached a unanimous guilty verdict (after starting 
8-4). 'We had', he said, 'a deep and emotional involvement in the 
case, yet were simply sent home after announcing our verdict 
while the defendant was remanded in custody'. The juror claimed 
that this left the jurors 'up in the air' but he at least 
terminated his emotional involvement by contacting the court 
later and learning the consequences of his decision: the sentence 
of the offender. This simple action would appear to have the 
effect of tidying up an important and stressful episode in a 
juror's life. A letter from the court expressing thanks and 
acquainting a juror with the result of the trial seems little 
enough to do. 
209 
JURY DELIBERATION 
Anyone who has been a member of a committee knows the rigors of 
small group decision-making. But at least committee members have 
grouped together for a common purpose or interest. The jury 
is a (theoretically) random group of people brought together 
under some compulsion, so it is unsurprising that their group 
decision-making is often strained. 
One juror said that his jury had found the trial not particularly 
stressful but that 'when it actually came to making decisions the 
whole atmosphere changed', and initial discussion was 'slow and 
heavy'. Several other jurors commented on final deliberations in 
the jury room. It was 'like fighting with the family'. It was 
'nasty, people got very angry and we all said things we regretted 
later'. 
And, 'I abused hell out of him', he being the one juror 
maintaining a guilty verdict after six hours without his 
discussing or arguing the merits of the case. This is of course 
not an isolated instance. In the celebrated Thorpe casein England 
the bulk of the two days of jury deliberation was spent trying 
'to persuade a single juror, who held out for conviction, to 
accept the view of the other eleven' (Chippindale and Leigh, 
1979, 120). 
Callinan (1984, 167) suggests that 'the fact that jury decision 
making is a group process raises the question of whether minimum 
social skills should be required of a juror in major trials'. But 
just having such skills may not be that helpful. One juror 
indicated that discussion in her jury room was hampered by the 
difficulties faced by a couple of 'businessmen' who were not used 
to having to justify their decisions, especially 'not to women'. 
This last point receives mention in newspaper reports of 
interviews with Australian jurors which read: 
Three women (the fourth, a housewife, abstained from most 
discussion because she was not confident about expressing 
herself) were reduced to tears on a number of occasions 
because they tended to be shouted down by the men (Loane, 
1985, 22), 
and 
A couple of the girls were particularly concerned about 
being put down by the fellas. And a couple of the blokes, 
at different times, tried to put them down (Campbell, 
1984). 
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A similar view was given by a female juror In this sample. She 
wrote: 
Not all jurors were given the opportunity to adequately 
express their concerns or raise queries. This was 
particularly true of the women jurors. 
This last comment is plainly a criticism of the foreman. But as 
that person is selected withoutany great thought as to their 
duties, and, as those duties in any event are not specified, this 
is not altogether surprising. The obvious solution is for those 
who act as foremen of a jury to receive quite precise 
instructions regarding their role. Further, because the foreman 
may also have no great grasp of the legal points involved in 
coming to a verdict, and may therefore not be able to lead the 
discussions, it is not surprising that jurors in this sample 
described their decision making in the following sorts of ways. 
'People didn't make decisions on the evidence', 'I personally 
felt unable to make a decision', 'to get twelve people to agree 
is too hard', and 'the sole person who thought he was guilty 
could only keep replying "but I feel he did it".' 
This last commentreflects the first of a number of approaches to 
reaching a verdict all of which ignore the legal arguments. 
It involves the personal perspective of the juror. Loane's 
(1985) juror believed that his jury's decision was reached 
according to 'the juror's own personal prejudices' as there had 
been little attempt 'to logically sift through the evidence 
because of its sheer bulk' (Loan, 1985, 22). 
Illustrations of these personal perspectives were given by jurors 
in this sample. They Include the 'two jurors who just didn't want 
to be there',one who was described as 'irrational' and thought 
'whateverthe police said was rubbish', another who believed 'he 
[the defendant] wouldn't be there if he hadn't done it', and one 
who 'either misunderstood or refused to accept the task of the 
jury' at the commencement of deliberations, and who after 
pressure from the others announced that 'the law stinks' and 
'even if the defendant was guilty under the law he refused to 
find him guilty'. 
Jurors whose decisisons are most affected by what might be called 
expedient considerations comprise another group of some 
concern. They are ready to reach any decision or compromise in 
order to bring their jury service to an end. A distinction 
needs to be drawn between those who adopt this view from the 
commencement of deliberations (those who 'just want to get 
home') and those who finally compromise after some period of 
deliberation responding to the pressure from the rest of the 
jury to bring matters to an end. 
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This last scenario was apparently enacted in the Maher trial 
causing an editorial in the Melbourne Age to ask 'what sort of 
justice is this where verdicts are negotiated between jurors so 
they can escape from the jury room?' (Age, 1 November 1985). 
Explanations or interpretations of the offence also 
frequently played a major role during deliberations. Members of 
the jury on which Callinan served developed 'fantastical 
[sic] scenarios in the style of a soap opera' or 'most 
outrageous conclusions' about the relationship between the 
accused and the rape victim (Callinan, 1984, 167). And jurors 
in this sample, indicated how their fellows sometimes behaved in 
this way. One explained how a couple of men on the jury could not 
believe the defendant's behaviour (under circumstances of 
considerable threat) indicating that real men would simply not 
behave in that way so none of his evidence could be trusted. 
Another juror identified with the young defendant and decided 
because her son 'wouldn't do such a thing' nor could he have. And 
another interpreted the behaviour of the victim as unlikely, 
helping to make a case for the defendant. 
Consideration of the consequences of a decision was plainly 
important to many jurors. The following comments made by jurors 
illustrate this point. 'I felt it would be awful for her to go to 
gaol if she really wasn't guilty', 'there's no point putting 
the man in prison, it won't bring the girl back', and 'look 
what we're putting him through, hasn't he paid enough?' 
The personal situation or characteristics of the defendant 
appeared to affect some jurors' decision-making quite 
considerably. One female juror said 'Deep in my heart I knew he 
was guilty but he turned up with his pregnant wife and kids in 
court ... I just couldn't convict'. At the other end of 
the spectrum the foreman of one jury is alleged to have 
said that the defendant 'looks a wrong'un' and advanced 
that as his important consideration in reaching a verdict. 
POINTING THE JURY IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
Nobody would suggest that the particular idiosyncrasies of 
individual jurors should somehow be repressed as it is the 
balance of prejudices represented on the jury that help 
make it impartial. However, these idiosyncrasies should not have 
a greater influence on the verdict than the evidence and 
legal considerations. In order to assist achieve this end a 
couple of moves could be undertaken. 
The first is a response to the problem of information overload. 
An obvious way to tackle this is to allow, or even encourage, 
jurors to take notes. In a modest study Flango (1980) 
found that jurors would generally take notes if allowed to, 
and note-takers generally found cases less difficult to 
understand. 
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One juror in the current sample recalled how he took notes 
that were actually used to settle disputes in the jury room 
later. Another wished that she had taken notes as others in 
her jury had done as they were most useful at the deliberation 
stage. 
A Canberra juror whose experiences were published in the 
press makes this point: 'we found note taking very valuable 
later although we didn't realise it at the time' (Campbell, 
1984) 
The secondmove Is to provide specific directions to the jury to 
enable them to thread their way through the legal material to 
reach the correct decision. The innovative jury instruction 
described by Taylor et al. , (1980) Involves preparation of a 
series of questions which the jury has to consider in order to 
decide the component parts of the legal definition of the alleged 
crime. These questions are read to the jury by the judge, and 
presented to them in written form for their deliberation. Based 
on the consideration of the difficulties of small group decision 
making, these 'process instructions' would plainly overcome 
problems suggested by jurors in this survey as having troubled 
them? 
A POSITIVE EXPERIENCE 
The foregoing might give the impression that all jurors found 
their jury service a particularly unpleasant experience that they 
would rather forget. But this is not the case. Despite the 
difficulties canvassed above, many jurors found the experience a 
positive one. Kaplan (1985 makes this point. He says: 
'just being able to make it through so much stress was 
meaningful to one juror; another who had always distanced 
himself from people found that he could be accepted 
when he was forced to be with others during 
sequestration. He said that he was now getting along 
better with people socially and at work. 
But the fact that some jurors 'enjoyed' the experience, and are 
more than willing to act on a jury again should not be allowed 
to detract from those who found jury service a real agony. What 
is necessary is the introduction of changes such as those 
suggested here, to make jury service, a non-negative experience 
and a civic duty happily undertaken by all. 
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I I 
PRESENTING SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION IN COURT 
Dr Hilton J. Kobus 
Forensic Science Centre 
Adelaide S.A. 
INTRODUCTION 
Forensic science is defined in the Oxford dictionary as that 
branch of science which applies the principles and methods of 
science to the elucidation of legal problems. Scientists from any 
discipline can become involved in legally disputed matters where 
their particular expertise is appropriate to the problem in 
question. 
However, because there is a continual need for scientific 
assistance in criminal investigation, specialised forensic 
science laboratories have become established. There is a growing 
number of scientists who have applied their skills and knowledge 
to this area. Techniques and methods have been developed that are 
applicable to the materials and types of samples encountered in 
criminal investigation, and the scientists have developed 
experience invaluable in this type of work. Thus, forensic 
science can now be regarded as a profession. 
The objectives of forensic science examinations can be summarised 
as follows: 
(i) To identify unknown materials involved in criminal 
matters. 
(ii) To determine, if possible, the manner in which a crime was 
committed. 
(iii) To associate or eliminate a suspect with a crime scene. 
(iv) To produce scientific evidence as a result of examinations 
performed for presentation to the courts. 
INTERPRETATION OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION 
The production of evidence is clearly the important end product 
of any scientific work performed. In criminal proceedings this 
will result in a jury having to consider scientific information 
in coming to a final decision. 
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The juries are composed of people who may have very little 
scientific background, and it is grossly unfair to expect them to 
make scientific decisions. This, therefore, places great 
responsibility on the scientific witness to make clear and honest 
interpretations on the scientific results he or she has 
obtained. It is central to the presentation of scientific 
evidence to a jury that the meaning of the scientific evidence is 
explained. 
Fortunately, in most cases, the scientific evidence is easily 
interpreted and understood. "Hie simplest examples are where a 
suspect substance such as an illicit drug powder can be 
positively identified or a fingerprint matched with a suspect. 
The presentation of such evidence should present no problem for 
any jury. 
However, it is in cases where associative evidence is presented 
that interpretation can be difficult. The presence of a 
bloodstain on a suspect's clothing, textile fibres on a murder 
weapon, or paint flakes or glass on the clothing of a hit-run 
accident victim all need to be interpreted so that the jury can 
arrive at a correct decision. Also of vital importance at this 
stage is that the jury and the court are confident that the 
appropriate scientific tests have been correctly performed. For 
example, the presence of paint and glass on a hit-run victim that 
matches a suspect car as well as blood and clothing fibres on the 
car that match the victim, would be considered very strong 
associative evidence, while the presence of fibres only on the 
car would not be as meaningful. 
It is the experience and credibility of the scientific witness 
that is the important factor in explaining the evidence to the 
jury. 
SCIENCE AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
Unfortunately, science and the adversary system do not live 
together easily, and it is this factor more than any other that 
produces problems for the jury when scientific evidence is 
questioned. 
A factor that contributes to this problem is that forensic 
science laboratories are seen as arms of the prosecution for two 
reasons: 
(i) All criminal investigation is associated with the police 
initially and it is logical that forensic science 
laboratories have a close liaison with police forces. 
(ii) Forensic science laboratories are funded by the state and 
its employees are therefore public servants. 
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Creating doubt about scientific evidence is sufficient in a 
cross-examination process, and establishing the scientific truth 
may not be in the best interests of winning a case. This is 
completely foreign to the practice of science. It is vital that 
the scientific evidence is evidence for the court and not 
specifically for prosecution or defence. 
A scientific problem left unsolved leaves questions unanswered, 
the jury confused, and the court misinformed. Although this 
approach may achieve a desired goal, the best interests of 
justice are not served. Unfortunately, there is no shortage of 
scientific 'Perry Masons' who see the witness box as a forum for 
projecting their own egos often based on a shaky scientific 
foundation. 
A WORKABLE APPROACH TO FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE 
The following factors are important in providing a satisfactory 
forensic science service to the courts: 
(i) A service independent of police and prosecution and also 
available to the defence. 
(ii) A laboratory staffed by competent and well qualified 
scientists. 
(iii) A laboratory which encourages and maintains its contacts 
with the scientific community at large. 
This, I believe, is the direction the Forensic Science Division 
in Adelaide is proceeding. 
Such a completely open system would allow defence lawyers to 
discuss the scientific evidence with the scientist, if necessary 
in the company of their own independent scientist. Any 
difficulties can be resolved, further relevant examinations be 
requested, and the need for detailed scientific debate in the 
courts eliminated. The present plight of forensic science in 
Australia is as much due to the poor way it has been used by 
lawyers as it is due to deficiencies in the system. 
Thus, an adjustment to the adversary system in the way it handles 
scientific evidence would be necessary. A trust in the results 
and opinions produced by the forensic laboratory would be 
developed and the scientific evidence will be genuinely seen as 
impartial. 

EXPERT EVIDENCE AND THE ULTIMATE QUESTION 
Dr Ben Selinger 
Reader in Physical Chemistry 
Chemistry Department, The Faculties 
Australian National University 
INTRODUCTION 
In the process of doing the research, scientists work on the basis 
of a particular idea (or hypothesis) and spend most of their 
energy gathering information and results to support that idea. In 
practice, you cannot do research except on the basis of some 
explicit or implicit theory. Consider how 'discovery' of 
penicillin by Flemming was useless because he could not cope 
with the result. He had no theory. It took twenty years before 
Florey (with an idea) was able to do the productive experiments. 
However, when this research work is publicly presented (at a 
seminar or as a published piece of work), it is assessed on the 
basis as to how well all reasonable alternatives have been rejected. 
The set of alternatives is generally infinite and so 'reasonable' 
is a social decision of the scientific community, dependent on the 
state of knowledge at the time, the importance of the work, and 
the perceived consequences of the decisions based on the results. 
Except in a few limited areas (axiomatic mathematics, lo^ic etc.), 
proof is a default option. It is not always seen that way, and in 
fact in the 'harder' sciences (physics and chemistry), students 
are not taught properly in the logic of their subject. 
Forensic science is no different. The police have to have some 
theory of the crime in order to collect evidence. The forensic 
laboratories have to be told what the police are trying to estab-
lish in order to devise an appropriate testing regime etc. 
However, when the results are 'published' in court, the full 
inference system of rejecting alternatives at each stage must have 
been previously done and then properly demonstrated in court. 
Scientific analysis procedures may fail to provide the correct 
answer for a variety of reasons. The failure can occur at 
different stages. The aim of an inference chart is to break up 
the analysis procedure into logical stages and ensure that each 
stage is tested sequentially. Because forensic evidence covers 
such wide fields and conditions of samples vary greatly, the 
standardization of methodology will be a difficult and long 
process. On occasions, use will need to be made of the scientific 
equivalent to the legal term 'reasonable', namely Good Laboratory 
Practice (GLP). Nevertheless, the more the procedures are classi-
fied and opened to inspection, the greater will be confidence in 
the results and the more concentrated will be the examination on 
the relevant and weakest areas. 
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A study of court cases which have resulted in prolonged and expen-
sive controversy has shown that the point of weakness is the fact 
that reasonable alternatives had not been rejected (Selinger, 1984). 
AIM 
The final outcome of this proposal is to provide an inference 
scheme attached to a set of standard procedures to be produced 
under the auspices of the Standards Association of Australia, 
which will focus the examination and cross-examination of scien-
tific evidence on the critical relevant points so that the jury 
and judge can see clearly what is in dispute and why it is in 
dispute. 
A spin-off from the need to standardise procedures will be to 
raise competence of professional expert evidence. The proposal 
does not exclude evidence outside the range standardised (and so 
does not have the limitations of the Frye Test used in the US 
courts when testing the admissability of scientific evidence 
judged on whether the techniques are acceptable to "the appro-
priate scientific community") but encourages the use of standard 
methods (because the question as to why they were not used must 
then be answered). It also discourages the use of private, or in-
house methodology (and associated attempts to keep such metho-
dology secret For example, it can be very difficult for a defence 
expert witness to obtain a copy of the recommended procedures to 
be used for a Breathalyser or a copy of the relevant training 
manual). 
A major consequence will be that much shonky expert evidence will 
not reach the courts. Time will be saved and confusion minimised. 
WHERE EXPERTISE ENDS AND THE JURY BEGINS 
A classic example where failure to separate out a scientific 
procedure from legal evaluation occurred in the Royal Commission 
on Agent Orange. As far as can be ascertained from the evidence, 
the scientific statistical results were competently obtained but 
their presentation in the traditional manner meant that the 
experts decided 'on the ultimate issue'. The function of the 
Commission was usurped. In my view, the task of the statistical 
expert was to take data that indicates that a series of diseases 
or abnormalities in offspring occurs at a higher rate in exposed 
veterans' families compared to unexposed controls, and to calcu-
late the odds that this has not happened by chance alone. 
However, the experts go beyond this. They make an arbitrary 
social and legal decision. They say in effect to the bench that 
unless these odds are greater than 19:1, then one must say that 
the difference between exposed and unexposed groups is due to 
chance, i.e. 'not statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence limit'. They have in effect decided for the court what 
the appropriate odds are, at which chance, as an explanation, is 
no longer acceptable. This contrasted directly with what the 
Royal Commission itself stated as its modus operandus. 
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Standard of Proof 
1. The Commission adopted the normal civil onus of 
proof, i.e. it needed to be comfortably satisfied 
that a fact or connection was established before 
it found that it existed. 
2. It kept in mind those sections of the Repatriation 
Act dealing with the standard and so-called onus of 
proof required in determinations. 
3. Appropriate scientific principles have also been 
applied. (Royal Commission, 1985, Chapter II, p.10). 
It is highly ironic that the Royal Commission's epilogue consist 
of a scathing attack on scientists and publicists arguing that 
Agent Orange was a causative agent, when the Commission itself 
obviously understood little of the scientific philosophy of its 
own experts. As I will now show, these experts adopted an onus of 
proof beyond even the criminal level. 
There is a long and fascinating history of the development of the 
statistical rules of assessment of evidence for scientific 
purposes. I have studied this with a statistical colleague and we 
have contrasted that with a current legal attitudes (Hall and 
Selinger, 1986). The 'law' for statisticians (and for other 
scientists using statistics) was laid down by R.A. Fisher in 1925 
in an often-quoted paragraph: 
If one in twenty does not seem high enough odds, we 
may, if we prefer it, draw the line at one in fifty 
(the 2 per cent point), or one in a hundred (the 1 
per cent point). Personally, the writer prefers to 
set a low standard of significance at the 5 per cent 
point, and ignore entirely all results which fail to 
reach this level. A scientific fact should be regar-
ded as experimentally established only if a properly 
designed experiment rarely fails to give this level 
of significance. (Fisher, 1925, 80). 
This principle was to have dramatic repercussions. It appeared to 
draw a sharp dividing line between white and grey, where a conti-
nuous gradation of grey had existed before. And it proved very 
popular. 
To quote Fisher so baldly, without more careful reference to his 
context, is a little unfair. As we shall see, Fisher saw the "5 
percent principle" not as a dogma but as a useful rule which was 
appropriate in an important class of circumstances. The con-
venience of the rule enabled him to sell his ideas to many non-
statisticians (including, with enthusiasm, the tobacco industry 
for whom he consulted). But the dividing line between 'appro-
priate' and 'inappropriate' uses of the rule was not at all clear 
in Fisher's early writing. Scientists have on the whole stuck 
slavishly to this early axiom and ignored the possibility that 
legal and scientific requirements might be different. 
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There have been several efforts to quantify the level of signi-
ficance which juries (and judges) take 'reasonable doubt' to 
imply. Samples of U.S. students' and jurors' opinions of the 
meaning of "beyond reasonable doubt" showed that it meant a level 
of doubt of about 0.2 or less (estimated as the medians of samples 
of sizes about 70). However, as Table 1 shows, judges were more 
stringent and assessed 'reasonable doubt' at about 0.1 or less. A 
survey of ten Federal District Judges from the Eastern District of 
New York suggested that 'reasonable doubt' means a probability of 
0.15 or less (Simon and Mahan, 1971). These figures are only 
TABLE 1 
PROBABILITY OF GUILT REQUIRED FOR PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT 
„ . Mean of persons surveyed Crime 
Judges Jurors Students 
Murder 0. ,92 0. 86 0. ,93 
Forcible rape 0. ,91 0. ,75 0. ,89 
Burglary 0. ,89 0. ,79 0. ,86 
Assault 0. ,88 0. ,75 0. ,85 
Petty Larceny 0. ,87 0. ,74 0. ,82 
averages. The level of significance required must depend on the 
circumstance: 'In proportion as the crime is enormous, so ought 
the proof to be clear'. Furthermore, the figures are for indivi-
duals and not for juries. Most people would be prepared to send a 
person to gaol on evidence less statistically significant than a 
scientist requires to publish a research paper. The statistical 
evidence that needed to be evaluated by the experts for the Agent 
Orange Royal Commission was unbelievably 'dirty'. There were many 
confounding variables which had to be eliminated etc. In the end, 
some questions are easier to answer than others. 
(1) What are the odds that the higher incidence of X in the 
exposed veterans compared to the unexposed controls was not 
due to chance [related to the size of type I error]? These 
odds can be calculated and a legal decision on whether to pay 
on those odds can be left to the court. 
(2) What are the odds that we will be wrong if, on the basis of 
these odds we accept that the effect was not due to chance 
[type II error]? These odds cannot be calculated - so the 
court cannot calculate the risk to the Government of paying 
out unneccessarily. 
The reason these latter odds cannot be calculated is that this 
requires a single alternate hypothesis, for example, the rate of 
incidence of X in the veterans is 'y' times the rate in the 
controls - where 'y' needs to be known but is not. You can assume 
varied values for 'y' and calculate odds for question (2), but the 
answer is only as good as the assumption. 
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The experts should say what can and what cannot be calculated, and 
leave as much of the arbitrary (social, legal) decision to the 
court. 
The rules that these experts use in their own field and in aca-
demic science are that they would not back a horse unless the odds 
of it winning are at least 19:1. Such a harsh filter for science 
may be appropriate (although there are circumstances where this is 
disputed) because experiments are repeated many times and in many 
places. Unjustified rejection in the scientific sense does no 
long term damage. However, this approach does great damage when 
transferred to the one-off decision-making process of the law. 
The separation of scientific evaluation and social decisions based 
on that evaluation is a requirement in spheres other than the law. 
Experts calculate risks, for example the effect of setting various 
speed limits for cars in various situations (city, urban etc.) on, 
for instance, the number of accidents and the severity of the 
accidents that occur, and also the economic cost of slower speeds 
on total traffic movement. The assessment of safety, that is what 
speed limits to set, is a social decision of which the scientific, 
evidence is only an input. 
In occupational health, risk assessment (science) and safety stan-
dards (social) are also separated (Lowrance, 1976). Care is taken 
to separate the empirical (factual) from the normative (value 
judgment) as the following shows. 
EMPIRICAL NORMATIVE 
RISK SAFETY 
EFFICACY BENEFIT 
WHICH PARTIES FACE THE EQUITY OF THIS 
HAZARDS, GET THE BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION 
AND PAY THE COSTS 
DETERMINING CRITERIA SETTING STANDARDS 
These in-principle separations are not always kept in practice. 
The price of good decisions is eternal vigilance. 
The separation of the expert statistical calculations from a 
decision based on those results is relatively simple, but under-
standing statistical methods is not. One fashionable confusion 
results from the use of Bayes' theorem for conditional probabi-
lities (Darroch and Eggleston, 1985; Tyree, 1984). Let us take 
an example from medicine. Some years ago it was compulsory to 
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undertake mass chest X-rays for detecting tuberculosis in the 
general population. Let us assume that such a screen was very 
accurate. 
• If someone had TB, the screen would detect it 99 percent 
of the time. 
• If someone did not have TB, the screen would clear 
him 99 percent of the time. 
In terms of conditional probability this would be written 
P(+|TB) = 0.99 {or in legal terms P(E|G)} 
P(-|FB) = 0.99 {or in legal terms, P(E|G)} 
Now we assume that the average incidence of TB in the population 
is say 1 in 10,000 and an average person is forced to undergo a 
chest X-ray. If the result is positive, what is the chance that 
this poor individual has TB? You may be swayed by the accuracy of 
the testing procedure but then neglect the low incidence of the 
disease. In statistical terms you are asking for the value of 
P(TB|+) {or in legal terms P(G|E» . Note that we are now 
'conditioning' on the test (evidence) not the disease (guilt) or 
its absence (non-guilt). 
Bayes' theorem (Tyree, 1984) allows us to calculate this probability 
P(TB|+) = 0.99 x 10-4/{ 0.99 x 10"4 + 0.01 x(l-10-4)} 
= 0.0098 
The individual with the positive test result has less than 1 percent 
chance of actually having the disease. The X-ray screen has an odds 
reducing power (that is, of reducing the odds before the test to the 
odds after the test) of 100. This sounds great. But if the odds 
before are 1 in 10,000, then the odds afterwards are 1 in 100. The 
result is not impressive. Accurate tests become inaccurate if the 
event is rare. Unfortunately in most legal situations there is no 
agreement on the prior odds, although where an estimate can be made 
as in the Splatt Royal Commission, (Shannon, 1984) the result can be 
devastating. 
Precisely the opposite effect of rarity is seen in epidemiology. In 
the Agent Orange Royal Commission the veterans exposed to pesticide 
seem to have a higher incidence of certain disease/abnormalities 
etc. However, it is not the absolute rate in the veterans but the 
ratio to unexposed controls that suggests cause and effect. The 
rarer the incidence in the controls, the more significant the effect 
in the exposed. In occupational health it is really only very 
unusual diseases that have led to uncontroversial attribution of 
cause and effect. With more usual diseases, courts have to be 
given a chance to use their social judgement. 
What we are seeing over and over again, is the critical issue of 
analysing the alternate hypotheses. In an article 'The mathema-
tics of corroboration', Sir Richard Eggleston provides a Bayesian 
analysis of corroboration by unreliable witnesses (Eggleston, 
1985).His critical argument evolves around the ooint of how many 
different credible lies are available to the witnesses, that is 
alternate stories to the one actually told. Without clarity on 
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this point, popular legal phrases such as the following, become so 
much mumbo jumbo...1, Many rays of weak light combine to 
illuminate ...', Many thin threads in a rope together ...', or, 
'The weakest link in a chain ...'. 
A classic illustration of how important it is to clarify the 
hypotheses being tested is in the popular lecture ploy of asking 
whether two people in a room have a birthday on the same day. The 
answer is given as follows: 
Select the first person's birthday, then the probability that the 
second person has a different one is 364/365 and so on, giving for 
3 people 
= 1 -[364/365 x 363/365] 
For n people the probability 
i 364J 
(365)n_1 (365-n)! 
which results in the following probabilities: 
TABLE 2 
COINCIDENTAL BIRTHDAYS (365 HYPOTHESES) 
No. of people in audience 10 12 20 30 50 
Probability of two 
identical birthdays 0.12 0.17 0.41 0.71 0.96 
The probabilities appear surprisingly high unless you realise that 
you are simultaneously testing 365 hypotheses, namely that the 
common birthday is on the 1 January, 2 January etc. Even for a 
jury of twelve, the odds are better than 1 in 6. 
If we insist on a single hypothesis, for example, do two jurors 
both have their birthday on a particular day (such as my birthday) 
then the odds for a jury of 12 drop to five in ten thousand. 
Well, if you think statistics is too hard, it is at least quanti-
fiable. While much of chemical analysis can be quantified, there 
is much that cannot. A simple case of quantified evidence is when 
for example a breath alcohol result obtained on a Breathalyser 
(TM) is reported as 0.14 ± .02 (2.s.d.) where the error is quoted 
as a 95 percent confidence range. In this case the use of 
'scientific' confidence limits is justified as part of the 
scientific evidence because we are dealing with an 'experiment' 
which has a high precision and so demanding limits can be placed 
on its confidence levels. Houts, Baselt and Carrey's (1985) 
standard text explains the terminology and importance of proce-
dures, and the meaning of variables of legal significance. It 
provides a toxico-legal checklist. An inference chart could be 
built from this check-list to provide the scientific equivalent of 
forensic continuity, that is, to establish that the procedural 
track is sound and that all confusions, confoundings and contra-
dictions have been suitably accounted for. 
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In the Chamberlain case (Tipple, 1986) the forensic biologist gave 
evidence that while examining the Chamberlain car she unbolted a 
hinge on the passenger seat and observed "a lot of flakes of dried 
blood. It was just virtually suspended there between the hinge 
and the vinyl..." The amount of material described would have 
allowed thousands of tests to have been performed. None of this 
material was preserved, because the biologist explained (Second 
Inquest 1981-82 transcript 643)"... I was not requested to keep 
any of the sample." 
The tragedy of not preserving any of this extensive sample is now 
well known. Not only did it prevent the accused from being able 
to carry out any independent testing but the loss was accentuated 
because unlike other forensic laboratories within Australia and 
around the world the test plates were destroyed and no photogra-
phic records were kept. The greatest tragedy however has been 
that now a completely new technique has been perfected which would 
allow a pico-gram amount of blood to be analysed and typed for 
DNA. This would have provided a good identification of Azaria. 
These results would not have been affected by denaturation of 
protein (as were the evidential tests). 
The legal system must allow science to progress and be able to 
come back later with new ways of assessing evidence. As stated in 
the High Court of Australia by Deane J in his judgement on this 
case 
The principle that no person should be convicted 
of a serious crime except by a jury on the evi-
dence - has no corollary requiring that every 
person who is found guilty by a jury's verdict 
should remain so convicted. (1984, 51 A.L.R. 
305). 
227 
REFERENCES 
Darrock, J. and Eggleston, R. (1985), Probability and 
Circumstanciai Evidence, Paper presented at the 
International Criminal Law Congress, Adelaide, 6-11 
October. 
Eggleston, R. (1985), 'The Mathematics of Corroboration', 
Criminal Law Review, 640-9. 
Fisher, R.A. (1925), Statistical Methods for Research Workers, 
Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh. 
Hall, P. and Selinger, B. (1986), 'Statistical Significance: 
Balancing Evidence Against Doubt', Australian Journal of 
Statistics, (in press). 
Houts, M., Baselt, R. and Carrey, R.H. (1981), Courtroom 
Toxicology, M. Bender, New York. 
Lowrance, W.W. (1976), Of Acceptable Risk - Science and the 
Determination of Safety, William Kaufmann Inc., Los 
Altos. 
Royal Commission on the Use and Effects of Chemical Agents and 
Australian Personnel in Vietnam, (1985), Final Report, 
Volume 8, A.G.P.S., Canberra. 
Selinger, B. (1984), 'Science in the Witness Box', Legal 
Services Bulletin, 9, 108-11. 
Shannon, C. (1984), Report concerning the conviction of 
Edward Charles Splatt, Government Printer, South 
Australia. 
Simon, R.J. and Mahn, L. (1971), 'Quantifying Burdens of Proof: 
A View from the Bench, the Jury and Classroom', Law and 
Society Review, 5, 319-30. 
Tipple, S.G.H., (1986), Personal communication to the author. 
Tyree, A.L. (1984), 'Probability Theory and the Law of 
Evidence', Criminal Law Journal, 8, 224-36. 

A FORENSIC STANDARDS PROPOSAL: THE INFERENCE CHART 
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The criminal justice system is vulnerable to human error, 
intentional and unintentional, at many points. Those in which the 
jury is involved are: 
(a) the jury is CONFUSED by technical detail, 
(b) the jury is CONFUSED by conflict between experts, 
(c) the jury is MISLED by an expert incompetent in technique 
or methodology, 
(d) the jury is MISLED by an expert incompetent in logic, 
(e) the jury is MISLED by a dishonest expert. 
Safeguards against these dangers must be set up because, firstly, 
the justice system is manifestly being damaged by the improper 
application of science, and secondly, because the application of 
science to the justice system is expanding rapidly. The dangers 
are not removed by the rapid improvement in scientific 
qualifications of forensic scientists now under way, since many 
of the more notorious misapplications of science in the courtroom 
have occurred at the hands of highly qualified and experienced 
practitioners. 
The system of forensic standards now being proposed aims not only 
at the methodology of scientific testing employed by the 
profession but at the way in whch inferences are drawn from the 
test results and the way in which the inferences are 
communicated. By removing the jargon from scientists' reports 
it should be possible to expose to the view of the court the 
logical pathways they follow in getting from their test 
results to their final opini ons • Justice is most likely to be 
served if the scientist retains control of the testing 
procedures, the qualifications for which are well understood and 
easily examined by the court but leaving to the jury the control 
of matters of opinion. This is not to deprive experts of their 
opinions, but merely ask them to explain how they reached them. 
The logic involved in reaching conclusions from scientific data 
is not more difficult to follow than logic employed in other 
items discussed before a jury and there seems to be no barrier 
other than the unfamiliarity of scientific language to prevent 
the court following it. A major aim of the proposed system of 
forensic standards is the removal of this barrier, enabling the 
court to return the expert to his proper function which, as 
stated in Cross on Evidence (Gobbo et al., 1980): 
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... is to furnish the Court with the scientific criteria 
necessary to come to a reasonable and independent judgment 
on the merits of the scientific or specialist issue which 
would otherwise be beyond them. 
In the criminal investigation the benefits of expertise in 
forensic science are felt in several different ways. The 
competent expert knows the overall procedure to adopt when 
presented with a sample and asked to report on it. (Strategy) He 
knows how to select the various individual tests which properly 
comprise the method, including the 'controls', which he uses to 
exclude false positive and false negative results. (Methodology) 
He knows how to physically perform the tests on his behalf. 
(Technique) He knows how to exclude alternative explanations of 
his results, both by recourse to the control experiments carried 
out before tests were performed and by new experiments. 
(Reasoning) Finally, he understands the importance of each of 
these separate activities in the logical pathway leading from the 
test results to final conclusion. (Reasoning) 
It is now clear that impressive academic qualifications and long 
experience provide no guarantee to a jury of the accuracy of a 
scientist's logic, or even of his or her objectivity. It is 
necessary to require, as in science, generally, that the 
conclusions scientist offer be judged on their merits. Helping 
courts carry out this judgment for themselves is the aim of this 
proposal for forensic science standards and, in particular, a new 
kind of courtroom exhibit, the Inference Chart. 
Helping courts to follow the logic of scientific evidence is 
likely to have two important effects on jury trials. First, it 
will remove the mystique which confers on the forensic scientist 
the unjustifiable infallibility of Sherlock Holmes. Second, it 
will help to display the real worth of Rumpole's declamations 
when he presents his perceptions of science to the jury. When the 
logical pathway can be laid out on paper it ought to become 
possible for the court to follow the argument, at least with no 
greater difficulty than that involved in other parts of criminal 
trials. 
The precision offered by technical language is indispensable for 
the scientist, but once the science is done, the structure of the 
argument is quite susceptible to simple description. If this can 
be accomplished, judges may be as willing to intervene in 
instances where scientific evidence may be apt to confuse or 
mislead the jury, as they are now with other kinds of evidence. 
It is because the logic can be understood that fingerprint 
evidence is so rarely the cause of courtroom confusion or 
wrongful conviction. 
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AUSTRALIAN STANDARDS AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 
Given that the Standards Association of Australia or some similar 
body is willing to disseminate an Australian standard for each 
forensic test used routinely in criminal investigation, courts 
will be able to test the materials and assess their value. 
Such a standard will incorporate full information about 
techniques (sampling, physical performance of tests ...), 
the precision attainable, the range of materials to which the 
test can be applied, the controls necessary to avoid spurious 
results, and the safeguards necessary to avoid invalid 
conclusions. Summary materials will provide general 
information about the method, its capabilities and its dangers, 
in a form intelligible to counsel and, if necessary, the court. 
A vital part of the Australian standard for a test is the 
document designed to bridge the gap between the knowledge which 
the expert brings to a test and the level of understanding of the 
jury which must form an opinion on it. We propose a single-sheet 
document to be used in pre-trial proceedings and in trial by 
judge and counsel or, if necessary, introduced to court as an 
exhibit. The primary purpose of the inference chart is to show 
how the test result (a meter reading, say, or a colour reaction 
in a test-tube) is able to yield a reliable, positive conclusion, 
if and only if, (a) false positive tests are excluded, and (b) 
alternative explanations for a true positive results are 
excluded. Because of this, the inference chart is framed in such 
a way as to require an unbroken chain of YES responses before a 
positive final conclusion can be accepted as valid. 
The existence of an Australian standard for a test will indicate 
the confidence the scientific community pi aces in the method 
described. Unusual measures, commonly necessary for a science 
dealing with minute traces of evidence collected under adverse 
conditions, are not excluded, but the onus is placed squarely on 
the professional scientist to explain why a non-standard 
procedure is being used and to explain to the court the effect of 
such a measure on the precision of the test results and the 
validity of the conclusions. Likewise, when a laboratory chooses 
a test for which no standard has been prepared or one not yet 
widely accepted, the onus Is on the expert to show that he has 
conformed to criteria no less stringent than those used in 
standard procedures. 
An immediate advantage in court of the use of tests for which 
Australian forensic standards exist would be the barrier placed 
against any attempt to reverse the onus of proof. Suggestions, 
such as the one made in a recent highly publicised trial by a 
very experienced overseas scientist, that results show such-and-
such to be the case 'until proved otherwise' are clearly 
exposed. Contrariwise, arguments carefully formed by systematic 
exclusion of alternative ways of explaining the results will 
present themselves with the weight which is their due. 
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A second benefit of the inference chart method of documenting 
forensic science evidence is of the kind most noticed when it is 
absent. Evidence which is incapable of meeting the criteria laid 
out in sequence in the inference chart is unlikely to be 
introduced. 
The necessity of the Inference Chart is the recent and frequent 
exhibition in court of experts disputing scientific matters 
which juries and judges cannot possibly understand, much less 
adjudicate. Confusion is inevitable. The aim of the forensic 
standards proposal is the raising of standards of evidence 
presented in court to the point where unprofessional material 
will not be offered. The high standards insisted upon in 
Fingerprint Bureaux in Australia and England have led to a 
situation where evidence is rarely, if ever, challenged. 
Fingerprint experts are proud of the fact that evidence which 
fails to meet the convention (in Australia 12 points of 
resemblance, no unexplained dissimilarity; in the U.K. 16 points 
of resemblance) never reaches court. In the U.S.A. no such 
convention exists and conflict between experts (as many as six 
disputing the validity of identification) is the unfortunate 
result. 
In cases where conflict is unavoidable, the chart might be 
introduced as an exhibit, providing the jury with a clear outline 
of what features of the evidence are being disputed and why, thus 
reducing the premium on theatrical performance by barristers. 
When experts disagree on matters too high for ordinary people 
to understand it is not likely that ordinary people will 
withhold their judgment. A decision is reached just the 
same, but on matters unconnected with the facts. 
It is taken as a right of every citizen in a democratic country 
to full and early disclosure of scientific evidence to be brought 
against him. If this right is exercised, the fact that an 
inference chart is available in pre-trial conference to both 
counsel ensures that the defects or the strengths of the evidence 
are clearly known. The judge may use the Chart to determine the 
approach likely to be taken by the prosecution when the case 
comes to trial and, consistent with the right of the accused to 
reserve his defence, to assess in advance whether or not forensic 
evidence will be challenged. Early warning will assist him to 
decide whether the confusion caused by an ensuing conflict 
between experts will outweigh any possible value it may have. 
The logical chain necessary to reach a conclusion from results 
obtained from chemical, spectrometric, and immunological tests 
lends itself well to presentation by an inference chart. Other 
kinds of testing, no less vulnerable to low standards, are more 
difficult to adapt to a presentation which relies on decisions 
made In sequence. 
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Tests which tend towards subjective evaluation based on the 
assessment of numerous observations simultaneously require a 
different approach, perhaps one in which the dangers associated 
with a single opinion are reduced by referring the assessment to 
a group of scientists rather than a single expert. Methods in 
this category include bloodstain pattern interpretation and the 
assessment of psychiatric illness. 
CONCLUSION 
The Inference Chart, a jargon-free outline of the logical pathway 
followed by a forensic scientist in reporting the results of his 
testing and the conclusions drawn from them, is devised to assist 
juries to reach their own independent assessment of the expert's 
evidence. It uses the method used by courts to remove their 
doubts about any other argument, reducing it to steps and taking 
the steps one at a time. It advertises the fact that faulty logic 
in the office is just as deadly to forensic science as faulty 
technique in the laboratory, and it recommends that juries no 
longer delegate to others the responsibility of deciding whether 
an expert's opinion is valid or not. 
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JURY PERFORMANCE IN COMPLEX CASES, 
particularly those Involving fraud or the 
presentation of forensic evidence 
Professor Richard W. Harding 
Director 
Australian Institute of Criminology 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last year or so, the jury system has been under 
intense scrutiny, both in its birthplace, England, and in 
Australia. Much of that scrutiny has been hostile. Several 
strands of criticism can be identified. 
First, all too predictably, there is the 'law and order' push - a 
belief that the jury system can be manipulated or naturally 
operates so as to increase the likelihood of unjustified 
acquittal. There is, of course, nothing new about this either in 
England (Mark, 1973) or in Australia (Miller, 1980). Howard 
(1985) has recently argued with regard to Australia that: 
It is by no means obvious that a system which is 
already heavily weighted in favour of the defence 
by restrictions on police powers of investigation, 
by many rules of evidence, by preliminary hearings 
or by rights of appeal which to a large extent are 
available only to the defendant, should have 
juries added in at the trial stage as well. 
This contribution typifies the quality of this strand of 
criticism. Not a scintilla of evidence is offered that actual 
distortion of the criminal justice process is brought about by 
the operation of the jury system. Nor does the protagonist feel 
any obligation to refer to sources of possible distortion under 
the control of the Crown - for example, jury-vetting. 
A second strand of the debate springs from concern, even 
compassion, for individual jurors. The spate of jury-room 
disclosures arising during 1985 in relation to the Gallagher, 
Maher and Murphy trials highlighted the pressures under which 
juries are expected to function. An article in the Sydney 
Morning Herald, 'Too Much Pressure on Jurors?', referred in 
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detail to the fact that individual jurors felt under attack when 
an avalanche of comment followed their verdict (SMH, 18 February 
1986). An earlier article in the National Times (Loane, 1985) 
took the matter back one stage to the process of deliberation. 
Under the title, 'Psychological Warfare in ttie Jury Room', it 
purported to describe how harrowing is the experience of being a 
juror in a case of great public interest. 
There is a great deal in these concerns. They find expression 
also in more reputable ways than as articles written by staff 
writers of the Fairfax Press (which almost singlehandedly has 
created the atmosphere of juror trauma which it purports so much 
to deplore): see, for example, Lovitt, 1985; New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission, 1985; Victoria Law Reform Commission, 
1985; and Australian Law Reform Commission, 1986. In Victoria 
there has been a quick legislative response by way of the Juries 
Act Amendment Act 1985, the purpose of which is to provide 
comprehensive protection for jury confidentiality. 
A third strand of criticism is technocratic. This questions the 
intellectual or experiential competence of the jury either to 
discharge its task at all or to do so in particular types of 
cases. The most sweeping attack is, once more, that of Howard 
(1985): 
It is often suggested that the jury is a corrective 
to the individual attitudes of particular judges. 
This may or may not be the case. It is also not 
the point. 
The point is that any human institution is bound to 
be only as good as the people who comprise it. 
There is no reason to suppose that a more or less 
random selection of ordinary people is going to have 
any less impressive an array of prejudices than a 
judge. 
Usually, however, the technocratic argument takes a narrower form 
than this, being confined to fraud cases, trials involving the 
presentation of forensic evidence and cases which are otherwise 
complex or highly technical - the subject matter of this paper. 
Discussion thus seems to start from the premise that the jury 
system as such should be retained. However, the question 
obviously arises whether erosion of jury authority based on 
supposed incompetence is not, in reality, a crucial political 
step in de-legitimising the whole system. Is it not different 
from quantitative limitations of jurisdiction made, for example, 
by way of provision to elect summary trial by a lower court? In 
addressing the narrower set of issues, therefore, one must be 
mindful to some extent of the broader issue: should jury trial 
be retained at all? 
FRAUD TRIALS 
In 1983 the Roskill Committee was set up in the U.K. 'to consider 
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in what ways the conduct of criminal proceedings in England and 
Wales arising from fraud can be improved and to consider what 
changes in existing law and procedure would be desirable to 
secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of such 
proceedings'. The Committee reported in 1985 and its Report, it 
is fair to say, canvasses the principal issues constituting this 
debate in Australia also. (New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, 1985, paras 10.1 to 10.2.) 
Roskill draws upon the technocratic argument par excellence: 
There is, however, one particular class of case 
which, in the view of a majority of us, needs 
special treatment: that is the fraud case of such 
complexity and difficulty that it cannot reasonably 
be expected to be understood by a jury selected at 
random. (Roskill, 1985, para. 1.6.) 
Later it emerges that belief in jury incompetence is an article 
of faith rather than a construct of empirical evidence: 
There is no accurate evidence ... that there has 
been a higher proportion of acquittals in complex 
fraud cases than in fraud cases or other criminal 
cases generally. Nevertheless, we do not find 
trial by a random jury a satisfactory way of 
achieving justice in cases as long and complex as 
we have described. We believe that many jurors are 
out of their depth. (Roskill, 1985, para. 8.35.) 
Before ascertaining where the available empirical evidence might 
have led the Roskill Committee, had they cared to look at it, one 
should refer to its recommendations on broader issues - for 
example, with regard to such matters as the processes of invest-
igation and preparation of a case for trial, the identification 
of defects in the substantive law, and in particular the question 
of interlocutory headings. (Roskill, 1985, Chapters 2, 3 and 
6. ) 
As to the latter, a pilot project had been set up in 1983 in 
relation to all criminal cases, not merely those involving fraud. 
The objective had been to achieve, broadly speaking, in criminal 
litigation what is intended to be achieved by interlocutory 
procedures in civil litigation. Of course, a natural limit is 
set to this by rules as to onus and standard of proof and against 
self-incrimination. The Committee nevertheless found that 'pre-
trial reviews [the term used to describe this interlocutory 
process] operate sensibly and efficiently in a large number of 
cases in which they are held'. (Roskill, 1985, para. 6.11.) 
This finding was somewhat impressionistic inasmuch as 'there has 
been no quantitative or qualitative research into the effects of 
pre-trial reviews'. (Roskill, 1985, para. 6.10; Ashworth, 
1984.) It was based on interviews with judges, court 
officials and lawyers. In the absence of any other information 
it is entitled to some credence. 
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So too is the further finding that 'in fraud cases ... the 
additional expense of holding a pre-trial review has not been 
justified by any significant savings in trial time nor has it 
resulted in any other obvious benefits'. (Roskill, 1985, para. 
6.11.) However, the Report does identify factors that would seem 
to have caused this failure: they include such matters as the 
pre-trial and trial judges not being the same person; tardy 
distribution of documentation; inadequate preparation by counsel 
and/or change of counsel during the case; and above all the 
absence of sanctions to persuade parties to co-operate at that 
stage of proceedings. (Roskill, 1985, paras 6.12 to 6.22.) 
The Committee accordingly made detailed recommendations to 
improve pre-trial procedures. They are of considerable interest 
also in an Australian context (New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, 1985; 1986). From the point of view of the debate 
about the jury system, the essence of the recommendations is that 
they would tend to increase the comprehensibility and diminish 
the duration of complex fraud trials. This in turn would erode 
arguments based on supposed lack of capacity of jurors to grasp 
the crucial issues and maintain concentration. In summary, the 
Roskill recommendations were as follows: 
(a) the pre-trial review or preparatory hearing 
[henceforth the preferred terminology] should 
be an integral part of the trial itself, with 
the consequence that it would normally take 
place in open court; 
(b) the court itself, rather than the parties, 
would decide upon the necessity of such a 
hearing; 
(c) the same judge would, naturally, preside at 
each stage of the trial; 
(d) scheduling of cases would ensure that the 
presiding judge had sufficient time to study 
relevant documents, and secretarial assistance 
would be improved; 
(e) the prosecution would be obliged to supply the 
outline of its case and all supporting 
documentation to the court and to the 
defence; 
(f) procedures would be established to enable the 
defence to make factual admissions; 
(g) by negotiation and agreement, case summaries, 
chronologies and glossaries of legal terms 
would be drawn up for the benefit of the 
court, parties and the jury; 
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(h) contested evidence would be presented in ways 
which were easier to comprehend than by merely 
verbal presentation - for example, by way of 
graphs, tables, other graphics and diagrams; 
(i) preliminary arguments as to admissibility of 
evidence and points of law would take place 
before empanelment of a jury, and only those 
matters which could not reasonably have been 
anticipated would be subject to further voir 
dire during trial. 
This is a cogent program of reform. If the essential question in 
a complex fraud case is ultimately that of dishonesty, and if it 
is thought that this issue may often be obfuscated by complexity 
or sheer volume of evidence, then it would seem that the proposed 
reform package would sharpen that question considerably. One 
would have thought that the Roskill Committee would have put its 
eggs first into this reform basket. Once implemented, such 
reforms could have been systematically monitored for their 
impact. A more radical fallback position - changing the jury 
system itself - could then have been considered in due course if 
there were a perceived need. 
However, what should have been the Committee's fallback position 
- the creation of a special non-jury procedure for complex fraud 
trials - is presented as if it were logically the primary 
position. Indeed, the introductory chapter highlights this 
proposed non-jury procedure, the creation of a Fraud Trials 
Tribunal. (Roskill, 1985, para. 1.6.) The Government White 
Paper (Home Office, 1986, para.43) in turn highlights this as the 
issue requiring urgent resolution; and it skirts by the proposed 
procedural changes as if their raison d'etre was to facilitate 
the working of the proposed Fraud Trials Tribunal. This was 
certainly not intended to be the case. (Roskill, 1985, para. 
8.39.) It is a neat piece of sleight of hand by the author of 
the White Paper; the jury disappears up the conjuror's sleeve. 
Yet it is evident that the Roskill Report itself does not make 
out even a prima facie case of jury incompetence. As mentioned 
earlier, its attitude is more an article of faith than a 
construct of empirical evidence. (Roskill, 1985, paras 1.6, 8.35 
and 8.12.) In fact, worthwhile research tending to confirm jury 
competence does exist, though the Roskill Report does not cite 
any of it. 
The English research may be found in the book, Jury Trials, 
(Baldwin and McConville, 1979). The research related to 370 jury 
trials in Birmingham and 347 in London. The authors character-
ised certain aquittals as 'questionable', the criterion adopted 
being that of both the trial judge and either the prosecution or 
the police or the defence itself regarding the acquittal as 
unjustified. In the Birmingham sample there were 114 acquittals 
of which 41 (36 per cent) were 'questionable'. On this basis the 
researchers stated that trial by jury was 'an arbitrary and 
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unpredictable business1, and that their own confidence in the 
jury system had been shaken. The Roskill Report cites these 
conclusions with relish. (Roskill, 1985, para. 8.11.) Yet it 
fails to refer to the more cogent finding specific to fraud 
trials: 
Furthermore, not one of the questionable acquittals 
involved complex frauds, offences which were rarely 
contested before juries in Birmingham during the 
study period. Indeed, of the eight cases of fraud 
which raised questions of some complexity, six 
resulted in the defendants being convicted and the 
two acquittals were regarded as broadly justified 
by the respondents. (Baldwin and McConville, 1979, 
Eight cases may not be an ideal sample; but in the absence of 
any other objectively obtained empirical evidence it is 
disingenuous if not dishonest of the Roskill Committee not to 
mention these findings. They were fortified, moreover, by the 
conclusion that there were no questionable verdicts at all in the 
25 long trials within the total sample. 
The Roskill Report also failed to make any mention of the 
findings of Kalven and Zeisel in their seminal research, The 
American Jury (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966). The methodology adopted 
there was as follows: asking trial judges, upon retirement of 
the jury and before verdict, a series of questions including what 
they considered the verdict should be, how finely balanced the 
evidence was and how difficult overall the case was. Against 
their answers was measured the actual verdict in the case. The 
sample was 3576 trials. It was found that in 75.4 per cent of 
these cases, judge and jury verdicts (whether of conviction or 
acquittal) coincided; that in 16.9 per cent of cases the judge 
would have convicted where the jury acquitted; and that in 2.2 
per cent of cases the judge would have acquitted where the jury 
convicted. The remaining cases involved a hung jury. 
The analysis went further by attempting to ascertain whether the 
likelihood of notional disagreement was greater with regard to 
'difficult' cases. In other words, the researchers confronted 
the basis of the technocratic argument that there are limits to 
the ability of the jury to understand. A random sample of 1191 
of the 3576 cases showed that the rate of disagreement was no 
greater with regard to difficult cases than easy ones. The same 
was true as between close and clear cases. 
61-2 . ) 
Disagreement Difficult 
Clear cases 9% 
(N=618) (N=57) 
8% 
Close cases 41% 
(N=406) 
39% 
(N=l10) 
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'The result', claimed the authors, 'is a stunning refutation of 
the hypothesis that the jury does not understand'. (Kalven and 
Zeisel, 1966, 157.) 
It must be said that Kalven and Zeisel did not identify a 
separate category of complex fraud cases. However, 3.9 per cent 
of their total sample (i.e. 131 cases) involved fraud of some 
kind or another. It is not unreasonable to presume that some of 
these were captured in the sub-sample analysed above. Whilst the 
evidence that juries cope no less well with complex fraud cases 
than with other cases is thus not direct, the American research 
is nevertheless sufficiently cogent to have deserved some 
reference. 
If the Roskill Committee displayed the Nelson touch in this 
respect, it emulated Don Quixote in another. The windmill at 
which it chose to tilt was that the Crown may decide not to 
prosecute at all in a major fraud case because of the expectation 
that the case could not be presented in a way which an ordinary 
jury could comprehend: 
We were told that this was rarely the sole reason, 
but that it was sometimes a major contributory 
factor in deciding not to proceed with a 
prosecution. We also had evidence that the 
difficulty of presenting a complex case often 
resulted in a decision to opt for less serious 
charges than the offences warranted. (Roskill, 
1985, para. 8.36.) 
The dissenting member of the Committee, Mr Walter Merricks, met 
these rather general abstractions with specifics: 
As far as lack of prosecution is concerned, the DPP 
supplied us with an analysis of cases referred to 
his fraud division for the year 1983. Of the 179 
referred for prosecution (as opposed to criminal 
bankruptcy cases and others), in 31 cases the 
decision was to prosecute, 77 were still pending at 
the time, and in 71 the decision was not to 
prosecute. Of these, the largest category revealed 
insufficient evidence to justify proceedings (32), 
in some there was no evidence of an offence (12), 9 
were referred to the Department of Trade and 
Industry, in 10 cases there were difficulties over 
extradition. The remainder either revealed other 
offences but no fraud (9), were not prosecuted by 
reason of staleness (6), or the small amount of the 
deficiency (5). One case was not prosecuted due to 
complexity: the case involved the theft of 
intellectual property. Civil proceedings were 
pending, and independent counsel had advised that 
the cost of a prosecution would be enormous and 
that the chances of success did not warrant it. 
(Roskill, 1985, 193.) 
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So much for the English position. The debate seems to be a 
contrived one, deriving not so much from documented inadequacy of 
the jury system as from ideology. Indeed, the Australian 
Director of Public Prosecutions has pointed out that the English 
practice is not to bring charges for major fraud but rather to 
compromise the action, 'which means that people buy their way 
out'. The English D.P.P. simply does 'not have the basic 
experience of the work problems'. (Temby, 1986c.) 
Whilst the Australian debate has not gone quite so far down the 
track, the attitudes traversed by the Roskill Committee 
have certainly permeated public consciousness. For example, 
following the Maher trial, where the jury deliberated for a 
record eight days, the views of one juror received great 
prominence in the National Times: 
After Sunday's bus outing, Monday morning was the 
showdown. The women felt strongly about returning 
a guilty verdict on all counts. We finally came to 
a compromise - with guilty on counts one and 20 and 
not guilty on counts 16 and 21. [Counts 2-15, 17-
19 and 22 had been withdrawn from the jury at an 
earlier stage.] In the end no one was completely 
happy because not one verdict reflected a unanimous 
decision ... 
Most people, especially those selected for jury 
duty, don't often discuss complex issues as a 
matter of daily life. It is a mechanism they have 
never developed, and they have to try to do it for 
the first time. After a few days in that room, 
there is no logical discussion - it becomes 
psychological warfare, where people start thinking 
of tactics to change other people's minds. (Loane, 
1985.) 
Other media coverage adopts a not dissimilar tone. Specious 
legitimacy may be lent to this by the suggestion that 'those who 
support a change in the jury system in complicated fraud cases or 
where scientific evidence is confusing to the average ... juror 
include a large section of the Australian legal profession'. 
(Adelaide Advertiser, 17 October 1985.) This claim is not 
substantiated by empirical evidence; it might be more accurate 
to suggest that some members of the legal profession are 
concerned. 
For example, the principal researcher concerned with the 
preparation of the Victoria Law Reform Commission's paper, The 
Role of the Jury in Criminal Trials, has suggested that addresses 
by counsel and summings-up by judges in complicated commercial 
cases are becoming increasingly technical. (Read, 1985.) The 
context of her remarks seems to indicate that, for this reason, 
it may be appropriate to limit jury trial in such cases - an 
interpretation borne out by a later paper. (Read, 1986.) 
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Mr Justice Deane, whose dissenting judgment in Kingswell (1985, 
60 A.L.J.R.17) was a stirring defence of the jury system as such, 
is another who has acknowledged the pertinence of such issues: 
... contemporary circumstances have raised new 
questions about, and placed additional strains 
upon, the institution of the criminal trial by 
jury. There is, for example, obvious force in the 
argument that a jury of ordinary men and women 
selected at random from the community lacks the 
knowledge and experience necessary to sit in 
responsible judgment upon the type of scientific 
dispute between specialists that may arise in the 
course of a criminal trial or upon the detailed 
technical questions which may be involved in the 
trial of white collar and computer crime. 
On the other hand, the Director of Public Prosecutions, who had 
previously (The Age, 15 October 1984) expressed some reservations 
about the capacity of jurors to cope with such matters, has more 
recently taken a pro-jury stance. He has stated: 
Some prosecutors think they would have a better 
chance of success (particularly in complex taxation 
and commercial cases) if there were trial by judge 
alone or by specialist jurors. Indeed, recently in 
England a Committee chaired by Lord Roskill has 
recommended that trial by jury be abolished in 
complex fraud cases. The recommended alternative 
is that such cases should be tried by a judge and 
two lay persons with business experience and the 
capacity to grasp intricate issues. I would be 
against any such change in this country. I 
strongly believe in the jury system of trial and 
remain unconvinced that it is inappropriate for 
various sorts of complex criminal matters. 
The jury system is not perfect. Like most 
institutions it has strong and weak points. Some 
changes may be desirable. Nevertheless, critics of 
the jury system itself should not be heard unless 
they are able to prefer an alternative which is 
better than the present system. Thus far such an 
alternative has not been devised. (Temby, 1986a.) 
It should be noted that the Director has the carriage of a major 
number of complex fraud cases (including the Maher case itself) 
arising out of 'bottom-of-the-harbour' tax evasion schemes; 
his quoted views presumably reflect his Office's evolving 
experience In this area. 
The Victoria Law Reform Commission itself, whatever the personal 
views of its principal researcher, also tentatively lends its 
support to the status quo: 
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It may be considered odd that complicated 
commercial cases are singled out for attention, as 
somehow distinct or apart from other complex cases 
of a non-commercial nature: there is no reason to 
believe that tangled commercial matters are more 
difficult to understand than labyrnthine conspiracy 
cases, or cases of another nature involving 
convoluted fact situations and perplexing evidence 
of various types. It is not immediately evident 
why it should be accepted wisdom in some quarters 
that juries are incompetent to deal with such 
matters and that to leave these cases to judges 
would be preferable, or non-problematic. No doubt 
judges may have a difficult time understanding 
knotty commercial matters: not all are well versed 
in commercial law. Not all, even if expert in some 
or many commercial law areas, need be without any 
difficulties in handling decision-making in this 
area, as in other areas of complexity in criminal 
trials. (Victoria Law Reform Commission, 1985, 
177-8.) 
A final view on this is that of jurors themselves - not 
individual jurors fresh from the trauma of a difficult case but 
jurors as a group, recollecting their experience in tranquility. 
Vodanovich (1986) has documented the attitudes of a sample of 747 
Western Australians towards the jury system. Within that sample 
was a sub-sample of 54 respondents who had served as jurors. One 
question in the survey asked: 
Many authorities are strongly of the view that 
there should be special juries where the situations 
involve difficult scientific, medical or commercial 
evidence. Do you agree? 
Sixty-two percent of non-jurors agreed and only 25 per cent 
disagreed with this. However, 40 per cent of those with actual 
experience of some kind of jury trial disagreed, whilst 53 per 
cent agreed. This, it must be said, is double-edged evidence. 
But it does seem to indicate that the technocratic argument is 
more appealing in the abstract than it is in the concrete, that 
as citizens gain experience of the jury system they gain also 
confidence in their ability to cope with it. Similar findings 
have been made in Canada, (Doob, 1979) and in New South Wales 
(New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 1986, 14; Wilkie, 1986.) 
In summary, the case for interfering with the jury in complex 
fraud cases has not been made out. To the extent that there are 
technical weaknesses in the present system, technical means of 
strengthening it can and should be found. Such means have been 
described in the Roskill Report and by the New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission. (1986, paras 10.6 - 10.11.) That Commission 
has also affirmed its view that in such cases there is no basis 
for trying the matter in an abnormal manner. (1986, paras 8.24 -
8.38.) 
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CASES INVOLVING FORENSIC EVIDENCE 
This debate parallels the previous one in that a radical 
'solution' is offered, on technocratic grounds, for a 'problem' 
whose existence and nature is never really established. However, 
it must be said that in Australia there has been a considerable 
body of controversial material to fuel the debate, more so 
certainly than with complex fraud cases. These are the trials of 
van Beelen, Splatt and Chamberlain, all in their different ways 
causes celebres. 
In van Beelen (1972, 4 S.A.S.R.353) the trial for murder lasted 
71 sitting days; there were 214 exhibits and some 3300 foolscap 
pages of transcripts. Some five-sixths of all the evidence was 
made up by expert scientific evidence presented by each side. In 
these circumstances, the Mitchell Committee regarded it as 
axiomatic that 'special juries' should be empanelled for such 
trials: 
In the long run we believe that the fact that 
jurors have certain basic knowledge concerning the 
matters in respect of which expert evidence will be 
called will save time of counsel in addressing and 
will save a good deal of time in the examination 
and cross-examination of experts. (Mitchell, 1975, 
102.) 
In Splatt the difficulties were not dissimilar: 
Some of the jurors who convicted Edward Splatt in 
South Australia, chiefly on the basis of forensic 
evidence, have since his release publicly admitted 
that they did not understand that evidence. 
Recommending Splatt's release, Royal Commissioner 
Shannon reportedly said that problems as complex as 
those involved in the case are 'so detailed and 
convoluted that the jury needs to be furnished with 
considerable assistance'. (New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission, 1985, para. 10.3.) 
As for the Chamberlain case (Bryson, 1985) it is of course 
subject to a Royal Commission and nothing that will be said 
should be construed as expressing a view as to the appropriate 
outcome. However, on any view the only evidence that could have 
founded a verdict of guilty was the forensic evidence - to the 
point where a reversal of the trial verdict would be likely to be 
seen as adversely reflecting, at least in part, upon the 
competence of the jury in forensic matters. The technocratic 
argument against the jury must, therefore, be confronted. 
To put the matter in perspective, the obvious point should be 
made that many serious criminal cases involve the presentation of 
forensic evidence - as to cause and time of death, calibre of 
bullet, identification of body from parts, speed or angle or 
point of impact of motor vehicles, fingerprints, mental state of 
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the accused, and so on. Procedures for presenting this evidence 
and evaluating its significance are relatively straightforward 
and familiar. When such evidence is presented in conjunction 
with other direct evidence, such as witness identification, 
confessions, demeanour and opportunity, it is seldom suggested 
that the jury lacks competence to comprehend it. 
Of course, these examples concern relatively accessible scient-
ific concepts, dependent for their ascertainment on fairly crude 
technologies or no technology at all. However, new techniques 
have taken these and other areas to previously unimaginable 
degrees of sophistication - for example, gas chromatography, 
micro-spectrophotometric analysis and infra-red examination. The 
more complex the scientific concept and the more technical the 
means of ascertaining or measuring a scientific fact, the less 
accessible it is to the average juror. Nevertheless, the point 
should once more be made that where such evidence is part of a 
more complete jigsaw of other evidence, the jury can comprehend 
its significance, as strikingly illustrated in the earlier 
Australian case of Bradley (Thorwald, 1966, 359-82). What 
should also be apparent is that high-quality forensic investig-
ation tends to lead to the discovery or disclosure of other, more 
accessible, evidence - confessions or physical evidence, for 
example. 
Difficulties tend to arise when forensic evidence is, to all 
intents and purposes, the sole evidence. These difficulties are 
compounded when such evidence is complex in its nature and in its 
mode of ascertainment. In such circumstances, not only jurors 
but also judges may become perplexed. The Victoria Law Reform 
Commission has encapsulated the issue: 
The elimination of juries would not solve the 
problem, however - judges are not necessarily well-
versed in matters of forensic medicine, nor immune 
from partisan persuasion of experts. (1985, 174-5.) 
This is resoundingly true. My own view is that in this area jury 
malfeasance is invariably a direct function of legal or 
scientific malfeasance. 
The popular media does not, of course, present the matter in 
quite this way. For example, a leading article about the 
Chamberlain case stated: 
In an age of mind-blowing technology, have lay 
juries in criminal cases become incompetent to 
judge any complex scientific issues? Or should 
expert jury panels be taking their place in the 
courtroom? (Northern Territory News, 15 February 
1986.) 
Again, an article in The Bulletin portrayed the jury as a group 
lured by the form rather than the substance of complex forensic 
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evidence, consumers in search of attractive packaging rather than 
content: 
Why was Boettcher's evidence [tending to exonerate 
the accused in the Chamberlain case] not accepted 
at the original trial? It is easy to see how his 
rather heavy academic style could bore a jury. He 
says that the jury was more impressed by the 
dramatic and more practised presentations of Kuhl 
and Cameron [Crown forensic witnesses]. (Abbott, 
1986.) 
In much the same way, a prominent article about the Splatt case, 
having referred to the fact that some jurors had publicly 
admitted that they did not understand the forensic evidence, went 
on to question the suitability of the jury system as such in 
cases of that sort. (Cockburn, 1984.) 
The issues are far broader than this. They include: the mode of 
presentation of forensic evidence; the present role and 
professionalism of forensic scientists in Australia; and the 
capacity of the legal profession (judges and counsel) to control 
and direct the evidence of forensic witnesses. It is only in the 
light of such factors that the question of jury competence can 
properly be addressed. 
a. Mode and presentation of forensic evidence 
In both the Splatt and the Chamberlain cases, key forensic 
witnesses seemed to take on the role of protagonist rather than 
that of dispassionate provider of scientific Information. To 
make this a point of criticism is not to deny that the trial 
procedure is, and should remain, adversarial in nature. Rather, 
it is to make the point that the adversarial edge is normally 
injected by counsel on each side, emphasising and probing the 
strengths and weaknesses of evidence. Broadly speaking, 
witnesses of other facts - even victim-witnesses - are 
constrained by procedural rules from identifying their own 
interests too overtly with any particular outcome. However, with 
expert witnesses the crucial difference is that traditionally 
they are permitted considerable latitude as to their opinion on 
facts in issue. Thus it is that their professional standing and 
reputation can themselves indirectly become an issue, at least in 
their own perception of proceedings. For a Crown forensic 
witness, the verdict of guilty may seem to be professional 
vindication and that of not guilty professional failure. Mutatis 
mutandis this may also be the case with forensic witnesses for 
the defence. (Kobus, 1986.) 
Of course, not all forensic scientists allow themselves to fall 
into this false dilemma. Indeed, it should be put on the record 
that the overwhelming majority discharge their functions as 
dispassionately as one can realistically hope for in human 
affairs. Nevertheless, the point is not fanciful. In the U.K. 
dozens of convictions, including murder convictions, have 
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recently had to be reviewed as the result of the discrediting of 
a Home Office forensic scientist, Dr Alan Clift. (Cockburn, 
1984; Phillips and Bowen, 1985.) In Australia a prominent 
trial lawyer has argued, on the basis of the van Beelen case and 
practices that have purportedly developed since then with regard 
to the presentation of forensic evidence, that no scientist 
should be permitted to express an opinion except in the 
rarest and most exceptional cases. (Abbott, 1985.) In the 
Splatt case the evidence of the dominant forensic witness was 
excoriated by the Royal Commissioner precisely because of 
its protagonist nature. (Shannon, 1984, 31-7.) 
The most striking example of all concerns the Chamberlain case. 
It will be recalled that there were two key elements without 
which, on any view, the prosecution case could not succeed. 
These were: first, that incisions in the baby's jump-suit could 
not have been made by dingo teeth and were indeed positively made 
by scissors; second, that the substance detected under the 
dashboard of the Chamberlain's car and in Mr Chamberlain's 
camera-bag was a mix of foetal and adult blood of a proportion 
appropriate to a nine and a half week old baby (i.e. approx-
imately 70:30). Each of these issues was, in the absence of any 
kind of direct evidence, exclusively forensic in nature. 
The principal witness for the first proposition was Professor 
James Cameron. He was a British expert whom the Crown had 
brought to Australia for the second inquest (which led to the 
laying of charges against the accused) and for the trial itself. 
Bryson (1985) has analysed Professor Cameron's evidence in 
detail, and there would be no further benefit in setting it out 
at length. There can be no real doubt on the basis of Bryson's 
analysis that Professor Cameron became at some stage and to some 
extent a protagonist for his own views as much as a dispassionate 
witness of scientific fact. Two examples of how this manifested 
itself will serve. 
First, Professor Cameron seemed to regard it as part of his task 
to play detective in relation to non-forensic evidence in the 
case. His report to the second inquest stated: 
On reading all the evidence, it would suggest that 
the last time the child was seen, by an independent 
observer, was 1530 hours on the day of the alleged 
disappearance of the child, although there is 
evidence given that the child moved, or was seen to 
be held by the mother. Nobody actually saw the 
child, apart from an alleged kicking motion seen at 
the barbecue site. (Bryson, 1985, 450.) 
To include such a statement in a forensic report seems to display 
some role confusion. This was exacerbated by the fact that the 
statement seems to have been erroneous in some key aspects. 
(Bryson, 1985, 450.) 
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Second, Professor Cameron some six months after the conclusion of 
the Chamberlain trial gave an address in England to the Royal 
Society of Medicine in which he again took on the role of one who 
had successfully participated in the process of detecting and 
convicting an offender. (Bryson, 452-4.) This is a quality 
which he had also displayed in an earlier English case, Confait, 
which had been the subject of an adverse comment at an Official 
Inquiry. (Fisher, 1977, para. 2.32.) 
The principal witness on the second key forensic issue - adult/ 
foetal blood - was Mrs Joy Kuhl, a biologist then employed by the 
New South Wales Health Commission. Apparently, one of the 
techniques available to identify the blood characteristics is to 
place a sample on a polyacrylamide gel and expose it to an 
electric current of a certain voltage. As the size of the 
molecules of adult and foetal blood are different, they separate 
under this treatment. The proportion of each can then be 
measured. According to notes made by Mrs Kuhl of this experi-
ment, the separation showed a 50:50 ratio - significantly too 
much foetal haemoglobin for a baby of 9-1/2 weeks. A second 
available technique is immunological in nature, measuring blood 
samples for reactions against anti-sera. The foetal and adult 
haemoglobin components should be able to be ascertained, this 
time by comparing the strength of the reaction with that caused 
by umbilical cord haemoglobin. Again, the results obtained 
seemed to show markedly too high a ratio of foetal blood. Yet 
the witness was not deflected from her conclusions. Bryson's 
analysis (1985, 428-32) suggests that the explanation for this 
lies in a degree of involvement which did not sit well with 
dispassionate presentation of objective fact. 
Of course, to a degree protagonism is inevitable. Its extent and 
form will vary with individual personalities. But the potential 
for protagonism is also systemic and structural, bound up with 
the extent to which forensic scientists work for, or closely in 
association with, crime investigation authorities. Scientists, 
like the rest of us, can get caught up in the excitement of the 
chase. Also, external pressure from investigators can sometimes 
be enormous, resulting even in the making of false reports. 
(Dibben, 1986.) 
b. Professional standards 
This issue is intertwined with that of courtroom conduct 
and attitudes, but relates more to pre-trial ethics. Both the 
Splatt and the Chamberlain cases seem to indicate ethical 
hiatuses within the forensic sciences professions or some parts 
thereof. 
To bring out the first example of this, let us consider the 
crudest of criminal investigation techniques - the identification 
parade. Under the general rubric of 'fairness', certain well-
known practices have been developed. If the description of a 
mugger is that he is about 20 years old, blonde and stocky, a 
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parade of the accused (broadly answering that description) and 
one other person of quite dissimilar appearance would be 
worthless as evidence. That is obvious enough; the circum-
stances unduly influence the witness in reaching a conclusion. 
Yet, fantastic as it may sound, practices akin to this were 
followed in the Splatt case with regard to forensic evidence. 
For what were sent off to the scientists in that case were 
samples 'in tandem' - one from the crime scene, the other from 
the accused's belongings - with a request to indicate whether 
they were similar to each other. The Royal Commissioner 
commented: 
It seems to me that what has just been described is 
a wrong procedure; and it is a dangerous one 
because of the serious risk of unconscious bias. 
(Shannon, 1984, 48.) 
Whilst the decision to send the material in tandem was not, of 
course, made by a forensic scientist but by the investigating 
officer, the point is that the scientists did not themselves 
regard the procedure as inappropriate or question it in any way. 
Quite the contrary; they fortified it by failing to bring out in 
their evidence the inherent limitations on its cogency. For 
example, crucial evidence concerned foam spicules found on the 
bedsheet beneath the victim's body; the question was whether 
these came from the car-coat of the accused. Forensic evidence 
presented to the court was that there were 'no dissimilarities' 
between foam spicules from the two sources. What was meant by 
this, it emerged at the Royal Commission, was that sufficient 
similarities were found to indicate that both samples were 
degraded polyurethane foam - a common enough substance in which 
potential points of dissimilarity were relatively few. The 
witness knew this but did not volunteer it at the trial, 
explaining later: 
I believe I answered the questions as best I could 
within the frame of the questions I was being 
asked. (Shannon, 1984, 53; see also 166.) 
Such an answer would be impeccable from an ordinary witness, 
confined strictly to matters of fact. But with an expert 
witness, possessing the privilege of ranging beyond fact to 
opinion, is there not a matching responsibility to put facts into 
full perspective, whether asked to do so or not? Does the 
profession as a whole not perceive this ethical issue and guide 
its members' conduct? The Royal Commissioner certainly 
considered that there was such a responsibility: 
Of course, in that context of question and answer, 
the primary responsibility must always remain with 
the scientist; because it is he who should know 
the nature and scope of his scientific analysis and 
the limitations and exceptions properly attachable 
to the results which he achieves. 
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Accordingly, in my view it is not properly open to 
a scientist ... to say: 'I answered correctly such 
questions as I was asked. If I had been asked 
others and more relevant questions I would also 
have answered them correctly. It is not my fault 
that the correct questions were not asked of me'. 
(Shannon, 1984, 52.) 
The issue, then, is that of the duty of the forensic witness to 
the court to ensure that his own evidence is presented conform-
ably with the dictates of justice. Integral to this is the 
question of disclosure to the defence of possibly exculpatory 
forensic facts discovered in the course of tests and also the 
question of preservation of material relied upon by Crown 
forensic witnesses. 
In Australia is must be said that the doctrine of the duty to 
disclose exculpatory evidence has been slow to develop. (Lane, 
1982.) To all intents and purposes, the matter is left to the 
discretion of the prosecutor which, in reality, often means to 
the police officer in overall charge of the investigation. In 
Splatt an exculpatory item of forensic evidence was positively 
suppressed by the Crown, epitomising both the protagonist role 
into which forensic witnesses can fall and a lack of clear 
ethical standards. (Shannon, 1984, 223.) 
In addition, forensic information - even though not thought to be 
positively exculpatory - may be withheld from the court despite 
the fact that its disclosure would tend to assist a proper 
evaluation of the total worth of evidence of that sort. This 
surely is because such evidence is thought of as 'belonging' to 
one of the adversaries. The most noteworthy recent example of 
this occurred in the Chamberlain case. 
It will be recalled that one of the tests used to try to 
determine the proportions of adult/foetal blood involved the use 
of anti-serums. The testing solution used by a defence forensic 
witness reacted in such an odd way as to raise suspicions that it 
might be defective. The question therefore arose: had the Crown 
witness used testing solution from the same batch of the same 
manufacturer? Such an eventuality was anything but fanciful 
given the highly specialised nature of the product and the very 
limited number of manufacturers. Before trial, the defence 
sought to ascertain the batch number from the Crown's forensic 
witness; she refused to answer the question one way or another. 
The pertinence of the question was subsequently highlighted by a 
manufacturer's admission that the defence batch was defective in 
a way which might cause it to react to a substance other than 
blood. What conceivable justification could there have been for 
refusal to supply this scientifically neutral information? It 
was only explicable in terms of a lack of proper ethics and 
guidelines within the profession. (Bryson, 1985, 426-7.) 
The most startling example of inadequate professional standards 
was, however, that of the destruction before trial of the test 
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plates upon which the Crown forensic witness had conducted each 
set of foetal haemoglobin experiments. The tests, it must be 
stressed, had been conducted for the purposes of the second 
inquest, i.e. at a time when the possibility of criminal charges 
would have been uppermost in people's thoughts. The evidence was 
the single most significant part of the Crown case. As Murphy J. 
stated in the High Court: 
The foetal blood was the hinge of the Crown's 
theory that the baby was murdered in the family car 
.... Once it is accepted that it was unsafe to 
conclude that there was foetal blood in the car, 
then the conviction of Mrs Chamberlain was unsafe. 
(1984, 51 A.L.R.271.) 
Although the majority in the High Court did not see this 
question as absolutely disposing of the issue, they nevertheless 
accorded it a high significance. In these circumstances, prudent 
professional conduct would surely have been to ensure that the 
most comprehensive evidence was available to the trial court, 
i.e. not just the Crown's records of forensic tests but also the 
defence's check analyses. The jury was entitled to the best 
evidence; in its absence arguments as to their competence to 
assess forensic evidence simply do not get to first base. Yet, 
apparently, professional standards as a whole would have regarded 
the destruction of the test plates as not unusual. In the United 
States, failure to preserve this evidence would have invalidated 
the trial. (Newman, 1975.) 
c. The role of the legal profession 
Do lawyers - counsel and the judiciary - possess the capacity to 
control and direct effectively the presentation of complex 
forensic evidence to the jury? If they fall short, the jury can 
hardly be expected to make good their deficiencies. 
The Splatt case Inexorably suggests that the input of lawyers is 
defective. Time and time again, the Royal Commission Report 
refers to a line of evidence which should never have been started 
and, once begun, should have been stopped; to the presentation 
of inferences or opinions that were not supportable by 
established forensic facts; and to misleading or inadequate 
summing-up. (Shannon, 1984, 39-40, 47, 175-6, 184, 186.) 
Mr Shannon does not throw individual brickbats on this account 
but rather looks for a systemic explanation: 
The Trial, as it was conducted, represented an 
encounter of the closest possible nature between two 
systems, or disciplines: the discipline of Law and 
the discipline of Science. It is my opinion that 
from this encounter neither discipline escaped 
unscathed; they both bear the scars of that 
encounter. This was a very unusual ... case; 
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there are aspects of the Trial and of the evidence 
and of the presentation of such evidence to the jury 
with which neither the discipline of Law nor the 
discipline of Science managed successfully to cope. 
(Shannon, 1984, 29.) 
It was decidedly not the jury system as such which let the 
criminal justice process down: 
Such defects as may have occurred were ... defects 
arising from that particular encounter between the 
legal system and the scientific system .... If the 
jury system is to be maintained [in such cases], 
and in my opinion it should be so, the machinery of 
assisting the jury to reach a correct verdict on 
the evidence needs considerable change and improve-
ment. (Shannon, 1984, 51.) 
This could be the epitaph also for the van Beelen and Chamberlain 
cases. It makes a constructive launching point for discussion of 
possible procedural reforms in this area. 
d. Procedural reforms 
First, reforms should be made which parallel those discussed for 
complex fraud cases by the Roskill Committee and the New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission (1986, paras 6.28, 10.6 to 10.1^.) 
Their objective would be to enable issues to be identified and 
participants to become familiar with complex factual matters 
before the helter-skelter of the trial process commences. Such 
weaknesses in the performance of judge and counsel as were 
documented by Shannon might thus be able to be minimised. (The 
Victoria Law Reform Commission's suggestion that judges should be 
trained to handle forensic matters also possesses some merit in 
principle : 1985, 177, 179-80.) In addition, each side would 
outline its forensic evidence, summaries could be prepared, mode 
of presentation agreed upon, and preliminary arguments as to 
admissibility settled. These proposals would conform with the 
spirit of resolutions passed by the Royal College of Pathologists 
and the British Association of Forensic Medicine in 1980 
deploring the use of forensic evidence in legal proceedings. 
(Phillips and Bowen, 1985.) 
Consideration should also be given to going rather further than 
has been suggested for complex fraud cases by empowering the 
trial judge to require that additional forensic evidence should 
be obtained for the benefit of the court with regard to any 
matter which he considered required further clarification. This 
is a radical suggestion, departing in spirit from the strong 
common law tradition that the court itself has no power to 
compel any particular evidence to be led. (Skubevski, 1977, 
2 C.L.J.73-5.) However, there are precedents at the pre-trial 
stage (regarding the issue of fitness to plead, inquiry into 
which may be activated by the trial judge) and at the post-trial 
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stage (regarding pre-sentence reports to assist the court). 
Being highly exceptional, this procedure could be made workable 
without imposing undue tension upon the adversarial philosophy. 
A further reform which should be considered is the development of 
prosecutorial guidelines with regard to the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence generally and the preservation of forensic 
evidence until the conclusion of trial and appellate processes. 
At the Federal level, the Director of Public Prosecutions has 
already published general guidelines relating to prosecutorial 
practices and discretion. (Temby, 1986b.) It is certainly 
within his Office's authority to develop guidelines in this and 
other areas - for example, jury selection procedures, search 
warrants and their execution and the role of the prosecutor in 
the sentencing process. Appropriate administrative guidelines 
would bring fairness into this area more rapidly than is likely 
to be achieved by the development of judicial precedent. They 
might also be a model for comparable State developments. 
COMPLEX CASES 
Not all commercial fraud cases or trials involving forensic 
evidence are complex; and not all complex cases involve 
commercial fraud or forensic issues. To the extent that the 
category of complex cases is a distinct one, what is normally 
contemplated is excessively long cases. To take a topical 
example, it is suggested that the 'Bikies Shoot-out Trial' in New 
South Wales, involving more than thirty defendants charged with a 
series of offences arising out of a single incident, may last for 
a year or even two years. 
Doubtless, the complexity - in the sense of massive detail - of 
cases such as this would throw an intolerable burden on to the 
powers of concentration of any jury. But that, it seems to me, 
is not the most serious concern. Rather, it is the sheer 
imposition upon the lives of ordinary citizens. If the lifeblood 
of the jury system is that citizen-participation is the epitome 
of a free society, we must not ignore the freedom of jurors. No 
one should be expected to devote two per cent or possibly four 
per cent of his or her adult life to involuntary participation in 
the criminal process. This turns the notion of freedom on its 
head. What should be done, then? Prosecution authorities simply 
have to do better, in my view. More thought should be given to 
splitting trials, isolating issues and presenting evidence in a 
more economical way. For example, defendants charged merely with 
making an affray could have been dropped off the main presentment 
and tried separately; so too could defendants from one side of 
the battle have been tried separately from those on the other 
side. The issue of splitting trials has traditionally been 
litigated in terms of whether the accused is likely to be prejud-
iced by the joinder of counts; but it is time the criterion was 
developed of whether the administration of criminal justice 
generally is likely to be prejudiced. This could be done, once 
more, through the development of prosecutorial guidelines or by 
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way of judicial jurisdiction over abuse of process. Clearly, 
such trials do impact negatively upon the acceptability of the 
criminal justice system to the community generally and to the key 
participants in that system - jurors. 
Apart from this, the residual category of complex cases raise 
identical issues to those already discussed. No case of jury 
incompetence has been made out. Quite the contrary: where cases 
are presented properly and judge and counsel play their parts 
effectively, juries are able to cope with whatever comes their 
way. All Australian jurisdictions permit appeal against a 
verdict of guilty on the basis that such verdict was unreasonable 
or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence - i.e. that 
the jury got it wrong. Appeals on this basis alone are 
extremely uncommon, and they very rarely succeed. By contrast, 
appeals on the basis of a misdirection of law are relatively 
commonplace, and it is on this basis that verdicts are most often 
quashed. In Chamberlain (1984, 51 A.L.R.225) an appeal on the 
basis that the verdict could not be supported on the evidence was 
lost by a bare majority (3:2), as had been the case in the Full 
Court of the Federal Courts (2:1). As we have seen, however, 
that case did not involve idiosyncratic jury behaviour so much as 
skewed presentation of forensic evidence. In the Splatt case, 
where the Royal Commisson finding was that the verdict could not 
be sustained, there was no question of jury idiosyncracy or 
bloody-mindedness but rather skewed forensic evidence and legal 
non-feasance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The media debate about supposed jury incompetence in Australia 
has been rather ill-informed. Perhaps that is in part due to 
failure by the legal profession to explain the operation of the 
jury system adequately. Fortunately, ballast has now been 
restored by sober and scholarly analyses, based on empirical 
research, by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (1985; 
1986), the Victoria Law Reform Commission (1985), the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (1986), the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(1986 a), Vodanovich (1986) and many others. 
Attacks on the jury at its most vulnerable point - sitting in 
cases which are difficult to comprehend - would, if successful, 
begin to de-legitimise jury trial as such. This paper demon-
strates that such attacks will not stand up. That being so, not 
only is there no case for further erosion of the jury system but 
also there is a positive case for strengthening and possibly 
extending it. A blueprint for doing so would be the recent 
recommendations of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
(1986), which range from such questions as jury comfort and 
dignity through the question of eligibility and randomness to 
matters of jury protection, prejudicial pre-trial publicity and 
privacy. 
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Of course, when all the mechanical, logistical and technocratic 
arguments are stripped away, a discussion of the jury system is a 
discussion of the relationship between the citizen and the State. 
E.P. Thompson (1980, 108) has put it as follows: 
In my books, the ... common law rests upon a 
bargain between the Law and the people. The jury 
box is where the people come into the court: the 
judge watches them and the jury watches back. A 
jury is the place where the bargain is struck. The 
jury attends in judgment not only upon the accused, 
but also upon the justice and humanity of the law. 
In Australia we must ensure that ' the bargain continues to be 
struck1 in the daily operation of the criminal justice system. 
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I 
PRESERVING THE JURY 
A COMMENTARY ON PROFESSOR HARDING'S PAPER 
Mr Ian Temby Q.C. 
Director of Public Prosecutions 
Canberra 
My comments principally relate to the paper which was 
written by Professor Harding. I refer to the paper that was 
written, rather than what he said relative to it this morning, 
because my chief interest is in relation to major fraud trials. 
Now, as will be clear to those who have read the paper, I am a 
strong proponent of the jury system for reasons which have been 
stated by persons more eloquent than myself, the principal of 
those reasons being that the jury represents a deeply democratic 
institution of the law. As our chairman just said in effect: 
it can not be good enough to leave it to the lawyers and the 
judges, who might be described as the witch doctors of the 
system, to decide what content the system should have. The law 
belongs to the people not to the practitioners, it is the 
people's rights which are paramount, and the jury represents a 
very important part of these rights, I am accordingly very 
reluctant to see any suggestion that juries should be done away 
with. I think the case for the proposition that juries cannot be 
relied upon to handle major fraud trials is certainly not proven. 
Professor Harding, in his paper, refers at some length and with 
appropriate disparagement, to the recommendations of the Roskill 
Committee. What he does not say is that the members of that 
committee, almost necessarily, did not know what they were 
talking about, because in England they do not handle major fraud 
trials. There are practically no charges laid for defrauding the 
revenue in the guise of the taxation authorities in England. What 
they do is reach compromises, which means that people buy their 
way out, they compound the prosecution as a matter of conscious 
policy and there is far more prosecution of major fraud in this 
small country than there is in the United Kingdom as a whole. 
They have simply not been prepared to try and see if major fraud 
trials can be conducted in England, and they do not have the 
basic experience of the work problems. 
As to the suggestion that juries should be dispensed with in this 
or, indeed in any other area, there are two main 
points. One which Professor Harding made is that before you go 
down that road you should do everything possible to make the 
criminal trial process one which a jury can handle. There is 
a very great deal to be done in that regard by simplifying 
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procedures, by simplifying the laws of evidence which will 
shorten and simplify jury trials and make what happens 
comprehensible to the jury. Manifestly at the moment it 
frequently is not. 
There is also quite a lot that can be done by prosecutors and 
I think that we, at federal level, are heading in the right 
direction. There is a great deal one can do in in presenting a 
case, even a complex case, before a jury so as to make it fairly 
readily comprehensible despite the most archaic rules we have as 
to procedure and evidence. 
The second point is that if you reach the conclusion in a 
particular area, whether it be cases involving forensic evidence, 
or major fraud trials, or any other area, that the jury should be 
dispensed with, then there must be a trade-off in terms of 
maximum penalty. Now, we accept with relative equanimity 
magistrates sending people to prison for a year, a couple of 
years, in some jurisdictions for three years, and nobody seems to 
too fussed about that. The proposition that a magistrate, or 
indeed any non-jury tribunal should send somebody to prison for 
life, is one which I think most of us, perhaps everyone this 
room, would reject as being inappropriate. If the authorities 
decide and the parliaments decide that major fraud trials can not 
be handled by juries and that the jury must be dispensed with, 
then they must be prepared to trade-off against that lower 
penalties, so the offence of defrauding the revenue attracts 
relatively, a low maximum penalty (up to perhaps three years 
imprisonment). I would urge that you can not have non-jury trials 
and potentially heavy penalties at the end of the day. 
Could I finally, Mr Chairman, make a couple of broader comments 
with respect to juries. Professor Sheehan suggested yesterday 
that the institution of the jury has imperfections, that jurors 
are not terribly good at confidently finding the truth on 
the evidence before them. As he pointed out that is a difficult 
deed which all of us share to a significant extent, although 
perhaps to a slightly varying extent. And as he also pointed out, 
although the game might not be perfectly straight, it is the best 
game in town and that is a proposition with which I would wish to 
join. 
If one looks on the jury as a final filter designed to get rid of 
weak cases not previously filtered out of the system, and if it 
be remembered that juries inject nothing more valuable than their 
collective common sense, then it seems to me there is no cause to 
be alarmed if it transpires as a result of experimentation that 
individual jurors do not remember fully or understand perfectly 
everything they have heard during the course of the trial 
process. Indeed I would urge upon you the analogy of the jury as 
a final filter; the system has a whole series of filters built in 
which are designed to chop out the weak cases. One starts with 
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a couple of police decisions whether to investigate, whether to 
charge rather than warn. Then there is a series of decisions, 
some of which the prosecutors have to make, as to whether the 
case should be pursued or abandoned, prior to committal and post 
committal, and of course a series of decisions which courts have 
to make. 
Each of those filters is designed to get rid of the 
unpromising or weak cases and on that basis the jury may be 
looked upon as the final filter. 
Finally, could I make a brief comment about the suggestion we 
have heard from more than one quarter in recent times that the 
over-zealous prosecutor represents a danger to the community. I 
would have thought that that was a blindingly obvious 
proposition. No head of a prosecution service would claim 
infallibility for all of those who work for him or her or are 
retained by him or her. Human institutions are by definition 
imperfect. But any student of history would know that at almost 
all prior times prosecutors have been less fair, have been more 
savage, if you like, than is the case in this country presently. 
If you think about the way in which the legal system operates in 
most other parts of the wrld, I think the same could be said 
about almost all parts of the world compared to Australia. Look 
at our cousins in America, I would wish to applaud our 
prosecution system enormously compared to the system that 
prevails in all parts of the United States. If some prosecutors 
occasionally lapse into impropriety there are adequate safeguards 
which are immediately available. 
It must be remembered that what we do is done in open court, and 
that judges are not loath to criticise either unfairness or 
inefficiency. Everything we do, unless it is a decision not to 
proceed, ultimately finishes up in court. The courts are open. 
The judges are there with a clear charter, amongst other things, 
to look after the interests of accused persons and to ensure that 
fairness is accorded to accused persons. They are not reluctant 
to criticise. It is heartening that, at least at Commonwealth 
level, such criticism has occurred with very great rarity, at 
least over the two years plus that I have occupied my present 
position. 
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